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U.B.C. LIBRARY
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THE
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RARY
THE UNIVERSITY OF
BRITISH COLUMBIA
Gi/t
Thomas Farrell
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CONFIDENTIAL. Serial Vo. VJ2
OPERATIONS
IN
WAZIRISTAN
1919-1920
Catalogue No. C. W. 4. 4^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^' ^^^"^ ^' ^
Compiled by the General Staff
Army Headquarters
India.
1921,
CALCUTTA
SUPERINTENDENT GOVERNMENT PRINTING, INDIA
1051
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2010 with funding from
University of British Columbia Library
http://www.archive.org/details/operationsinwazOOindi
CONTENTS.
Page.
Glossary ........... ix
CHAPTER I.
Introductory.
Geographical — Inhabitants — Characteristics of Mahsuds and Wazirs. —
Blood feuds. — Fanaticism. — Lack of unity between Mahsuds and
Wazirs. — Fighting strength and armaments. — Tactics of tribesmen . 1
CHAPTER 11.
Political.
Afghan claims to Waziristan 1884-92. — Policy of British Government
1892. — Opening of Gomal route 1890. — Tribal allowances. — Durand
Agreement 1893. — Occupation of Wana 1893. — The Mullah Powindah.
— Reconsideration of Policy after signing of Durand Agreement. —
Occupation of the Tochi Valley 1894. — Formation of Tribal Militias. —
Policy in 1899. — Breakdown of Policy during Afghan War 1919. —
Present Policy .......... 7
CHAPTER III.
OPERATION'S AGAINST THE WaZIRISTAN TRIBES PREVIOUS TO 1914.
Operations against Mahsuds 1860. — Attack on Palosina Camp 22nd-
23rd April, — Action of Barari Tangi, 2nd May. — Mahsud Blockade
1879. — Operations against Mahsuds 1881. — Afghan intrigues 1892. —
Boundary intrigues 1892. — Boundary Commission 1894. — Attack on
camp by Mullah Powindah. — Punitive Operations 1894. — Attack on
Political officers escort Upper Tochi 1897. — Mahsud Blockade 1900-
01. — Expedition against Kabul Khel Wazirs 1902 . . . . 'l'^
CHAPTER IV.
Operations against Waziristan tribes between 4th August 1914
AND 11th June 1917.
Incursions by Afghan tribesmen 1914-15. — Attitude of Mahsuds 1914-
17. — Mahsuds situation at beginning of 1917. — Negotiations with
Mahsuds. — Attack on Sarwakai Post in March. — Route to Wana
cleared by moveable column. — Attack in the Gwalerai Algad 1st •
May. — Attack on Tormandu Post, 6th May. — Action near Palosi
Ziarat, 9th May. — Punitive operations sanctioned. — Attack near Chota
Gwalerai Pass, 16th Ma3\ — Proposed plan of operations. — Comparison
of Gomal and Shahur routes. — Gomal posts rationed. — Attitude of
the Amir. — Capture of Tut Narai Post, 31st May. — Distribution of
troops in the Tochi. — Attack on piquetting party near Khirgi 7th
June ............ 30
CHAPTER V.
Operations in the Shahur and Khaisara valleys between 12th
June and 17th August 1917.
Preliminary reconnaissance from Jandola. — Passage of Shahur Tangi,
14th and 15th June. — Advance to Barwand 19th June. — Attack on
( iii )
{ iv )
Page.
piquet Barwand, 19th June— Attack on Xanu Villa^'c, 21st June. —
first ovci-tures for jx^ace. — Situation on 22n(l Junr. — Advance to
Narai llaL'hza, 23rd June. — Action near Sluawanai Pass. 24th June. —
Arrival of j^eace emissaries. — Withdrawal to Ispana Kaghza. — Value
of Aeroplanes. — Terms given to Mahsuds. — Hostilities suspended, 27th
June. — Mahsud hostages and surrender of rifles. — Withdrawal to
Manzal. — Full jirga interviewed at Sarwakai, lOth August. — Terms
coinplie<l with. — Peace announced, and force returns to Jandola. —
Climatic conditions and health of troops ...... 49
CHAPTER VI.
Events leadinc; up to Campaign 1919-20.
Plan of campaign in Waziristan during Afghan War 1919. — Situation
in North Waziristan May 1919. — Evacuation of Upper Tochi Posts
23rd May. — Withdrawal of garrisons of Spinwam and Shewa, 24th and
2oth May. — Situation in Miranshah. — Attitude of Northern Waziristan
Militia. — Attacks on Tochi Posts. — Situation in South Waziristan in
May. — Attitude of Southern Waziristan Militia. — Evacuation of the.
Wana Agency in May. — Situation in the Tochi at end of May. —
Attitude of Mahsuds. — Formation of Tochi Relief Column, 30th May. —
Tochi Posts relieved. — Punitive measures against Lower Daurs. —
Situation in the Derajat. — Relief of Jandola 9th June. — Afghans in
Wana. — Raid on Drazinda, 11th June. — Preparations for an advance
into Khost. — Attack on Bannu aerodrome, 14th July. — Attacks on
road piquets in the Tochi, July and August. — Action at Zarkani, 19th
September. — Actions near Manjhi October. — Air raid on Wana, 9th
October. — Attacks on convoys near Girni and Khajuri, 21st October.
— Maliks visit Kabul. — Summary of offences by Mahsuds and Wazirs
May to November 1919. — Necessity for punitive operations. — Factors
governing policy to be adopted. — Policy decided on. — Terms to
Wazirs and Mahsuds. — Measures taken on sanction of operations . 03
CHAPTER VII.
Operations of the Tochi Column.
Distribution of trooj>s November 1919. — Concentration of Tochi Column.
Kth November. — Advance to Datta Khel 12th November. — Tochi
Wazirs accept our terms, 17th November. — Mahsuds reject terms Uth
Noveml>er.— Withdrawal of Tochi Column to Dardoni, 2()t}i November.
— Troops transferred and JJerajat Column formed .... SO
CHAl'TKR \III.
Ol'EHATlONS OF THE DeKAJAT (AjU MN. - KlKST PHASE.
FactorH governing choice of Takki Zam route. — Measures adoj)ted to
wcure L. of C we«t of Khirgi. l^reliminary preparations for advance
over Spinkai Raghza lltli-13th December. Air Operations.—
Ki^uipment of Deraj.it Column.-- Strength and arnuiment of opposing
force«j.--Heiid«juarterH of Derajat Coluiiin moves to Jandola. —
Attack on pirjuetM at .landola. 17th December. .Vdvanee to Palosina.
18th lX»ceml>er. — Dewription of country round Mandaiuwi Hill. —
A<tion near Mandanna Hill. IfMli hecriidM-r. Operations to establish
piquet on .Mandannu Hill, 20th |)eecmb<r. Operations to estaltlish
piquet on Jilack Hill, 21«t DtKiemljcr. — Pernument picjuet eHtablished
on HIack Hill 22nd December. Negotiations for sett lenient. Jirga
at Jandola, 29th Defirnber. Original terms enhaii'eil. Submission
of .MalikM. — Knd of firMt phanc ....... '.l2
J
Facie
CHAPTER IX.
Operations of the Derajat Column. — Second phase.
Advance to Kotkai, 29th Docember. — Action near Kotkai, 2n(l January
1920. — Preliminary operations for eaj)tuio of Ahnai Tangi. — Unsuc-
cessful attempts to establish strong-point S.E. of Zeriwam, 9th and
10th January. — Capture of Ahnai Tangi, 11th January. — Advance
through Ahnai Tangi 14tli January. — Operations at Asa Khan, 14th
January. — Co-opeiation of Royal Air Force. — Importance of training
as shown by Asa Khan operations. — Dispersal of lashkar. — Advance to
Soraroglia, ISth January. — Aerodrome formed at .Sorarogha. — End
of second phase ... ......
CHAPTER X.
Operations of the Derajat Column. — The advance to Piazha
Raghza.
Afghan intrigues. — Description of Barari Tangi. — Preparations for the
advance through Barari Tangi. — Capture of Barari Tangi, 28th
January. — Camp at Ahmadwam. — Afghan guns in action against
our troops. — Advance to Aka Khel, 1st February. — Advance to Janjal,
3rd and 5th ^ebruar^^ — Camp at Piazha Raghza. — Punitive opera-
tions and preparation for advance to Makin . . .
CHAPTER XL
The advance to Makin and Kaniguram.
Advance to Marobi, loth February-. — Advance to Tauda Chma, 16th
Februaiy. — Punitive operations in Makin area 19th-28th Februar3\ —
Losses from surprise. — Settlement by Umar Khel section to save
their property. — Destruction of Marobi, 29th February. — Evacuation
of Makin. — Preparations for advance on Kaniguram. — Surrender of
rifles to save Kaniguram. — Difficulties of Maliks in collecting rifles. —
Advance to Ladha, 3rd March. — Column arrives Kaniguram, 6th
March. — ^Attitude of Mahsuds. — Punitive operations up Baddar Toi to
Giga Khel, 6th to 8th April. — Active operations cease, 7th May
103
122
132
CHAPTER XXL
Lessons of the Campaign
145
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.
H. H. the Commander-in-Chief and Maj.-Genl. Climo ... 1
Plate No. 1. Khirgi concentration camp (looking east) ... 93
„ „ 2. Showing nature of country between Khirgi and Jandola . 96
„ „ 3. Caves near Sorarogha camp showing how tribesmen could
be perfectly safe during air raids .... 83
„ „ 4. Jandola camp (looking east) . . . . . 98
,t „ 5. Palosina camp (looking south west) .... 99
„ „ 6. Looking south west from Spinkai Ghash ridge showing
country over which actions in vicinity of Mandanna
Hill took place ........ 101
„ „ 7. Kotkai camp (looking north west) ..... 109
„ „ 8. Ahnai Tangi (down stream entrance) . . . . Ill
„ „ 9. Transport parked preparatory to advance through Ahnai
Tangi IIL
( VI )
Plu^e No. 10. Asa Khan camp from Flathead Left
„ „ 11. Sorarogha camp and plain lookinjz north-north east .
„ „ 12. Sorarogha aerodrome ......
„ „ 13. Southern entrance to Barari Tangi
„ „ 14. No. (5 Mountain Battery R. G. A. (3*7 howitzers) in action
on Sorarogha plateau. .....
„ ,, lo. Gibraltar Hill from Ahmadwam Ziarat .
„ ,, ]•>. Ahmadwam camp from Barrier Left
„ ,, 17. View looking south west from Barrier Middle .
„ „ \$. The frozen Takki Zam at Piazha on 6th February 1920
,, ,, 19. Piazha Kaghza camp from Mira village .
„ „ 20. Marobi camp (looking north-west) ....
„ „ 21. Makin (looking north-west) . . . . * .
,, ,, 22. Dwa Toi camp (looking south-west)
,, ,, 2.3. Surrender of Mahsud rifles at Tauda China
,, „ 24. Ladha first camp (looking north-east)
,, „ 25. Kaniguram first camp showing village in background
(looking north-west) ......
,, ,, 20. Kaniguram first camp under snow ....
„ ,, 27. Kaniguram second camp (looking north)
„ „ 28. Jirga at Kaniguram 21st March 1920
„ „ 29. Jirga at Kaniguram 21st March 1920
„ ,, 30. Oblique photograph showing country in vicinity of Kani
guram . . . .
„ ,: 31. Vertical photograph showing entrance to Shahur Tangi
Page.
117
119
120
122
123
12()
126
128
130
131
133
13.5
139
140
141
142
143
143
144
144
145
49
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
J.
K
L.
APPENDICES.
Order of Battle, South Waziristan Field Force 1917 . . . 152
Striking Column, South Waziristan Field Force 1917 . . !54
Statement showing casualties from 10th May to 15th July 1917 . 157
Distribution of trooj)S in Waziristan, Oth May 1919 . . . 158
Terms announced to the Wazirs and Mahsuds 1919 . . 159
Comf>osition of Tochi Column, 13th November 1919 . . . 102
Troops comprising Waziristan Force 1919-1920 .... '63
Troops at action of Asa Khan, 14th January 1920 . . . 171
Statement showing raKualtifH in Wa/iristan Imucc from October
1919 to May 1920 i72
Stat4-ment showing easualties in Derajat Colunni from lllh De-
cember 1919 to 8th April 1920 173
Orj(anizati<;n and working of the Line-i ul Communication . . 174
.Main sub-DivisionB of Wazirs and Mahsuds . . . 18('»
LIST OF MAPS
hk' t<h at < amp U ana ........
No. 1. Map illu^trating riperationn in vicinity of .Maiidanna Ka<h
21
101
( vii )
No. 2. Map iUustrating operations in vicini
No. 3. Map illustrating operations in vicini
No. 4. General Map of Waziristan .
No. 5. New 1" Survey of Takki Zam
No. 6. Sketch Map of Waziristan
ty of Ahnai Tangi
ty of Barari Tang^
}
Paok.
113
ur)
In pocket
at end of
book.
LIST OF PANORAMAS.
No. 1. Sarkai Ridge from Jandola
No. 2. Pioneer Piquet from Spinkai Ridge .
No. 3. View from Kotkai Camj)
No. 4. Ahnai Tangi from Double Hill Piquet
No. 5. Barari Tangi from Sorarogha Camp .
No. 6. Baddar Toi Valley from St. Mark's Piquet
No. 7. Upper Badder Toi Valley
No. S. Scene of Action at Giga Khei
99
103
113
115
123
143
143
143
GLOSSARY.
AUjad. — Watercourse.
Badmash. — A blackguard.
Badraga. — Safe-conduct ; tribal escort.
Bahlr. — A trading caravan.
Band. — A dam.
Baramta. — A forcible seizure, by way of reprisal.
Barani. — Cultivated land dependent on rain. Also called lalmi.
Bhusa. — Chopped straw or chaff. Waziri Pushtu — Pir or Pror.
Chahveshii.— Tribal " Whippers in."—" Special Conetahle.^:''
Chigha. — A pursuit party. ^
China. — A spring ; fountain.
Chittai (chaitai). — Course matting, usuallj' made of dwarf palm (mazrai) Wazirs
call it Beza.
Daman. — Plain country on the skirts of the hills.
Dara. — A pass.
Gasht. — A patrol.
Ghar. — A mountain peak.
Ghazi. — A Mussalman who devotes his life to killing an infidel, or fighting Kafirs.
The title is no longer used officially, and its assumption by fanatical murdeiers
is disapproved by respectable Mussalmans.
Ghundai. — A knoll.
Jiliad. — A Muhammadan religious war ; equivalent to a crusade.
Jirga^ — An assembly of tribal representatives or elders (maliks).
Kach. — An alluvial flat on the bank of a stream.
Kafila. — A caravan ; trading convoy.
Karez. — An irrigation- channel, frequently bored through hillsides.
Kais.—See Kach.
Kkarif. — The autumn crop.
Khassadar. — An Afghan militiaman or levy.
Kirri. — An encampment of nomads.
Khwar. — {Khwara, Tchor). — A ravine.
Koi. — A walled village.
Lashkar. — A tribal gathering of over 200 fighting men ; used as an exaggeration
of the numbers of a raiding gang.
Malik: — Master ; elder ; tribal representative.
Mullah. — One learned (or reputed to be so) in the Muhammadan scriptures-
Narai. — A col or kotal ; a pass.
Nakhtar (Nashtar). — Blue pine {pinus excelsa).
O&a.— Water.
Palosi. — Babul ; acacia tree.
Pir. — A saint.
Powindah. — A nomad.
Punga. — Upland glade, or patch of grazing ground.
Raghza {Rogha). — A plateau on the edge of a valley.
( ix )
( X )
Sangar.Stone breast-work.
5ar.— Head, peak.
Sur.—ifem. 5ra).— Red.
Shariat.— The Muhamnia<lau law as set forth in the Quran.
Shin —(fern. Shna).— Green.
Spin.— White.
Tangi.—A defile ; gorge.
Taud. — Warm.
Xoi. — A stream.
Tor.— Black.
T serai. — Holly oak.
Tuman.—The common people, as opposed to the maiiks.
Warn {wcm).—W&zm term of kats iq.v.).
Warsak. — A spur of a hill.
Wuch {Uch).— Bry.
Wuna. — A tree.
-Ziarat.—A -hrine.
I. HE. SIR CHARLES C. MUNRO, G.C.B., G.CS.I., G.C.M.C,
C.-IN-C. IN INDIA.
2 MAJOR GENERAL S. H. CLIMO, C.B., D.S.O., COMMANDING
WAZIRISTAN FORCE.
l'lM>iii-«-n'rniVfi| .v pniiiiil at iin (tni(i)> >it die Siii'\i > >>r Imliit, ('iilniiiit, lo'.'i
OPERATIONS IN WAZIEISTAN
19] 9-1920.
CHAPTER I.
.Introductory.
AVaziristan lies on the western border of the Indian Empire,
and forms the connecting link on the Afghan
eograpuca. frontier between the districts of KmTam
and Zhob. For political and administrative purposes it is
divided into Northern and Southern Waziristan, its shape
resembling a rough parallelogram, 5,000 square miles in
extent, practically the whole of which is a tangled mass of
mountains and hills of every size, shape, and bearing. At
first sight the mountains appear to run irregularly in all direc-
tions, but a study of the map will show that there are well
defined ranges protecting the interior of the country and
making penetration into it a matter of extreme difficulty.
The general trend of the main water-courses is from west
to east, and the country gradually rises by a series of parallel
Tanges from the Derajat plain to the watershed which divides
the basin of the Indus from that of the Helmand. The streams
Tary greatly in width and are generally flanked throughout
their length by high hills, but occasionally these narrow valleys
open out and cultivation takes the place of rocks and stones.
Here and there, by cutting through ranges of hills at right
angles to their courses, they have formed gorges which are
locally known as * tangis ' and these are usually held by the
tribesmen to oppose an enemy's advance. The beds of the
ivatercourses are thickly strewn with stones and boulders.
Jn dry weather a stream of water usually trickles down them,
and has to be crossed and recrossed frequently ; but after
rain they fill very rapidly, and become dangerous torrents.
The two chief highways of Waziristan are the Tochi and
the Gomal Valleys, the former giving access from the Bannu
district to the Afghan district of Birmal, and the latter con-
necting the two British districts of Derajat and Zhob, and
forming the principal route used by Powindah caravans in
their annual migration from ^Afghanistan to India. There
are no ^voll-delined h^teral communis aliens between the Tochi
and Gonial Vallevs, but the following routes are possible
alignments for metalled roads : —
((/) Datta Khel to Wana, via Shawal-Dhana.
(b) patta Kliel to Wana or Jandola, via Tot Narai-
i^azpni-Razmak, ^lakin and thence either, (i) via
Kajiiguram — Lare Lar to Wana : or (//) via Tank
Zam to Jandola and thence via Shahur Tangi and
Sarwaka to Wana.
(r) (Continuation of Thal-Idak road) Idak to Wana or
Jandola, vici Star Sarobi-Upper Khaisora Valley
to Razani and thence as in (b).
(d) Wana, via Spin to Khajuri Kach and thence down
Gonial to Murtaza.
AVaziristan is essentially a barren country, and the poorness
of the soil has hitherto proved an insuper-
able obstacle to a large increase in the
population. Tlie chief inhabitants are the Darwesh Khel
Wazirs, the ^lahsuds, the Daurs, and the Bhittannis. The
t\vo last named tribes can be dismissed in a few words. The
Daurs inhabit the banks of the Tochi River from Ghazlarnai
village to Khajuri Post, and are rejnited to be morally tlie
lowest of the Afghan races. Nevertheless they are diligent,
hardworking, and patient cultivators, and, though unwarlike
by nature, have often resisted successfully attempts by tlieir
neighbours to oust them from their rich lands.
The Bhittannis are a tribe inhabiting the borders of the
Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu districts and who dwell partly
in independent territory. TIk^ inde))endent Bhittannis though
hereditary enemies of the Mahsuds have more than once
foregone their time-honoured feud, and combined with their
more warlike and ra])acious neighbours in attacks and niids
in British territory. Now, however, they have [)ractically
identili(»(l themselves with J^rilish ijiteresis and U)v some
yeais have jKjt given seri^uis tiouiilc.
Tradition, the tiuth ot which is \ciy doubt liil, assigns ;i
common origiii to the Daiwesii Iviiel Wazirs and Alahsuds.
but the name Wazir i8a|)j)lie(l exclusively to the former branch.
The original honie of the \\'aziis and Mahsuds is said to
have Vjcen in the Afghaii bolder district of liirmal and that
these races began to move eastward at the clos" of the i4t!i
century, first occupying tlie area north of the Tochi river and
then spreading southward to the Gonial.
*The Wazirs are hxrgely a nomadic race and have compara-
tively few permanent villages or settlements. TJiey are
divided into two main classes, the Utmanzaif and the Ahmad-
zai.J The former occupy the Tochi Valley and areas adjoining
it, moving up to the higher hills in the summer and I'eturning
in the winter to the foothills and valleys. The majority of
the Ahmadzai migrate every autumn with their flocks to the
grazing lands on the western borders of the Bannu District,
returning in the spring to their summer settlements in the
W:ina and Shakai plains.
The three main branches of the Mahsuds are the Alizai,
Shaman Khel, and Bahlolzai, each of which is sub-divided
into numerous sections and sub-sections. The settlemeiits
of these sections are so greatly intermixed that it is impossible
to define clearly the localities occupied by the main branches
•of the tribe. As a result of this intermingling, sectional feuds
ar.e almost unknown and therefore in dealing w^ith the Mahsuds,
the possibility of a combination of all the sections against a
common foe must always be considered.
Relying on the inaccessibility of their country, the Waziris-
taii tribes have for centuries defied the
Ma?suds1ltwazirs. "^ P^^^'^r of the rulers of India and Afghanistan,
and on more than one occasion in the past
they engaged and defeated the invading armies of the Moghuls.
Their character, organization and instincts have made them
independent and strongly democratic, so much so that even
their own maliks (or elders) have little real control over the
unruly spirits. Any man may rise by courage and wisdom to
the position of Malik, but many who have attempted an
undue assumption of authority have been assassinated. True
sons of Esau, the Waziristan tribesmen carry their lives in
their hands and finding that the natural resources of their
country do not favour them enough, they eke out their exis-
tence by plundering their more peaceful neighbours. This
mode of life has produced in their men a fine physique and
a free and independent manner, and in their women a remark-
able power of resisting fatigue and of nurturing their children
under the most adverse conditions and circumstances.
* For main sub-divisions of Mahsuds and Wazirs see Appendix " L.
+ Known as the Tochi W?*zirs.
X Knovm as tho Wana Wazirs,
Both Wazirs and .Mahsuds are notorious for their raiding
pr(»])ensities, and for the ra})idity with whiih they remove
their phmder to the security of the inner hills of their country.
The Waziristan tribes do not in theory carry out a bk)od-
feud to the bitter end as do other frontier
Bioodfeuda. p^thaus, for the death of the offender
generally extinguishes the feud ; but if the offender escapes
the life of a relation may be taken instead, and as this may
in turn be avenged, the feud tends to become interminable
as is the case among the Afridis. On the other hand, a murder
mav be comj^ounded on payment of a sum which usually
varies between Rs. 700 and Rs. 1.000. Professional assassins
are sometime? employed to deal with a murderer, the fee^
being from Rs. 60 to Rs. 150. -
Mahsuds and Wazirs are not as a rule very much under
the influence of their Mullahs and are
Fanaticism. consequently less fanatical than many tribes.
on the frontier. On the other hand there hove been many
instances of murders of British officers or officials by individual
fanatics or '' ghazis," who were in some cases trusted and
apparently devoted employees of the officer they murdered.
The chief weakness of the Waziristan tribes lies in their
lack of unity. The Mahsuds and Wazirs
Lack of unity between j^^^,^ ^^^^ j^^^^ ^^ f^^(J ^j^^j .^ Vvhole-liearted
Mahsud-- and \\ azirs. . . ^. i- , i , • ^ i r i
combmation ot the two is therefore unusual..
On tiie other hand, the democratic character of the tribes,,
esjjecially of the Mahsuds, has the disadvantage from our
point of view that their jinjas, or assembly of tribal leaders,,
have little restraining influence over the more lawless elements,
and are therefore not truly representative of tribal opinion ;
in other words, a jirqa can produce no reliable guarantee that
the terms they have accepted will be carried out. This was
well illustratecl during the 1919-20 cam})aign, and ])laced us
at a considerable disadvantage in our negotiations with the
Mahsuds. it is important to remember, how^ever, tliat a wave
of fanaticism or the rise to power of some conunanding |)erson-
ality may at any time cause Mahsuds and Wazirs to sink
their diflVrences and effect a formidable combination against
UH. It must not be forgotten also that when the (Jovernment
of India undertake operations against an oifending tribe,
neiglibouring sections are often placed in an unenviable |)osi-
tion ; if they decide to stand aloof, they run the risk of losing
their projjerty oi lives Jinless stnmg enough to defend them.
while if they agree to help theii- co-religionists, they will prob-
ably become the objective at some later date of another puni-
tive ex])edition. They generally elect to brave the remoter
retribution, and for this reason it is impossible to foresee the
exact limits to which a tribal rising may extend.
The fiefhtinji strength of the Waziristan tribes has been.
appreciably reduced by the campaign of
Fighting strength igig.oQ but it is as yet too early to calculate
and anna ments. x^ j ,. i-,
accurately the extent oi their loss. More-
over, the fighting strength of a frontier tribe is to be measured
not so much by heads as by rifles, and there can be no doubt,
as will be explained in a later chapter, that the Mahsuds and
Wazirs are still well supplied with arms, in spite of the severe
casualties they have suffered and the large number of rifles
they have been forced to surrender. At the present time
the Wazirs can probably still arm effectively about 10,000
out of a total strength of 23,000 fighting men, and the Mahsuds
about 12,000 out of a total fighting strength of 16,000 ; and
this takes no account of smooth-bores and other obsolete •
weapons, of which there are sufficient to arm the remainder
of the tribe.
Moreover, the Wazirs and Mahsuds operating in their own
_ . , ., country, can be classed among the finest
Tactics of tribesmen. r>i,- ,1 ii ^ . ^^
tighters m the world, and at the present
moment they include in their numbers upwards of three
thousand men who have served in our regular army or militia
and who have an intimate knowledge of our habits and
tactics. The tribesmen have been described as the best
umpires in the world, for they seldom allow a tactical error
to go unpunished. History furnishes numerous examples of
the price which has to be paid when fighting against them for
the neglect of ordinary precautions, such, for instance, as a
failure to piquet heights, the daily adherence to a fixed
method of carrying out protective measures, a loss of touch
with detached parties, or the miscalculation of time and space.
The tribal system of intelligence is also very good. All
movements of troops are closely watched, and at the first
threat of an advance into their country the implicated sections
hasten to bury their grain and send their women, children
and cattle into the fastnesses of the upper hills, or to the
settlements of sections with whom we have no quarrel.
Owing to his activity on the hillside and general watchful-
ness, it is exceedingly ditticult to outflank the tribesman or
6
-to cut oft* his retreat, while if vigorously pursued und unable
to cret clear away, he will hide his rifte and appear as a peaceful
villaser. He is an expert at attacking small parties and
• convoys, and when the troops begin to withdraw it is aston-
isliing'how large numbers of the enemy will appear in places
whieh had seemed to be deserted, and with wJiat determination
the rear-guard will be harried. In the past the Mahsuds have
been conspicuously successful in capturing small, isolated
posts, their usual procedure being to send an emissary to
induce the commander to detach a large part of the garrison
in i)ursuit of an imaginary raiding gang. One of tlicii* greatest
triumphs was the seizure of Kashmir Kar Post in 1901 which
•was largelv due to one of their number having spent several
weeks disguised as a shepherd learning the habits of the garri-
son.
This success was eclipsed by the capture of Tut Narai Post
in the Upper Tochi on 31st May 1917 by a gang of Abdullai
Mahsuds who employed the ruse of sending two of their
members disguised as women to attract the attention of rlie
militia garrison. The gang decamped with o9 rifles and
about 12,000 rounds of ammunition.
CHAPTER II.
Political.
From the time of our earliest dealings with the Wazira
and Mahsuds these tribes have presented a most difficult
problem and one which still awaits a satisfactory solution.
The political history of Waziristan especially in its earlier
stages has always been closely interwoven
w^zfrisUD, r^4"iW with, and to some extent overshadowed by,
that of Afghanistan. Since the middle of
the nineteenth century the British Government has from
time to time been involved in military operations with the
Waziristan tribes, but the first event of purely political im-
portance with which we are concerned occurred in 1884,
when the Amir of Afghanistan made an attempt to establish
his supremacy over the Wazirs, and, though it met with little
or no support from the tribesmen, our policy with regard to
Waziristan had not reached a sufficiently advanced stage
to enable us to dispose of the question finally. Four years
later the Amir was informed that it was not our intention
to occupy Wana. This somewhat vague intimation led him
to suppose that the Afghans were free to go there, and they
accordingly did so. Previous to this the Amir had on more
than one occasion asserted that Waziristan belonged to him,
but his claim was not definitely repudiated until 1892, when
he was informed that, although he would not be called upon
immediately to evacuate Wana, we did not admit his right
to occupy it, and he was forbidden to advance further into
Waziristan pending a settlement. At the same time he was
reminded that we had always insisted on the independence
of the Wazirs and upon our right to deal directly with them,
that we should continue to do so and that he must not attempt
to bring them under his authority. This pronouncement
was naturally unpalatable to the Amir, who objected to our
having any dealings with the Wazirs and claimed the whole
of Waziristan in his dominions. It was of course, impossible
to admit such a claim, which had no foundation in fact, for
it would have allowed this large track of country, in which we
were becoming more and more interested, to pass entirely out
of our control.*
* It is interesting to note that the present Amir (Amanulla) has by no means aban-
doned the hope of one day regaining his suzerainty over the Waziristan tribes and hi*
delegates brought out this point strongly in the Mussoorie Conference in 1920.
( 7 ) ,
The position of Waziristau was thus clearly defined to
the Amir as being one of complete inde-
Govemraent! 1892."^'^ pendence, qualified by our right to hold
direct relations with its inhabitants. About
this time a proposal was made that we should hand over the
suzerainty to the Amir, allow the tribesmen to pay liini tribute,
and at the same time exercise some sort of control over them,
ourselves and bind the Amir to abstain from all actual inter-
ference with the tribes. Lord Lansdowne, however, disliked
the idea of this arrangement which would have given both
our.-elves and the Amir concurrent rights in the same country,
and it was rejected. Nor did the Government of India view
with more approval a suggested solution of the question in-
volving a partition of the Wazir tribes between ourselves and
the Amir. This scheme, by which the whole of the Darwesh
Khel would have been transferred to Afghanistan, was consi-
dere 1 as presenti i;^ insuperable difficulties and was also
dropped.
It had always been the policy of the British Government
to abstain as far as possible from interference with the internal
affairs of the independent tribes living beyond our Indian
border, but the decision to exclude the Amir from Waziristan
logically involved the protection of that region as well as of
its inhabitants from unprovoked acts of aggression on his
part. All* that Government wanted, however, was that the
Wazirs should look to us and to no one else. Obviously the
advantage of gaining the confidence of the tribes was all-
important
AVlien the Gomal route was first opened iji 1890 a system
Oimimii of Goraal ^^^ tribal aUowauces was inaugurated, the
Houte. 181X). main considerations on which they were
Tribal allowance.. ^rfautcd being as follows ! (1) general good
behaviour; (2) the prevention of laid.s and other offences
across the border of British India ; (3) the surrender for trial
and j)uni8hmcrit of tribesiiieii Inr offences against us; (4) the
furnishing of tribal escorts to oHicer> vis'ting any part of
their coujitiy un(l(*r oidcrs of Government; (5) the rendering
of HcrviccH, for wliicii they received allowances, in any j)art
of tlicir country moHt .cojivenient to Governincnl. The sub-
sidizing of llic t ril)('s?iif'ii formed part of a |)(»licy to sui)])le-
nient the scanty lesonrces of the Wazirs and .Mahsuds and
to assist in providing them with an honest means of livelihood.
It Was in tli(* complement of tliis policy, namely in the emj)loy-
9
ment of the tribesmen and enlarging the scope of tlieir energies.
that the Government hoped to find the real remedy. t
Tn 1893 the negotiations of the previous year leaelied a
hnal settlement and by the Dnrand Agree-
^^Durand Agreement, ^^^^^^^^ ^j^^^^.^^ -^^ ^i^^^^l in November, the
Amir definitely renounced all claim to
Waziristan (the Birmal tract excepted) and agreed to the
request of the British Government that the boundary line
between India and Afghanistan should be delimitated.* A
Commission was accordingly appointed in October of the
following year to demarcate the Western boundary of Waziris-
tan from bomandi, on the Gonial, northwards.
It was considered that this was a suitable opportunity
to accept the invitation of the Wazirs of
^^o^cupationof Wana, ^y^na, givcn two ycars previously, to
occupy their country, thereby preventing
future aggression on the part of either the Afghan authorities
or the Powindahs and securing the Gomal route against the
depredations of the Mahsuds. To do this it was decided to
establish a military post in Wana with outposts along the
line of the Gomal Valley. No sooner was Wana occupied
than a Mahsud attack on the camp occurred and the third-
Mahsud expedition of 1894-95 was the immediate result.
This attack was organised by a fanatical priest of the
Shabi Khel, Alizai, section of the Mahsuds,
^jhe MuUah Powin- ^.^-^^^^.^ ^s the Mullah Powiudah, who had
already achieved notoriety as the leader
of the faction, hostile to the maliks, which may be termed the
*' Young Mahsud " party. From this date the Mullah steadily
increased his influence with the tribe and up to his death in
1913 was a constant thorn in the side of the Indian Govern-
ment.f He was as bitterly opposed to the British as he was
to the control of the tribe by their maliks, and all efforts to
uphold the authority of the latter against his faction failed.
Efforts to drive him from the country proved of no avail
and Government, making a virtue of necessity tried a policy
of conciliation. In 1900 his official status was recognised
and he was granted a monthly allowance of Ks. 100 and in
1906 a grant of land was sanctioned for him in British territory.
Both these privileges were cancelled in 1907 as a result of his
•continued hostility, and henceforward Government adopted
* The Durand Line,
t The Mullah was nicknamed the " Pestilential Priest " by Lord Kitchener.
b2
10
the policy, which had better results than any previous eft'urts.
to lower his prestige, of ignoring his existence in all oiticial
dealings with the Mahsuds. On his death his son, Mullah
Fazl Din, was nominated as his successor by the tribe, and,
although he never achieved anything approaching his father's
influence, he was ])roniinent as a leader of the oppositii^n
both in the 1917 and 1919-20 expeditions.
The signing of the Durand Agreement necessitated a
Reconsideration of rcconsidcration of our policy regarding the
Policy after signing of Wazirs aud Malisuds, and it was recog-
Durand Agreement. ^^-^^j ^j^.^^ -^^ COUrSC of time the whole of
their country up to the Afghan border nmst come more and
more under our control. On the conclusion of the Malisud
operations in 1894 it was deemed advisable, for the greater
security of that part of the frontier, to take advantage of the
repeated offers of the Daurs of the Tochi
Tc^hi^^iieT^'isgl *^^ ^^^ t^ occupy their country. Posts were
therefore established along the valley of
the Tochi as far as Sheranni and occupied by troops and local
levies. The districts thus occupied in Wana and Tochi were
termed " Protected Areas " and were administered by political
officers, while a loose form of political control ba.«ecl on tribal
allowances was exercised over the Wazirs and Mahsuds outside
these areas.
Witli the object of relieving regular units of the Indian
army of the task of garrisoning outlying
Miiiti"r^*'''' ""^ ^"^^^ P^^^^S' ^^^ ^^ purely police duties on the
frontier, and in view of the fact that
neither the Tochi nor the Gonial routes were regarded as
being suitable as main lines of advance into Afghanistan, it
was decided in 1899 to call on the inhabitants of the various
localities to take jjart in their own defence, and at the same
time to establish a licji oji iheir loyalty, by enrolling them
ill militias and levies to su])j)Iy the local garrisons. Though
not a military body, since they were und(M- the control of
the civil adiniiiistiatioji, these militias were traijied and
e(jui|)pcd on military lines byollicers secojided IVoin the-
Indian army.
The policy in 1899, thcji, was briefly as follows : On tiie
North and Sout4i of Mahsud country, the
'"*^^'" ' '* Protected Areas," long narrow stri|)s of
country ujidcr the direct control of our j)oliti('al oflicers,
stretched out towards the Afghan border. In these areas.
11
were various posts garrisoned by tribal militias, led by British
officers but directly under the Civil administration, and with
backing of regular troops in Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan. The
raison d'etre of these militias was to prevent incursions by
tribesmen from the interior into the Bannu and Derajat areas,
and definitely to obtain the loyalty of a number of their
3'oung men by providing congenial employment for them. Over
the remainder of the country a loose form of political control
was exercised, which consisted mainly in affording moral
support to the maliks, and, by the payment of tribal allowances
for good behaviour, to ensure that the tribesmen could support
themselves without increasing their income by raiding in
British territory.
There is no doubt that this policy wa3 open to serious
objections both from a Political and Military point of view,
and a study of the next chapter will shew that on many occa-
sions military operations were necessary to enforce it. It
was, however, considered at the time the best solution of an
extremely difficult problem and in spite of many suggestions
for its revision* it was adhered to with slight modifications
for the next twenty years.
The complete breakdown of this policy during the Afghan
Breakdown of Policy ^^r in 1919, however, shewed that it
during Afghan War, would have to be abandoned and its place
^^^^' taken by one of military occupation and
road making, even though the tribesmen would see in it the
final blow to their independence.
During this campaign the loyalty of the Militias, which
had successfully stood the test of the great war, was put to a
severe strain by our withdrawal from the Upper Tochi and
from Wana. This, combined with the call of Islam, proved
too much for them and the defection of large portions of their
transfrontier elements not only reduced the value of these
corps but proved a potential source of danger to us. Mahsud
and Wazir raiding parties swept over the border tracts of the
Derajat and Zhob, and even penetrated into the Punjab,
robbing and murdering peaceful villagers, especially Hindus,
and their activities increased rather than diminished after
' the signing of peace with Afghanistan.
* One of the most discussed suggestions was the occupation of Waziristan up to
rthe Durand Line,
12
Present Policv.
This contiimcd and gratuitous provocation could uo longer
be tolerated and our present policy demands
that our forces shall remain in occupation
of central Waziristan «and that, mechanical trans])ort roads
shall be constructed especially to join up the Tochi ^vith the
Gomal line. The occupation of the country must eventually
le^ul to the inauguration of a loose type of administration, and
consequently a partial if not complete disarmament of the
tribesmen.
The security that is sought for is not security only from
raiders in Waziristan. There is no doubt that any weakness
in our administration of our frontier tribes constitutes one
of the chief dangers in our relations with Afghanistan. If
once we strengthen our hold on our hitherto unadministered
tribes, one of the chief temptations and opportunities of Afghan
intrigue will be removed.
It is to be hoped that in the peace which our domination
of Waziristan will eventually secure, rapine and violence will
give place to security and contentment ; and that the tribesmen
will find, both in the material improvement and developmenti
of their country, and in the civilizing intercourse with India,
a more stable prosperity than their traditional profession of
robbers and marauders has ever been able to afford them.
CHAPTEU 111.
Operations against the Waziristan tribes previous to
1914.
TJie great majority of tlie disturbances in Waziristan have
been caused by tlie Mahsuds, against wliom the six principal
series of operations have been mainly directed. Sections of
the Darwesh Khel Wazirs have on occasion given trouble, but
have generally proved less obstinate. This can be accounted
for partly by the fact that many of them hold land in the
plains, and as their hill settlements are more accessible than
those of the Mahsuds they have to be more circumspect than
the latter in their dealings with us.
The first important expedition occurred in 1860, the
immediate cause being a Mahsud attack on
Ma^hS!'i860. ^^^'"'^^ ^^^ ^^^^^1^ of Tank, which was completely
crushed by the skill and energy of an
Indian Officer. Colonel Paget's description of this brilliant *
little cavalry affair is as follows : '' Emboldened by years of
immunity, and believing that they could successfully oppose
any attempt to penetrate their mountains, the Mahsuds had
on March 13th, 1860, without provocation or pretext of any
kind, come out into the plains to the number of some 3,000,
headed by their principal men with the intention of sacking
the town of Tank, which stands on the plains some five miles
from the foot of the hills. The Nawab's agent, having obtained
previous intimation of their gathering, on the 12th informed
Saadat Khan, the Indian officer in command of the troop of
the 5th Punjab Cavalryf (now the 25th Cavalry, Frontier
Force) then holding Tank. This Indian officer at once sum-
moned the sowars from the neighbouring regular outposts,
besides collecting twenty of the Nawab's horsemen and some
irregular horse ; so that the force , at his disposal was one
hundred and fifty eight sabres of the 25th Cavalry and
thirty seven mounted levies. On the morning of the 13th
the whole party moved out towards the mouth of the Tank
* " Record of Expeditions against the North- West Frontier Tribes " by Paget and
Mason. See also " Campaigns on the North- West Frontier," by Captain H. L. Nevill,
D.S.O., R.F.A.
t When a unit still exists, its present designations will be given ; this arrangement
will, it is thought, add interest to the narrative, the old designations being practically
unknown to the present generation of readers.
( 13 )
14
Zani, on arriving near the entrance of wliieli they found
the Mahsuds drawn up about half a mile on the plain side of
the defile. The Mahsuds immediately opened fire on the
cavalry, on which Kessaldar Saadat Khan ordered his detach-
ment to retire with the intention of drawijig tlie enemy furtlier
into the ])lain. 'i'lie stratagem was successful and the enemy
followed with shouts of derision ; but when they had come
nearly a mile the cavalry turned and having first cut off their
retreat to the hills, charged in the most dashing manner.
The Mahsuds. personally brave and invariably of vigorous,
muscular frames, wanted the power of combination to resist
eft'ectually the charge of our cavalry. Cut down and ridden
over, they fled in confusion, the men in front forcing back
the men behind till all became a helpless rabble, strugg-
ling, striving, straining to regain the safety of the mountain
defile. The result was that about three hundred Mahsuds
were killed, including six leading maliks, and many more
wounded. Our loss was one Jemadar of levies killed, two
non-commissioned officers, and eleven sowars of the 2oth
Cavalry, and three of the levies wounded." The principal
chief of the whole Mahsud tribe was killed in this encounter.
The unprovoked nature of this attack led to the despatch
of an expedition, and Brigadier-General N. B. Chamberlain
was accordingly ordered to assemble a force to enter the
]\rah8ud hills and there exact satisfaction for the past and
security for the future. The force, which numbered about
^ya thousand of all ranks, included detachments from the
following units : —
21st, 22nd, 23rd and 24th Mountain Batteries (Frontier
Force), whose guns were at this time carried on elephants ;
Guides Cavalry, 23rd Cavalry (Frontier Force) and 15th
Lancers ; 1st Sappers and ^liners : Guides Infantry : 20th
infantry and 2l8t Punjabis ; 32nd l^ioneers ; 54th Sikhs ;
55th, 56th and 57th Rifles (Froaitier Force) and 5th Gurkha
liifles (Frontier Force). Ik^fore advancing, a ])r()clamation
was addressed to the Mahsud Chiefs ajuioujuijig the objects
for wliicli the foicc was about to ejitei" tlieii- hills ; to tell them
that, within a lixed ])eri()(l, they wer(; free to atteiid the camj)
and hear the demajids of th(^ liritish (Jovenimejit ; and that,
<)ji their failing to appeal' of coniplv wilh ihc (iciiiajids, they
would b(* treated as (ncniics aiid punished accordingly. No
reply having been received to the pioclamation, (JejuM'al
Clianiljerlain moved forward on the 17lh Apiil with the whole
15
of liis force, avigmonted by sixteen luiiulred levies, to the
inoiilh of the Tjink Ziiin and cam])ed on the present site of
Khirgi ])OSt. On jinivjil at Jandola, a portion of the force
was sent up the diilicult (h'fde known as the Shahur Tangi to
operate against certain liostile sections of the tribe in the
neighbourhood of llaidari Kach and Barwand. No opposition
was encountered and an important fort was destroyed ; but
during the absence of this cohimn, the remainder of the force
had been seriously attacked in its camp at Palosina near
Attack on camp at J'^ndola. On the night of the 22nd/23rd
Palosina, 22nd, 23rd April, a body of 3,000 Mahsuds makmg a
April 18G0. sudden rush, overpowered and nearly des-
troyed the camp piquets immediatel;^in their line of attack ;
here the majority of them stopped, but 500 of the bravest
of them dashed into the camp sword in hand, and penetrated
into the areas occupied by the Guides and the mounted levies.
For a time the confusion was general, but eventually a counter-
attack by the 25th Punjabis, 54th Sikhs and the Guides was
organised, the camp cleared and the enemy pursued for fully
three miles over the hills. Ninety two Mahsud corpses were
found in and around the camp and forty more in a nala on
their line of reteat ; our own casualties, many of which occurred
.among unarmed followers, amounted to 37 killed and 132
wounded.
Three days later, the column from llaidari Kach rejoined
the force headquarters, and a move up the
Tatgt Tnd May i^Go!" Tank Zam was begun. Some negotiations
took place with a party of Mahsud maliks
before the Ahnai Tangi was reached, but they led to nothing
and the force moved forward towards the Barari Tangi on
the 2nd May. The Barari Tangi is a narrow cleft cut by the
Tank Zam through a range of mountains crossing its course
at right angles, both banks of which are perpendicular cliffs
eighty to one hundred feet in height. A strong obstacle in
the shape of large rocks and felled trees had been placed in
position by the Mahsuds, completely closing the river bed.
The enemy's position was one of great strength. A double
row of sangars, admirably sited for flanking fire, had been
constructed on either side of the defile, and above these again
were numbers of sharpshooters whose fire would also tell
on a body advancing by the only line of approach to the main
position. A precipitous ridge also afforded the enemy a safe
line of retreat, — always an important consideration in Mahsud
tactics — enabling him to inflict injury on an attacking force
#j^
IG
up to tlie last iiioinont, and tlion to got away without fear of"
being cut otL
The interesting action which followed will well repay careful
study, especially in the light of our most recent experience
on the same ground ; but space does not permit of more than
a brief outline of it here. The troops advanced in two columns,
that on the right being entrusted witli a frontal attack on
the left of the main position. The leading line consisted of
two companies of the 2l8t Punjabis, who succeeded in estab-
lishing themselves without great difficulty within a short-
distance of the enemy's sangars, situated on the crest of a
rugged, steep ascent, the last twelve or fifteen feet of which
were practically inaccessible. Here a check occurred, the
men seeking shelter from the enemy's fire and from the rocka
and stones hurled down upon them from above. The Mahsuds,
emboldened Ijy the check, leaped from their breastworks and
rushed down upon the 21st Punjabis sword in hand, causing a
panic which for a time threatened to become general. The
leading companies fell back upon their support, and, the
latter having also given way, the enemy continued his advance
upon the mountain guns and the ooth Rifles in reserve. The
latter unit stood its ground firmly, and the Mahsuds, coming
under heavy rifle and gun fire, retreated up the hill, hotly
pursued by the 55th rifles, who took the main breastwork.
The other troops now rallied and the left of the position was-
won.
Disheartened by the loss of their left, the Mahsuds offered
only a feeble resistance to the advance of our other column
which advanced steadily from ridge to ridge with the loss
of only two men. In the centre, as soon as the barricade at
the mouth of the gorge had been removed, the 20th Infantry
and 5th GurkJia Rifles moved forward and completed the
capture of the whole jjosition. No further oppositicm was
oflVred and camj) was pitched on the Baiigiwahi Kach, three
miles bevond the defile. Our loss in this allair was thirty
killcfj and eighty-six wounded, while the enemy lel't thirty
five dead bodies on t he jiround.
There is no ju^ed to deseribe in (h'tail the i-eniaijider oi the
eampai^'n. Our troops visited Kaniguram and .Makin without
sueceediji'T ijj brijirrinjr the Mahsuds to teiins ; and theji, the
state of our suj)plies rendering it necessary to biing the o])era-
tions to a close, the force was withdrawn to l'>annu, via Razajii
and tin; Khaisora Valley. Although the expedirntii did jiot
17
result in the submission of tlie Malisuds, its success was con-
siderable. The loss inflicted on them was estimated at over
a lakli of rupees ; their chief town Kaniguram, had been occu-
pied, and spared only on ])ayment of a tine ; Makin, their next
most important town had been com])letely destroyed ; their
hitherto unknowi\ country had been surveyed and mapped ;
and whenever they had met our troops, they had been signally
defeated.
The next twenty years was a period of almost continual
unrest on the Waziristan border, and
^^Mahsud Blockade, g^y^ral minor expeditions had tg be under-
taken. In 1879, a body of Mahsuds..
estimated at between 2,000 and 3,000 men, raided the town
of Tank, plundered and burnt the bazaar, and carried off a
large quantity of private property. This event was the signal
for general disorder, and for some time predatory bands of
marauders continued to raid, plunder, and destroy along the
border, enjoying a considerable measure of immunity as the
result of our preoccupation in Afghanistan. All w^e were
in a position to do at the time was to institute a blockade,
a form of reprisal which is very difficult to enforce and which
must in any case be a slow process.
On the termination of the Second Afghan War, however,.
Government was able to take the matter
Mawti88i. '^^'""'^ in hand. In 1881 a proclamation was
published and widely circulated, which,
after reciting the engagem.ents under which the Mahsuds had
bound themselves to abstain from aggression in British terri-
tory, offered to them a final opportunity for peaceable sub-
mission and invited them to depute delegates to arrange for
the terms of settlement. Meanwhile orders were issued for
the concentration of a force at Tank under the command of
Brigadier-General T. G. Kennedy, C.B., and of a reserve
brigade at Bannu under the command of Brigadier-General
J. J. H. Gordon, C.B. The former consisted of 12 guns, 270
sabres and 3,660 bayonets, and included detachments from
the following units : 22nd, 23rd and 24th Mountain Batteries
(F. F.). 21st Cavalry (F. F.) ; 51st and 54th Sikhs (F. F.) ;
55th, 56th and 57th Kifles (F. F.) ; 20th Infantry and 21st
Punjabis ; and 32nd Pioneers. The Bannu Column numbered
8 guns, 330 sabres and 3,380 bayonets, and included a battery
of Royal Field Artillery, the 4th Battalion Rifle Brigade,
the first time British troops had been employed in Waziristan,
18
<letacliments from the 21st ^luuntain Battery (F. ¥.). 18th
Lancers, 14tli ."^ikhs, 20tli Infantry, the 21st and 30th Punjabis,
and the 58th Rifles (F. F.).
Neither coliinm was seriously engaged, and the total battle
•casualties incurred during tlie expedition amounted to only
32. The Tank Column marched to Kaniguram, via Jandola,
Barwand, and Kundiwam, the only action of importance
being at Shah Alam, between Kundiwam and Kaniguram,
where the enemy liad to be ejected from a strong position on
a densely wooded hillside. When the troops had deployed
for attack and were halted while a reconnaissance of the
position was being made, the Mahsuds suddenly charged the
51st Sikhs, but the attack broke down before the fire of this
battalion, and suffered considerably. The Bannu Column
marched, via the Khaisora A^alley and Razani to Razmak,
where communication was established with the Tank Column
at Kaniguram ; and then, after a short stay in the heart of
the Mahsud country, each colunm returned to its base. During
the return march the Bannu Column paid a visit to the Shaktu
Valley, the inhabitants of which had hitherto held aloof from
all negotiations, thinking themselves secure on account of the
difficulty of penetrating to their settlements and because
they were left unmolested in the campaign of 1860. They
now submitted without a struggle, and the presence of their
malihs in the British camp reassured the people, most of
whom had never before seen a European.
Although the expedition had been successful u]) to a point
and the boldest of the ^lahsuds had been taught that no
natural difficulties of their country could protect them from
))unishment, yet the demands of the Government had not
been fully complied with, and the blockade was therefore con-
tinued. Even before the tro()])S had left the M'lhsud hills,
some leading s])irits among the ajiti-])eace party sought the
intercession of Afghanistan, and the aj)])eaiance of tlie Amir's
agent at Kaniguram tended considerably to thwart the efforts
of llie j)arty who favoured a settlcnicnt with the British Gov-
ernment. However, such was the [iressure of the blockade
th.'it the welcome accorded to the Amir's (Miiissarv was but a
i'()\i\ ojk; and lie dc])arted su(l(h'jily lor Klio.st and tliejice to
Kalnil, acc(jmj)anied by a few leading Malisuds. The abseiice
of these latter and the reaction consecpient on t he hopes raised
by interference from Kaljul retarded a final setth'nient. with
the tribe. Ere long, however, the .Mahsuds discovered tiuit
19
papers had been received by the Amir purporting to offer
him the sovereignty oi' their country and freedom to enlist
troops from tlieir liills. This discovery alarmed and irritated
a peoj)le both proud and jeak)us of their independence, and
the feeling that their freedom was involved produced a reac-
tion in favour of concluding peace direct with the British
Government. The surrender of six prescribed ring-leaders
had been laid down as an earnest ot their submission, and
these were now brought in. The Mahsuds having thus accepted
a humiliation as great as a Pathan clan can suffer thereby
proving an honest desire and intention to submit, the block-
ade was raised and they were once morje at liberty to renew
trade and intercourse with markets in British territory.
Save for a few minor incidents, the next ten years was
a period of comparative peace on the
18^2.^^^'' ^^^"sues, Waziristan border, but in February 1892,
the Amir of Afghanistan again began to
intrigue with the tribesmen.
In May a force of Afghan Cavalry and Infantry arrived
at Wana under Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan, and matters
began to take a serious turn. In July the Government of
India addressed a warning to the Amir, informing him that
no encroachment in Wazir territory would be tolerated, pending
a settlement of the frontier ; the substance of this letter was
at the same time communicated to the Mahsuds and Wazirs,
who were told to refrain from acts of aggression against
Afghanistan. The activities of Gul Muhammad, however,,
created considerable unrest, and it was found necessary to
concentrate a force at Khajuri Kach as a precautionary
measure ; but in September the Amir withdrew his troops
and the attitude of the tribesmen improved.
In October, 1893, a Mission under Sir Mortimer Durand
went to Kabul at the invitation of the Amir, and an agreement
was signed by which the latter relinquished all claims to
Waziristan.
In accordance with this agreement, preparations were-
made earlv in 1894 for demarcating the
sioa'^89r^ ^''°'°'''' new boundary. As the attitude of the
tribesmen was uncertain, it was decided
to place a large force on the frontier during the delimitation,.
and it was also considered a favourable occasion on which to
accept an invitation, recently received from the Wana AVazirs^
'20
to take over and administer tlieir country. It was finally
decided that the British and Afudian Coniniissiuners should
meet and start work at Dcniandi on the Gonial, and a pro-
clamation was issued to the Wazirs describing the line agreed
upon and informing thorn that the Government had no inten-
tion of interfeiing witli their internal affairs, l)ut only desired
to establish peace. Large jirgas assembled to discuss the
situation, and for the most part appeared to be prepared to
receive the Commission in a friendly spirit.
The escort to the Commission consisted of one Squadron,
•21st Cavalrv (F. F.). 23rd Mountain Battery (F. F.), 20th
Infantry, o3rd Sikhs (F. F.), and 1st Gurkha Rifles. Wana,
which was to be the headquarters of the Commission, was
reached on October 25th, via Spin and Karab Kot. Some
sniping into camp occurred during the march, but the attitude
-of the inhabitants was generally friendly, and a large jirga
of Wana AVazirs. which came into Wana during the afternoon,
appeared pleased at the arrival of the troops. For political
reasons, the camp was pitched at the eastern end of the Wana
plain and was surrounded by a chain of piquets posted merely
for purposes of observation and not intended to hold their
own against a serious attack. In the latter event, they were
instructed to fall back on their supports and then to the camp
perimeter, which was to be the main line of defence ; three
■of the twelve piquets were detailed for the defence of the
political camp situated at some little distance from the main
camp.
*0n the 28th. news was received that a certain number of
Mahsuds headed by the Mullah Powindah were trying to create
dissensions and jnevent a representative jirga coming in.
It was reported that the Mullah had succeeded in collecting
about 800 men, that he proposed to visit Kaniguram for the
purpose of increasing his force, and that he intended to attack
the camp at Wana or liarass convoys. On the evening of the
Ist November news was })r()Ught in lluit the Mullah had
arrived at Torwam with a foUowing of a thousand men ;
piquets were consequently doubled and the troops ordered
to be under arms at 4 A.M. 'Vim next day mcssejigeis arrived
from the Mulhili. but tliry were informed that n(> dealings
-could take j)lace with him except through the jinja. The
camp defences were strengthened and the same precautions
iaken as oji Ih^ jirevious night.
'\
\ ^~^~---^^
:
The iiiglit of the 2nd November, which was very dark,
])assed quietly till 3-30 a.m., when the
Attack on camp near ^ ^ -, ^ *^ iii iiii
Wana by Mullah Towin- wliole t'lim]) was Suddenly roused by three
daii, 3rd November, .sliots, I'ollowed bv wild yells and the
1894 • •
beating of drums. At the same time a
desperate rush of some five Inuidred fanatics was made straight
into the left flank and rear of the camp, held by the 1st Gurkha
Kifles. So ra])id was the rush that before the Gurkhas could
turn out of their tents, the leading men of the enemy had
•climbed over the defences and penetrated into the middle of
the camp.
It appears that under cover of darkness the enemy had
•crept up two large ravines, and, rushing two piquets in their
line of advance, one of which had fired the three alarm shots,
had charged straight down on the camp. At the same time
a large body of Mahsuds continued their course down the
ravine and had split up into two parties, one of which joined
the main attack on the left flank of the camp, while the other,
continuing down the ravine, broke up against the rear-guards.
Many of this party made their way into camp behind the
hospitals, where they did much damage among the transport
animals, and some of them succeeded in reaching the cavalry
lines, w^here they got to work cutting free the horses in the
hope of causing a stampede.
Meanwhile, the Gurkhas had stopped the main rush from
passing down the centre street of the camp; and the regimental
reserve was fighting hand to hand with the enemy. They
were soon reinforced by two companies of the 20th Infantry
and a company of the 53rd Sikhs (F. F.), and the enemy was
systematically driven out of the camp at the point of the
bayonet. He made two more but less determined attempts
to gain a footing within the perimeter, but these were steadily
met, and our' infantry got in several effective volleys with the
lielp of star shell.
At day break the enemy's fire slackened, and as he w^as
now evidently in retreat, the cavalry was ordered to pursue.
"Within a few minutes of this order being received, the squadron
liad started and was quickly followed by a mixed detachment
of artillery, sappers, and infantry. After covering about
three miles the cavalry came in sight of the enemy, but the
ground was here so bad that it was impossible to move out
of a trot. On gaining better ground, however, they charged
and recharged the tribesmen with great effect.
oo
111 addition to our losses in officers and men at Wana,
amounting to 45 killed and 75 wounded, the enemy succeeded
In carrvini' off a larc^e number of rifles and Rs. 2.t)00 in cash,
jlore than a hundred trans])ort aninuils were also killed or
Wounded. The enemy's loss was estimated at about 350
killed.
The attack at Wana made a ])unitive expedition inevitable,
and tliree mixed brigades were accordingly
^^Punitivo oporations, ^^3senibled at Waua, J'lndola and Bannu,
respectively, the whole under the command
of Lieutenant-General Sir William Lockhart, K.C.B. The
1st Brigade consisted of the original Commission escort,
reinforced by the 2nd Battalion Border Regiment. The 2nd
Brigade included the 28th Mountain Battery, a squadron
each from the 21st and 22nd Cavalry (F. F.),*^No. 5 Co., Ist
Sapper? and Miners, the 33rd Punjabis, 38th Dogras, 57th
Rifles (F. F.) and the 1st Battalion, 5th Gurkha Rifles (F. F.).
The 3rd Brigade consisted of the 21st Mountain Battery (F. F.),
the 23rd Cavalry (F. F.) the 51st Sikhs, 56th Rifles, and 59th
Rifles, all of the Punjab Frontier Force.
It is unnecessary to describe in detail the operations of
these three brigades, as no fighting of importance occurred,.
our battle casualties amounting to only 23 all told. Suffice
it to say, that the whole of Waziristan was completely overrun
from end to end, all sections of the ^lahsuds inij^licated in
the Wana attack were punished, much damage was done to
towers and defences, and a large quantity of forage and graini
and over 1,000 animals were captured. The Government
terms were fully complied with, and the demarcation of the
boundary successfully accomplished.
Nevertheless. (Aiimcs of violence contimicd to be of trequent
occurrence during tlic jicxt few years, hi 1895, ;lji ojlicer
(>f the 59th Rifles was stabbed jiear J^oya, and his syce and
orderly dangerously wounded ; a lajice-naik <;f the5()th I\ifle»
was shot dead at AliranshaJi ; a party of Daufs tried to enter
the j)Ost at Miransluih and succecd(Ml in stabbing two se|)ovs ;
an officer of the 23rd Cavalry was very seven^ly woujuiecl near
Boya ; and a sowai- ol ilie same regiment on grass-cutting
guard was also shot dead near the sainr j)lace. These and
other offences necessitated a show of foK c in i he Toclii N'jilley,
which henceforward became apeimanent locatioji foi' regular
Indian troops
23
The next episode of importance was an unprovoked and
Attack on Political luicxpected attack on a Political oiiicer's
officer's escort in Upper escort at Maizar in tJie Upper Toclii Valley
Tochi, 1897. -^^ jgg^ rpj^^ Political Officer had i)r()-
ceeded to IMaizar with a mixed escort to settle a dispute among
the local tribesmen regarding tlie incidence of a tine imposed
for the murder of a Hindu clerk. The tribal maliks met the
party and escort in an apparently friendly spirit, and, pointing
out a site to halt at, offered to provide a meal for the Mussalman
sepoys of the escort. The party were thus lulled into a false
sense of security. Suddenly a hubbub began in a village
close by, and the villagers, who had been listening to the
pipes of the 51st Sikhs which were playing in camp, drew off.
A man was observed to wave a sword from the top of a tower
and two shots were fired in quick succession from the village,
the second of which wounded a British officer. Firing now
commenced from other neighbouring villages, as the result
of which another British officer was wounded. The guns of
the escort opened fire with case at 100 yards' range ; two of
their officers were quickly wounded but the gunners continued
to fight their guns with great gallantry. As only sixteen
rounds per gun, however, had been brought with the escort,
ammunition soon ran short, and orders were given for a
retirement to the ridge. Meanw^hile a general stampede had
occurred among the baggage animals, and when the retire-
ment was ordered most of the reserve ammunition and other
equipment had to be abandoned.
The enemy now appeared in force on all sides, but the
retirement, which began under such very trying circumstances,
was carried out with great deliberation and gallantry. All
the British officers were wounded, two of them mortally ;
but all continued to carry out their duties and lead their
men. The gallantry of three subedars of the 51st Sikhs and
55th Rifles was especially noteworthy. Getting together a
party of their men, they made a most determined stand by
the wall of a garden, whence they covered the first withdrawal.
Here they remained themselves until the enemy closed with
them, and one of them was killed. Under cover of this stand
the wounded were carried and helped away, the guns with-
drawing to a low Jcotal about 300 yards distant. Here a
fresh stand was made, the guns firing blank to check the
enemy, as all the service ammunition had been expended.
One of the battery officers now received a third, and this
time a fatal wound, and another, who had fainted from loss.
24
of blood aud had been fastened on to the Political ofhcor's
pony when the retirement began, was found to be dead on
arrival at the kotal. The retirement was continued by suc-
cessive units, the enemy coming on in increasing numbers
and endeavouring to envelop the flanks, but on arrival at
the Sheranni plain, reinforcements from Datta Khel joined
the party and the enemy was at last beaten off.
Immediately after the outbreak at Maizar, the local Wazirs
had despatched messengers to other sections of the tribe for
assistance, and they also approached the Afghan authorities.
For a long time it was uncertain what effect these appeals
would have, and a strong force under Major General Corrie
Bird. C.B., was therefore assembled at Bannu to deal with
possible eventualities. The force consisted of two mixed
brigades, the first including one squadron, 21st Cavalry (F. F.),
23rd ^fountain Battery (F. F.), No. 2 Company, 1st Sap])ers
and Miners, 2nd Battalion Argyle and Sutherland Highlanders
51st Sikhs (F. F.), 55th Kifles (F. F.), and 33rd Punjabis ;
and the second, one squadron 21st Cavalry (F. F.), four guns
of the 26th Mountain Battery, 3rd Battalion Pifle Brigade,
14th Sikhs, 6th Jat Light Infantry, and the 25th Punjabis.
Practically no opposition was encountered during the march
to >Sheranni and Maizar, both of which were found deserted.
All the defences at these two places were destroyed, and
visits were paid to neighbouring valleys known to have been
implicated in the outrage.
In the meantime the Tirah campaign had begun, but,
contrary to expectations, the operations against the Afridis
and Orakzais did not cause any S])e(ial restlessness in Waziris-
tan, save that they delayed a settlement with the perpetrators
of the Maizar attack. However, as the winter of 1S97
aj)proached, the ]>ro8])ect of h)sing their sj)ring crops reduced
the tribesmen to a more submissive mood, and at the end of
October the liead of the offending section gave himsi'lf up
as an earnest of good beliaviour in the future. The total
casualties at. .Maizar, in additioji to the loss ol the l>iit'sh
olliccrs already mentioned, had been 21 killed :ind 28 wounded,
while our h)8seB iji the Bubse(}uent o|)er;it i(uis were 6 killed
and 8 woujided. The iriost noteworthy aspect of the campaign
liad been the unusual amount of sickness among the troops.
The climate of t-h<' 'i'ochi v.iHey is at all limes trving, but
the rapid concentration at liannu in the middle ol the hot
weather had no doubt, affected the constitutions of the men
^
25
-aiKl lendered tliein more disposed to contract disease, and
less able to shake it off, than would usually be the case. The
principal diseases were diarrhoea and dysentery, which took
an epidemic form and became very severe.
No sooner had the Government of India settled with the
Tochi Wazirs than the Mahsads again
1900-1901. ^^•^''''^^' began to give trouble, and the punishment
of this tribe had to be undertaken for the
fourth time. During 1898 and 1899, raids were of frequent
occurrence, and in January 1900, the levy post at Zam and
the Public Works Department bungalow at Murtaza were
both attacked. In October, the police post at Nasran, eleven
miles north of Tank, was surprised by Mahsuds, two sepoys
being killed and ten rifles stolen ; and, though the raiders
Avere intercepted and part of the booty recaptured, this was
only accomplished at the cost of the life of the British officer
in command of the pursuit party. A Mahsud jirga was
accordingly summoned to Tank and a fine of Rs. 1,00,000 for
past offences was impos3d, the jirga being informed that if
Ks. 50,000 were not paid up within fifteen days, a blockade
would be imposed. At the conclusion of the fifteen days'
grace, the jirga returned and asked for a further period of
two months in which to consider the terms ; this was refused,
and the blockade came into operation on December 1st.
The following preliminary measures were taken to ensure
the effectiveness of the blockade. On the east, small moveable
'Columns were located at Jani Khel and Zam, and a cordon
of posts established between Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan ;
in the south, the G-omal line was reinforced by putting regular
garrisons into Murtaza and Manjhi, two temporary posts
were established at Tormandu and Khwuzma Narai, and the
existing posts at Khajuri Kach, Sarwekai, Haidari Kach,
and Jandola were strengthened. A new post was also estab-
lished in the Spin plain. South of the Gomal, the battalions
stationed at Fort Sandeman and Loralai respectively were
moved up to form a cordon of posts on the Zhob-Waziristan
border. The troops originally employed on the blockade
consisted of the 21st and 25th Cavalry (F. F.), eight guns of
the 22nd, 26th and 27th Mountain Batteries, 17th Infantry,
23rd Pioneers, 27th and 28th Punjabis, 35th and 45th Sikhs,
123rd Outram's Rifles, and half a battalion each of the 109th
Infantry and 124th Baluchistan Infantry.
c2
26
These measures were so fiir effectual tliat the Mahsuds
began to make overtures regarding the ])ayment of the fine,
and for some time payment ])roceeded reguUuly, but in January
1901. a series of fresh offences began which made further
negotiations impossible. A mail runner was murdered near
Nili Kacli. and the mail was looted near Sarwekai ; a British
officer had liis baggage looted and his two servants killed
near Murtaza : three sepoys of the 4oth Sikhs on " grazing
guard '* were killed near Jandola ; the militia post at Kashmir
Kar was attacked, one havildar, three sepoys and three work-
men being killed, and thirty rifles stolen. These and various
other offences compelled the Government of India to introduce
a new jn-ocedure into the ordinary methods of a purely passive
blockade.
Hitherto, the tribesmen had invariably received notice
prior to the commencement of active operations, affording
them the opportunity of coming belatedly to terms. It was^
now, however, decided that, wliile the blockade should con-
tinue as before, it should be varied and accompanied by sharp
attacks lasting two or three days at a time and undertaken
by small mobile columns acting simultaneously and by sur-
prise. To enable this to be done, the following additional
units were employed : 29th Mountain Battery, 27th, 28th,
and 29th Punjabis, 32nd Pioneers, 38th Dogras, 55th, 56th,
and o8th Pifles (F. F.), 1st Battalion, 2nd Gurkha Pifles,
and Ist Battalion, 3rd Gurkha Pifles.
The fiist series of these operations commenced on the-
23rd November and was directed against the .Mahsuds of the
Khaisara and Shahur Valleys, combined with demonstrations-
from Jandola into the Tank Zam and from Datta Khel against
the north-west portion of the Mahsud country, the general
object being to demolish all defences, capture prisoners and
cattle, and to destroy grain and crops. Four columns, each
consisting almost exchisively of infantry and varying in
strength from 900 to 1 ,250 men, started from Datta Khel,
Jandola, Sarwekai and Wana ; all were ()j)|)(»st'd, and each
Buffered some loss, but tlie combined operations were very
bucccssful. (Iiic in hir^ic measure to the Malisuds having been
lulled into a false sejise of security by the inactivity of tlie
blockade.
.Moreover, no sooner were th< se ojx'iations at aji ejid tliaji a
furtiier Sf-ries Wiis piojected. ( )n tliis occasion, the .Mahsuds,
being on the alert, carefully watched the movement of the.
27
troops, and tliore was little clumce of taking them by surprise.
A column of 2,500 lilics and 4- guns left Jandola on the 4th
December and bivouacked at Dwe Shinkai. Next day it
withdrew to Guri Khel, the rear guard being so heavily pressed
across the Umar Raghza that it had to lager for the night on
the liills to the nortlf. During the Gtli, on which date the
rearguard rejoined the main body, tlie enemy made frequent
attacks on the piquets but were invariably repulsed, on
one occasion at the point of the bayonet by a company of
the 29th Punjabis. During the withdrawal to Jandola on
the 7th, the enemy showed increassd activity and the 29th
Punjabis again distinguished themselves by repulsing a deter-
mined attack and inflicting on the enemy a loss of 40 killed.
The third phas3 consisted of combined operations by
columns from Jandola and Sarwekai respectively which joined
hands at Dwe Shinkai and then carried out a series of raids
up the Shinkai Valley in three columns. Only slight opposi-
tion was encountered. The Mahsuds, however, still evinced
no inch nation to submit, and a fourth series of operations
was consequently planned against them. For this three
columns were formed, based respectively on Jandola, Jani
Khel, and Datta Khel, and varying in strength from 2,500 to
1,400 men, the objective being the punishment of Mahsud
sections inhabiting the Shaktu, Sheranna, and Shuza valleys
and the capture of a large number of cattle known to be grazing
on the slopes of the Baba Ghar. The operations of these
columns were uniformly successful. Standing camps were
now established at Zam, Miranshah, and Baran, whence it was
intended to resume punitive measures as soon as the troops
had enjoyed a much-needed rest. By this time, however,
the Mahsuds had lost heavily in men and cattle, and had
thoroughly realised that the innermost parts of their country
could be reached and traversed by our troops. They conse-
quently opened negotiations for peace and the removal of the
blockade, and after the usual delays paid up the fine in full,
restored all the rifles they had captured, and gave hostages
for the return of all plundered cattle. Our total battle casual-
ties during this campaign amounted to 32 killed and 114
wounded, those of the Mahsuds being estimated roughly at
126 killed and 250 wounded. In addition, 215 Mahsud prisoners
were taken, 64 towers were destroyed, 153 villages had their
defences levelled, and over 8,000 head of livestock were
-captured.
28
The severity of the punishment inflicted on the .Mahsuds-
Kxpc-duion against !^>y ^^^^^se Operations did not, however,
the Kabul KheiWazirs, impress all sections ot the \\ azirs, and
^'*'^'^* before the end of the year, an expedition
had to be set on foot against the Ka])nl Khel. — a branch of
the Darwesh Khel Wazirs who inliaHit the wedge of hilly
country lying between the Kohat and Bannu districts, east
of the Kurrani river. For some years a number of outrages
had been committed in this neighbourhood, and in each case
the perpetrators were known to have taken refuge in the
village of Gumatti, about 8J miles from Bannu. This village
was accordingly surprised and surrounded at dawn on the
6th February 1899, by a small column of troops from the
Bannu garrison. Seven of the outlaws were captured while
trying to escape, but the remainder took refuge in two strong
towers from which it was found impossible to dislodge them ;
and as a direct assault would have incurred a loss quite out
of proportion to the object in view and the column had to
return to Bannu the same day, it was obliged to withdraw
without accomplishing its object. Three days later another
colunm from Bannu foimd the village deserted, and blew up
the towers without encountering any opposition. The out-
laws, who had now lost all hope of pardon, continued their
depredations on the border until, in 1902, the state of affairs
had become so intolerable that an expedition had to be sent
into the district. The troops employed were drawn from
the 2lBt, 22nd, and 27th Mountain Batteries ; the 21st, 23rd,
and 25th Cavalry (F. F.) ; the 51st, 53rd, and 54th Sikhs
(F. F.), the 56th, 57th, and 58th Rifles (F. F.), and the 22nd
Punjabis, together with detachments from the Kurram and
North Waziristan ^lilitias. Four columns were formed and
ojx'rated from Thai, idak, Barganatu and Bajinu respectively,
only the latter encountering more than slight op])osition.
This column found itself confronted at ({umatti by a strong,
fortified enclosure, thickly surrounded by trees, and held by
six outlaws. The mountain gujis had jio effect oji the defences,
even at 400 yards range, and Colonel Tonnochy, the oHicer
conmiandinf^ the cohmm, wjis oidcring lliem to advance still
chjscr wiii'ii he fell moitally woujided. Two unsuccessful
attempts were made to l)reach the walls with gun-cotton, and
it was at last decided to carry the place by escalade. This was
accoiJi])li8li('d by a stoiniing jiarty of the 531(1 Sikhs {\'\ h\),
tliough all three British ofliceis were (Mther killed or woundtMl.
All six outlaws were killed, our own loss anioujitini: to four
29
killed and fifteen wounded. The total loss inflicted on the
enemy, by the four colunuis which rounded up the district
amounted to 20 killed, 303 ])risoners, 66 towers destroyed,
and 5,288 head of cattle captured.
In conjiection with this expedition, an incident occurred
which, tliough it had no bearing on the course of the opera-
tions, deserves special mention as a fine example of a forced
march carried out at very short notice. It had been arranged
that the whole of the prisoners and cattle collected by the
Thai and Idak columns at Spinwam should, on the dispersal
of the force, be taken to Idak ; and in view of their large
numbers, it had been decided to order out 100 men from
Idak to meet the Idak column on its return and assist in the
task. A message was accordingly despatched on the 22nd
November directing the officer commanding at Datta Khel
to send 100 rifles to meet the Idak column about half way
from Spinwam on the following day. The message did not
reach Datta Khel till after 3 p.m. on the 22nd, and 100 rifles
of the 56th Rifles (F. F.) left that place two hours later.
Marching all night, they reached Miranshah (25 miles) by
1-20 A.M. on the 23rd and Idak at 5 p.m. on the same day,
having covered 49 miles in just under 24 hours. Only one
man, a bugler, fell out during the march.
Following the Kabul Khel expedition, comparative peace
reigned on the Waziristan border for some years, although
in 1904, the murder of the Political Agent at Wana, and, in
1905, of the Commandant of the South Waziristan Militia
and the Brigade Major at Bannu, necessitated the infliction
of heavy fines and the dismissal of all Mahsuds from the
South Waziristan Militia. In 1911, a force of about 2.000
Mahsuds invested Sarwekai, at the same time cutting the
telegraph lines and completely isolating Jandola and Wana :
but the unexpected and rapid move of the Derajat Brigade
from Dera Ismail Khan to Spinkai within striking distance
of the enemy brought about his dispersal before any serious
damage had been done. Our posts at Spinwam on the Kaitu
and at Spina Khaisora in the Upper Tochi were similarly
attacked without success in 1913, but no further im.portant
operations were undertaken against the Waziristan tribes prior
to the outbreak of the Great War.
CHAPTER IV.
Operations against the Waziristan tribes between 4th
August 1914 and 11th June 1917.
On the whole the situation on the North-West. Frontier
remained remarkably quiet during the Great War, and it was
only against the ^lahsuds that operations on an important
scale had to be undertaken. The position during this period
was one of considerable difficulty. The border tribes were
naturally excited by the entry of Turkey into the war ; they
were encouraged by the preaching of a few prominent mullas
to look towards Kabul and prepare for Jihad ; they heard the
wildest rumours about the military situation in India and
abroad ; and as the war wore on pro-Turkish emissaries worked
incessantly among them to foment a general rising. The then
Amir. Habibullah, however declined to depart from his declared
policy of neutrality and discountenanced the efforts of his
more fanatical subjects to bring about a Jihad.
It was an essential part of the Government's policy at this
time to avoid any unnecessary complications on the frontier,
the two main reasons against the employment of military force
being, firstly, that it would entail the diversion of troops
much needed elsewhere, and secondly, that it might lead to
an outbreak all along the Border.
It was not therefore until the truculent attitude of the
Mahsuds had rendered military intervention absolutely neces-
sary in the interests of general peace that a punitive expedition
against them was sanctioned.
The close of 1914 was marked by the outbreak of a series
of raids, it was su])posed that Government was not in a
position to undertake reprisals, and there was a rumour abroad
that the frontier posts were about to be evacuated.
At the cjid of November a Khostwal Jas/thir crossed the
lncurHion« by Afghan ^^^^i'^.^^' ^^«"^ Afghanistan and looted the
in)Kmm-n from Khost savai at Miransliali before being driven off
^^^^'^^' l.v fhc Northern Waziristan Militia. The
Bannu moveables cohinin advanced to Idak and otluM* ])re('au-
tionary incasnrcs wci-c taken hut the pionipt^ action of the
^lilitiii had had its effect and the laslthtr withdrew to Khost.
ill January I'Jl.j ajiuiher unsuccessful attack by Khostwals
was made on Spina Kliaisora in the U|)per Toclii and on 24th
( .'JO )
31
March a, lashkar estimated at 10,000 Zadrans and other Khost
t]ibes crossed tlie frontier and advanced the following day to
tlie neiglibourliood of Miranshah Post. A cohinm of the
Northern Waziristan Militia with a section of mountain artillery
moved out from the post and by means of a night march
.succeeded in taking \\\) a ])osition across the enemy's line of
retreat. On the morning of the 26th the enemy who was in
sangars, was attacked by a force consisting of —
2 squadrons 25th Cavalry (F. F).
29th Mountain Battery less one section.
10th Jats.
52nd Sikhs (F. F.).
under command of Brigadier General V. B. Fane, C.B., and
driven in headlong flight across the Durand Line harassed en
route by the Militia detachment. The enemy losses were
estimated at 200 killed and 300 wounded.
This action proved a very salutary lesson to this part of
the frontier, and no incident of any importance occurred in
the Tochi for over two years.
The Mahsuds showed no inclination to aid these lashkars
from Khost, although they were smarting
^^Attitude of Mahsuds, ^^^^^ ^^^ stoppage of their tribal allowances
and restrictions imposed on them for their
failure to surrender certain individuals demanded by Govern-
ment for their connection with the murder of Major G. Dodd,
•C.I.E., Political Agent, Wana, who died at Tank on 14th
April 1914.
The anti-British party led by Mulla Fazl Din, son of the
notorious Mulla Powindah, was eager to begin hostilities but
the majority of the tribe was restrained by the maliks from
following its lead. In October however, Fazl Din's party
asserted itself and a great increase in raids was the result.
During the following month a gang of about 80 Mahsuds
attacked the road piquets between Khajuri Kach and Tanai
inflicting a loss of 5 killed and 10 wounded, and a few days
later a party of the Southern Waziristan Militia was ambushed
near Tormandu Post losing 10 killed, 3 wounded and 13 rifles.
In spite of these outrages it appeared that the bulk of
the Mahsuds were anxious for a settlement with Government,
but certain irreconcilable sections notably Fazl Din's section,
the Shabi Khel, and the Abdur Rahman Khel continued
.almost nightly to raid the border villages in order to implicate
32
the rest of the tribe. The hostile forces at work were too*
strong for the j)arty in favour of peace. Fazl Din exchanged
visits with Lahi Pir, ti fanatical mullah of Khost, and a member
of the Turkish Afghan pai-ty toured tlie frontier spreading
mendacious stories of overwhelming Turkish victories in.'
Mesopotamia and promising an early invasion of India.
To understand the subsequent events it is necessary to
remember two determining factors ; the
be^ghming 19 it'"'''*''''' difftculty in which Mulkh Fazl Din found
himself, and the implications of our own
policy at the beginning of 1917.
It was to the interest of those 7naliks in the tribe wha
were friendly to us and whose sections desired intercourse
with British territory, to break down the influence of the
]\Iullah whose continued hostility was the chief obstacle in the
way of a settlement. This they were in a fair way to
accomplish.
Our policy was to avoid for the present the final settlement
of the Mahsud problem. We had received grave provocation,
but it was not convenient, at a time when troops were needed
for the Great War to exact in full measure the penalties due.
The hostile sections of the tribe, with the exception of the
Abdullai, had no access to British territory and could not be
affected by anything less than a punitive expedition. It
seemed advisable to take no action beyond entering the case
against the guilty sections for future retribution, and mean-
while to depend upon the restraining influence of the friendly
sections to prevent collision with the tribe as a whole.
In accordance with this policy the inaliks of the friendly
.^ ^. ,. Manzai sections were warned to use their
ijitluence with the other section ot the
Alizai clan, the Shabi Kliel, the chief supporters of the ]\lullah.
since they too would be held responsible for outrages committed
by the .Sha])i Khel. 'j'lie IManzai malihf^ then held a jirqa
at Dwa Toi on the 18th J.'iiniary at which all the leading
Shabi Khel nialiks and Mullali Fazl Din were ])resent, and
announced ilieir intention of attacking the Shal)i Khel unless
they made a temporary settlenicul with (l(>\'(Mnment, or at
least promised to desist from fuiiher outrages. The Shabi
Khel asked for time to consider the matter.
Meanwhilt^ (;lovernment had sanctioned a scheme for
emj)loying Mahstids o?i tlie rej)air of the road bctw(MMi Mad
Hassan and Spinkai. This road had existed for some vear&-
33
and was acknowledged by tlie Malisuds to be well outside
the limits oi their territory. It was pro])osed to give contracts
to the three main Mahsud clans who would arrange to supply
the labour required. The scheme was received favourably by
the maliks but was bitterly opposed by the Mullah who used
the not unreasonable argument that better roads make invasion
easier. As the Shabi Khel were still discussing the proposal
put forward by the Manzai, it was considered undesirable
that their decision should be prejudiced by the Mullah's
arguments misleading though they were, and the scheme was
abandoned and all work stopped on 18th February.
The Shabi Khel resolved against compliance with the terms
for a temporary settlement, and the recalcitrant sections pre-
pared for active hostilities. It should be remembered that
during the spring there are more Mahsuds in the south of
the country than at any other time of the year. The Nana
Khel of the Baddar and the Upper Khaisara bring their flocks
to graze in the Shahur valley, and the normal population of
these parts is increased three-fold. It is therefore compara-
tively easy to raise a laslihar if sufficient temptation can be
held out to these tribesmen.
Mullah Fazl Din decided that the time for action had come.
He announced publicly that he intended to attack British
territory as a reprisal for our breach of faith in attempting
to repair the Mad Hassan-Spinkai road. Consequently on
26th February he collected at Mar obi a few hundred Shabi
Khel and some ilbdullai, and on the 27th moved to the Spli
Toi reaching Barwand on the 28th. On the march he was
joined by large numbers of the Nana Khel who have always-
taken the lead in hostile movements against us.
At Barwand the lashkar now numbering about 1,500 men
was joined by the Wazir Mullah Hamzulla and some Shakai
Wazirs. An attempt made to induce the Manzai maliks to
join the Jihad failed, and these maliks returned to their homes..
As soon as the news of these movements was received the
posts were warned, and Major Hughes — Southern Waziristan
Militia with 70 men reinforced the garrison at Sarwekai bring-
ing its strength up to 250 rifles.
On the evening of 1st March the post was cut off entirely
from telegraphic communication.
In the next few days, during which the attack on the post
developed, communication between Tanai and Sarwekai could
only be made by heliograph via Dargai Oba.
;J4
The lashkar at Barwaiid was joined on 1st March by parties
of Bahlolzai, so that its strength now stood at about 3000.
Sniping into Sarwekai began at 2 p.m. on the 1st March.
This post stands on a spur of Kundi Ghar
kaKlurcb foiT"" at a height of 3,940 feet, the spur rising to
tlie north-west in a series of steps, the
nearest of which, Garesi Sar, commands the post at a range
of 1,400 yards. The road from Dargai Oba crosses a nullah
full of thick dwarf palm and then zigzags up to the post.
To the south-east on the road to the Khuznia Narai is a
tower, connected with the post by a trench. On the north
there were formerly two other similar towers, but these have
been demolished, and their sites are known as those of No. 1
and Xo. 2 tower respectively. To the north of these sites a
long nullah winds down to Barwand, distant about 5 miles.
There are many nullahs and nmch broken ground in the
neighbourhood of the post and it is easy for a force to collect
without being seen by the garrison. Sniping from Garesi Sar
and the slopes about it is an ordinary occurrence, and can be
usually disregarded.
On this occasion, however, the post was sniped on three
sides from sangars within a few hundred yards ; a party was
sent out to drive the enemy off, but w^hen heavily fired on,
was ordered to retire. This was about 4 o'clock in the after-
noon.
Major Hughes now decided to seize, during the night,
three sangam on Garesi Sar, from which the Mahsuds at a
range of 1,400 yards had been firing at the post. Accordingly
100 rifles under an Indian officer proceeded at midnight and
occupied them with practically no op])C)sition. At 7-30 a.m.
a party of 150 Mahsuds attacked the sangars but were driven
off with loss. As it was necessary to carry u]) food and water
to the party on Garesi Sar, and the rationing parties were
invariably fired on, it was decided to withdraw it to the post.
With the object of covering the withdrawal, Major Hughes
proceeded with 50 rifles to take u}) a ))()siti()n in su])port.
The withdrawal commenced and was followed up immcMlialely
by th(* enemy, tin* coveriiif^ P'*^'"^y under Major 1 1 u^hes beconiing
heavily engaged. Much hand-to-hand fighting ensued, but
by 5 P.M. the survivors succeeded in reaching the post having
suilered casualties amounting to twenty -ojie killed (including
Major Hughes), ten wounded iind (»leven jirisoners. The
•enemy casualties were sonic (iltccn killed and t\vc?ity wounded.
35
IMajor Diivis commanding the Southern Waziristan Militia
learning of this action, moved out with 150 rifles on the 3rd
March from Wana and establishing heliogra])hic comnmnica-
tion with Sarwekai learnt that the garrison had sufficient
rations and stores for a prolonged resistance. The enemy
continued sniping at the post up to the 8th March on wliich
day they dispersed.
On receipt of the news of this affair the General Officer
Commanding Derajat Brigade ordered the moveable colunm
to proceed from Tank and to march via the Gonial route to
Sarwekai where it arrived on the 9th March. On the following
day the force advanced to Barwand in three parallel columns
with a view to driving off parties of the enemy who were
reported in that vicinity. Only slight opposition was encoun-
tered. Kirris and enemy property at Barwand were burnt
and the column withdrew suffering two wounded casualties.
The column returned on the 11th March to Khajuri Kach
where it remained in a standing camp until the 3rd April
when it began its withdrawal to Tank, which was carried out
without incident. Meanwhile the 44th Infantry Brigade
with the 23rd Mountain Battery had arrived in the Tank
area as a reserve.
The minor raiding which had been going on for some time
now culminated in an attack near the Gwalerai Narai on the
convoy from Khajuri Kach. The presence of enemy gangs
had already been reported and consequently the escort had
been strengthened. On the 9th April the convoy started
from Khajuri Kach for Nili Kach. When in the vicinity of
mile-stone 38, fire was suddenly opened on two piquet groups
going into position, killing or wounding every man. An
attempt w^as'made to re-establish the piquets but the increased
volume of fire forced the piqueting troops to withdraw. Our
total casualties were 18 killed and 2 wounded.
The 44th Brigade, which had meanwhile been withdrawn
from the Tank area, had already reached Kalabagh and Darya
Khan when orders were issued for the l/4th Gurkha Eifles
and one section 23rd Mountain Battery to return to Tank.
Two companies of the l/4th Gurkha Rifles wdth the section
23rd Mountain Battery remained at Tank while the other
half battalion joined the moveable column at Murtaza, where
it had moved from Tank on the 10th April.
A general rising of the Mahsuds was not a nticipated. and
it was not intended to take offensive action at present. It
36
was, however, necessary to keep open the communications to
our various posts, and, as far as possible, to suppress raiding.
With these objects in view the Derajat Brigade was strengthened
bv the 1 -4th Gurkha Kitles, one section 23rd Indian Mountain
Battery, 107th Pioneers and Xo. 7 Company Sappers and
^liners. The two hitter units were intended for the improve-
ment of communications and the construction of a bridge
across the Gumal near Murtaza.
The moveable cohimn at Murtaza under the command of
Brigadier-General Baldwin, D.S.O., was now composed of—
One squadron 11th K. E. 0. Lancers.
30th Mountain Battery.
nth Rajputs.
21st Punjabis.
67th Punjabis and
2 Companies l/4th Gurkha Rifles.
The Mahsuds who had attacked the convoy on the 9th
were reported to be still in the Sjnnkai
Moveable column ^^^^ rpj^-g ^g^ided General Baldwin to
ceararou o ana. ^\qq^j, ^]^q routc up to Waua and with this
object in view he began his advance on the 17th April and
arrived at Khajuri Kach on the 18th without op]:)Osition.
On the 20th the column moved to Tanai and the next day at
7 A.M. started for Wana. The route from Tanai crosses an
open plain for a mile and then enters the Sanzala Nala which
it ascends on the right bank under low liills for another mile
to Zaranni Oba where it turns west up the gorge of the Sanzala ;
it then crosses a ridge and emerges at the Karab Kot tower
six miles from Tanai : In advancing through this defile the
column encoimtered op])osition, but owing to' the skilful
handling of the piqueting troops and the close support of the
guns, the route was cleared for transport by 10 A.M.' The
strength of the Mahsuds was estimated at 400. Our casualties
amounted to 14 wounded. ^' •
The column readied W;uia on llie 21st without further
opposition and on the 24th returned to Tanai where it halted
\mtil the 2nd May, being well situated to sui)])()rt cit licr Wana
or Sarwekai.
On the 1st May a convoy of SO canicls left Nili Kacli for
Kliajuii Kach escorted l)y a force composed
Atuck in the Gwttleri ^^j .^^^ ^.^^\^.^ fp,„j \]^^. 2lst Punjabis, 2/G7th
^* " ' y- Punjabis and t)4th KusselTs Infantry.
37.
At 11 A.M. the piqueting troops for four ])iquest were
fired on and all, except one man shot down. The suj)ports
were attacked lieavily and forced to withdraw. Meanwhile
the convoy had begun to stampede and.it was decided to
return to Nili Kach, which was reached without further moles-
tation.
The piqueting troops from Khajuri Kach who had moved
out to meet those from Nili Kach reached Gwaleri Kotal
without incident, and hearing firing at 11 a.m. pushed on
and came across some 400 Mahsuds carrying away their
wounded and loot ; these were fired on. Hurrying to the
scene of the action, the Khajuri Kach party came upon our
dead and wounded, who were sent through to Nili Kach.
Our casualties during the day had been severe, and amounted
to 2 British officers, 2 Indian officers, and 51 Indian other
ranks killed and 1 British officer, 2 Indian officers and 50
Indian other ranks wounded.
News of this action reached General Baldwin at Tanai
the same afternoon, and he at once despatched a small column
to intercept the raiders on their return journey. The column
however, arrived too late to achieve its object. On the same
date the main column moved from Tanai, and arrived at
Nili Kach on the 3rd May.
The success of the attacks just described encouraged the
Mahsuds to further acts of aggression and small gangs were
constantly crossing the border and plundering the villages
of cattle and other property. Considerable bodies of Mahsuds
Avere also reported to be abroad and several attacks on our
posts were attempted.
On the night of the 6th-7th May, a party of Mahsuds
attacked the Tormandu tower. An iron
Pott?6?hray''''"''^' platform and shield had been constructed
for the assault, but the garrison was on
the alert, the attack was beaten off and the device abandoned.
On the 7th, the wing of the l-4th Gurkhas at Tank was ordered
to join the moveable column at Nili Kach, and a company of
the 54th Sikhs (F. F.) was despatched to Murtaza to protect
the parties of Pioneers working between that place and Spinkai,
the remainder of the regiment staying at Tank.
On the evening of 9th May, Major L. P. Collins, D.S.O.,
Action near Paiosi ^^^^^ Gurkha Eifles, who was in command
ziaratl'othMry. ^ ""'' ^^ Sarwckai received information from the
Political Agent who was present in the
-38
post that a strong party of Malisuds was at tlie Kliiiznia
Narai with the intention 'of returning to the Shahur.
Vs .\hijor Collins had received orders to intercept parties
of raiders he decided after consulting the Political Agent to
hold the route bv which the Mahsuds were most likely to
return. Two miles east of Sarwekai is the well-known land-
mark of Palosi Ziarat, situated at the head of the Danawat
\Urad which runs towards Haidari Kach, and at the foot of
Minnrez Sar which rises to a height of 4,077 feet, some 600
feet above it. Two miles again south-east of the Ziarat is-
the Sheranna Algad. This was the region, east and south of
Palosi Ziarat which :\Iajor Collins decided to piquet in order
to intercept the Mahsuds on their return journey. His force-
consisted of 250 rifles l/4th Gurkha Rifles, 80 of the Uth
Eaiputs and 120 of the Militia. With these he moved out
from Sarwekai at 1 A.M. on the 10th and posted one piquet
on Mamrez Sar and four others west of the Sheranna, while
it was still dark.
Soon after dawn smoke was seen issuing from a nullah
about one thousand yards distant from the most southerly
piquet and Subedar Mohibbullah, I.O.:\I., of the Militia with
50 Gurkhas and 50 Militia was detailed to get above this spot
knd drive the Mahsuds towards the line of piquets behind
which was the reserve. At 7 a.m. the Subedar succeeded in
surj)rising and opening fire on a party of the enemy who were
cooking their food.
The i\Iahsuds were caught completely off their guard-
no ordinary occurrence— and at first lost heavily, but there
was no panic amongst them and in an incredibly short time
they were counterattacking with extraordinary ferocity.
The rest of the lashhir reinforced by a party of Shahur Shaman
Khel now joined in t lie attack on the picquets. Fierce fighting
ensued during whicli our force gradually withdrew, hard
pressed by the enemy. A further rcMiiiorcement, in the shape
I,f 101) Dhurs, Nekzan Khel, under ({liulani Khan, was seen
from Sarwekai to be coming from the direction of l^arwand,
evidently with the intention of cutting in between the retiring
trr>ops and the post, but it was dispersed by the artillery of
the garrison, and the retireinml was fmt hei hicilitated by a
piciiiet of 50 rifles sent out on the right llniik Ir.nn Sarwekai
to the Waragha Tangi Sar. The i)ost was reached about
noon and as soon as the firing died down search ])arties were
sent out and were successful in collecting Ji certain number
39
of the wounded. The strength of the enemy, who were ahnost
exclusively armed with small bore rilles, was estimated at
between four and live hundred, and their losses were ascertained
to have been over 70 killed or died of wounds, amongst them
being their notorious leader. Slier Dil. Our casualties were
2 British olhcers, 1 Indian officer, and 30 rank and file killed,
3 Indian officers and 60 rank and file wounded, 70 Indian
rank and file missing.
Though our losses in this engagement were severe, those
inflicted on the enemy were also heavy and it was reported
that the Mahsuds regarded the encounter in the nature of a
defeat, and paid a tribute to the steadiness and valour dis-
played by the Gurkhas in the hand to hand fighting that
took place.
As the whole of the Mahsuds were now openly against us
it was clear that our defensive policy would have to be aban-
doned and a punitive expedition undertaken. The Shaman
Khel and Manzai sections, who hitherto had not been un-
friendly asked for a guarantee that they would not be held
in any way responsible for any future misdeeds of hostile
sections, but this of course, was impossible.
Punitive operations having been decided on, the force
shown in Appendix " A " was concentrated
saSSJned "P"'"*^"^' in the Dcrajat Area. The garrison of the
Tochi Area was also reinforced, the whole
being known as the Waziristan Field Force and comincr
under the command! of Major-General W. G. L. Beynon, C.B.,
CLE., D.S.O.
For Political duties the following officers were appointed
to the force : —
Sir John Donald, K.C.I.E., C.S.I. . Chief PoUtical Officer to tha
Waziristan Field Force.
Major F. H. Humphreys . . In charge of North Waziris-
tan.
Major R. J. W. Heale . . .In charge of the Bhittan-
nis.
J. A. 0. Fitzpatrick, Esq., CLE. . In charge of Wana and the
Mahsuds.
With regard to the policy to b ? adopted, it was recognised
that a final settlement with the Mahsuds could not be effected
without either occupying their country in strength for a
considerable period, or by instituting an extended blockade.
D
40
But such measures as these were out of the question during
the Great War, being too costly in men and money. There
remained an act of temporary but not ineffectual retaliation
for our recent losses and the present defiance, which would
perhaps at the same time afford a warning for the future.
This was a punitive expedition into the rich Khaisara valley,
which was ex])ected to ])roduce the desired effect without
exciting any feeling of alarm in Khost or Afghanistan gene-
rally, which had hitherto remained quiet and refrained from
interference. By devastating the Khaisara we should be punish-
ing the sections mainly responsible for the mischief done.
With this end in view, operations were finally sanctioned.
A force consisting of two brigades, each with a mountain
battery and a company of sap])ers and miners, was to concen-
trate at Wana. carry out punitive raids in the Khaisara valley,
and retui-n to Wana where it would remain until the effect
on the Mahsuds could be judged. The posts of Sarwekai,
Khajuri Kach, Nili Kach and Murtaza were to be
garrisoned by a battalion each, while two battalions and
some cavalry were to hold Jandola and the Derajat posts.
Four additional battalions were added to the Bannu
Brigade in the Tochi, where operations were to be of a defensive
nature only.
The rising of the river Indus and the floods occurring in
the Gonial greatly hampered the concentrat ion of troops and
accumulation of supplies. The Mahsuds, however, still con-
tinued their activities and on the 13th May raided two tongas,
7 miles from Tank. This gang was engaged next morning
in the hills, 4 miles west of Rori village by a detachment of
six sowars of the 11th Lancers and thirty rifles of the 54th
8ikhs from Rori post who inflicted casualties.
A convoy with much needed sup))lios for Wana and Sarwekai
had been delayed bv floods which had made
Attack noarthoChota 1.1 / i i r 1 '1 i /\ ^ r ii
GwaWi Pass, 10th May. ^'^^ Uomal untordablc. On account ot the
large number of camels, it was decided to
move the convoy in two echelons, and on the 15th May the
flrst of these, escorted by the 21st Pujijabis and the 1 1th
Rajputs, with two s(;ctions of mountain artillery, under
Hrirrjidicr-Cieneral Baldwin, started from Nili Kach and reached
Khajuri Kach without incident. The S(u:oji(l echelon, escorted
by the Ist Nepalesc Rifles, two companies of the l/4th (Jurkha
Itifh'S, and a section of mountaiji arliHcrv iin(h'i- tlic command
of Lieutenatit-Cohiuel Sealy, l/4th Gurkha Rifles left Nili Kach
41
the following day, troops from Kliajuri Kacli co-operating
in the piqueting duties from that post to the Gwaleri Pass.
The advanced troops from Nili Kach reached the summit
of the Ohota Gwaleri Pass at 8-15 a.m. witliout encountering
opposition, but on the van guard moving forward up the
main nala bed it was ambushed and all but two of its numbers
shot down. Large numbers of Mahsuds were then observed
on the hills in the vicinity. Artillery fire was opened on these
causing them to scatter only to reappear later and fire on the
main body which now had reached the slopes of the Chota
Gwaleri. Reports were received at the time that the enemy
was moving in rear of the convoy. Numbers of them could
also be seen east of point 4601 {see Map No. 4) from which
position they were maintaining a desultory fire. Lieutenant-
Colonel Sealy decided that it was not possible to get the convoy
through, and at noon began the return march to Nili Kach,
but owing to the difficulty in collecting the dead and wounded
the echelon did not reach the post until 8 p.m. Our casualties
were 17 killed, 9 wounded, and 4 missing.
Our losses on this occasion were attributable directly to
the premature advance of the van guard along the nala bed
before the establishment of at least two essential piquets on
features commanding the route. The sudden onslaught of
the tribesmen threw the supporting troops into confusion
and before a counter-attack could be organized the Mahsuds
had stripped the dead and wounded and retired under the
fire of their covering parties.^
Meanwhile the troops at the Gwaleri Pass endeavoured
without success to engage the retiring enemy. Attempts to
establish communication with the troops from Nili Kach also
failed.
The news of the return of the second echelon to Nili Kach
soon reached General Baldwin and the Headquarters of the
Waziristan Force, and instructions were issued for both echelons
to remain where they were until the arrival of reinforcements
which were being sent up.j
Brigadier-General Southey commanding the 43rd Brigade
at Tank was ordered to proceed with the 54th Sikhs, the 107th
Pioneers, and one section 23rd Mountain Battery as
reinforcements to Nili Kach, and from that place,
with the assistance of Lieutenant-Colonel Sealy's troops,
to attack the hostile lashkar, reported as numbering about
2,000, and to clear the Gwaleri Pass. The crossing of the
D 2
42
Gomal, still swollen by floods, delayed General Southey., and
ii was not until the 20tli that he arrived at Nili Kach. The
next day the column left for Khajuri Kach where it arrived
without having encountered any opposition. General
Baldwin's force co-operated from Khajuri Kach. as also did
5 aeroplanes based on Tank. The convoys now pushed on to
AVana and Sarwekai under escort of General Baldwins troops,
General Southey remaining at Khajuri Kach. Both places
were rationed with a further month's supplies, and the escoit
returned, after leaving the l/4th Gurkha Eifles at Sarwekai.
Luring the advance of the rationing convoys a half-hearted
attack had been made on "Wana Fort on the 18th, but the
enemv withdrew to Inzar Narai after three hours' desultory
sniping. Sarwekai jDost was also sniped on the 21st and
22nd, but without effect.
Reijorts now came in from political sources that the
lashhars had dispersed and that most of the tribesmen were
busy sowing rice and maize and harvesting barley, and that
I he reaping of wheat was to begin shortly. A lull in hostilities
therefore seemed probable, and the general feeling among
the [Mahsuds was said to be in favour of an early agreement
vrith Government.
For the proposed operations into the Khaisara valley it
was necessary to have a reserve of at least
opfmS!^ P^^ ^^ three weeks' supplies at Wana, but the
difficulties of concentration both of these
supplies and the troops on account of the rising of the Indus
and the continual floods of the Gomal, made it necessary to
reconsider the line of advance. It had been intended that the
striking force should advance to Wana via the Gomal route.
On account of the delay which had been caused, and of the
uncertainty as regards the Gomal river, it was now proposed
to concentrate all troops at Jandola and to advance to Wana
rid the Shahur, still maintaining the Khaisara valley as our
objective. From a political point of view this was less desir-
able, as the Shahur route led us very near the border line of
(•(•rtain sections of the tribes who were re])orle(l wavering
lictW'. en liostih; neutrality and active hostility, but this objec-
tion was no longer valid loi- cncji the Manzai section had
taken part in lli(» attack on (he convoy on the ICth instant.
Furthermr)re, it was ini])()rtant that the advance should take
place without further delay, so that the standing and newly
harvested (•ro))s couM be destroyed before they had been
threbhcd and buried.
43
The advantages and disadvantages of the two routes,
briefly stated, are as followed : —
The Gonial route is outside Mahsud territory and is less
liable to attack than the Shahur. There
Comparison of Gomal • ^ ^ ^ ^^ ^ rp.^j^j^ ^^ Murtaza, and,
and febahur routes. • <• i • i i i r< i
II a bridge were constructed over the bomal
at the latter place, mechanical transport could go straight
through to Nili Kach. As a set-of! against these advantages,
however, the Gonial is constantly in flood ; the country is
difficult, affording great opportunities for a few riflemen to
hold up whole convoys ; also, the stages are long and the-
climate is unhealthy.
The Shahur route, on the other hand, except for three
miles through the Shahur Tangi, is easier to protect ; the
stages are shorter, which is a consideration during the trying
heat of summer and though floods do occur they only close
the route for a few hours and are not so frequent or prolonged
as those in the Gumal. Further, a concentration of troops
at Jandola would have a steadying effect on the Bhittannis
and would strengthen them in their resistance to attempts
by Mahsud raiders to cross their hills. Finally, it was calcu-
lated that by using the Shahur route, the punitive operations
into Khaisara could be carried out some ten days earlier
than via the Gomal.
The disadvantages of this route are that it runs through
Mahsud territory, and though it is more easily defensible it
is also more liable to attack. Moreover, it had to be borne
in mind that no stage of the Jandola route, via Chasan Kach
and Khirgi, was practicable for wheels and consequently that
camel transport would be necessary from Tank onwards.
It was therefore decided that the advance should take
place via the Shahur, and that the Sarwekai garrison should
be increased to two battalions and two guns before the with-
drawal from the Gomal began. All this, however, was not
possible at once, because • supplies could not be transported
up to the Gomal posts and to Sarwekai without a considerable
weakening of the striking force.
General Southey, with the 11th RajputS' the 54th Sikhs,
. ^ and the 1st NeT3alese Rifles, with 4 guns
oomai posts rationed. ^^ ^^^ ^^^^ Mountain Battery, was ordered
to proceed up the Gomal, via Khajuri Kach and Dargai Oba,
and ration all posts, including Sarwekai, up to the 1st July
at their strengths as they then were. The force left Khajuri
44
Kach on the 2ik1 June, carrying out its mission and returning
without encountering any opposition. The cohimn then
marched r/a ^lurtaza to Jandola, where it arrived on the
9th June. By tlie following day the concentration of troops
which had been going on there in the meantime, was completed.
The order of Battle of the South Waziristan Field Force
will be found in Appendix B.
The heat since the middle of May had been severe, the
thermometer registering 120 degrees by day in tents, with a
minimum of 90 degrees by night in Tank, while at Jandola
it was sliojlitlv cooler.
The Boyal Air Force, which had been carrying out numerous
reconnaissances, had now obtained a suificient number of
photographs to compile a map of the Shahur route.
On the 29th ]\Iay. the Mahsuds held a jirga at Kaniguram^
, . , , , , . which was attended by delegates from
Attitude of the Amir. jr-i . * x xi • x' 17 i T^• J
Khost. At this meetmg razi Din read a
letter which he had received from the Amir of Afghanistan,
forbidding Mahsuds to go to Kabul for allowances as long
as they were at war with the Indian Government, or to fight
unless their country was invaded by troops. The jirga passed
a resolution that they were willing to resume friendly relations
vdxh the Indian Government, and to return all stolen rifles,
provided their prisoners and detenus were released and their
allowances continued, but that otherwise they would fight.
The Amir's letter promised to have an important bearing on
the situation, for it showed the ]\Iahsuds that they could not
expect any assistance from Afghanistan and at the same time
it held out some hope of a temporary settlement without an
expedition. This hope, was however, of short duration and
we soon found ourselves forced to adopt punitive measures.
Then came the attack on Tut Narai post, an example of border
land daring which has few equals even in the jinnals (J the
Mahsuds.
On the 'U)tli May, news was received that hishlur of 1.200
liad collecled with the object of making an.
diately warned, and a coinoy, wliidi was
returning from Datta Khel, was ])ushed through to .Miranshah
without halting at Boya. About half-past t(Mi o'clock on the
following morning a party of five men and two girls was not iced
a])proaching 'I'ut Narai ])ost. 1'he party sat down in the
vicinity of the j)ost and entered into conversation wilJi some
45
sepoys of the militia g«arrison who were standing close by.
Shortly afterwards three of the Mali suds, apparently unarmed,
approached the wire entanglement and persuadc^l a se])oy to
purchase for them some sweets from the post bunniah. As
the sepoy approached the main gate of the post he was closely
followed, but without realizing it, by the three Mahsuds. In
response to a shout from the sentry on the wall of the post
the sepoy turned to order the Mahsuds outside the wire entangle-
ment. It was too late. One of the Mahsuds producing a
revolver shot the sepoy while the other two dashed for the
gate about five yards distant reaching it at the same time
as the guard commander. Before the latter could close the
wicket gate he too was killed. In an instant the three Mahsuds
were attacking the remainder of the guard shooting them down
before they could reach their rifles. At the first shot, the two
Mahsuds who were with the girls fired at the sentry on the
wall, and then ran towards the post followed by the girls
who were throwing off their disguise. The latter turned out
to be ex-sepoys of the Militia. In the meantime a party of
about 30 Mahsuds who had been concealed in the holly-oak
jungle near by entered the post and kept the remainder of the
garrison whose arms were locked in the bell of arms, confined
to their barrack rooms. The sentries on the wall were rushed,
but the Subadar in command seizing a wounded sentry's
rifle continued firing at the enemy until wounded himself in
three places. The telegraph office clerk was chased from his
room and murdered, but not before he had sent off the message
— '' Please help, raiders are plundering " — to the Political
Agent at Datta Khel. This message was received at 11-6 a.m.
and was repeated immediately to Miranshah, whilst all local
cJiiglias were collected and sent to Tut Narai. The prompt
assistance rendered by these chighas, who hurried to the scene
from three directions, combined with the fire from towers
which command the post on two sides, stopped the looting
and resulted in the raiders being driven off. The post was
occupied by the cJiighas at about 12-30 p.m. their numbers
amounting to some 450. The Mahsuds however, had succeeded
in breaking open the bell of arms and decamping with 59 rifles,
120,000 rounds of ammunition, and Rs. 581 in cash. Our
casualties were six killed and eight wounded, those of the
enemy being estimated at about a dozen killed and many
wounded. The raiders must have numbered about six
hundred, of whom perhaps five hundred were Abdullai from
Makin.
46
The success of the Mahsuds on this occasion may be attri-
buted to the care with which their plans had been arranged,
and to their knowledge of the habits of the garrison. For
example, the day chosen for the attack was Thursday, the
weekly holiday, when it was certain that no outdoor ])arade
or tield training would disclose the presence of large numbers
of tribesmen concealed in the vicinity of the post. The time
too Wcis well selected. By that hour it could be anticipated
that the inspection of rifles would have been completed, and
the garrison engaged in bathing, or washing clothes at the
pond below the post, or enjoying a siesta.
The ^lahsuds too must have noticed and taken advan-
tage of the error made shortly before, in changing the position
of the sentry watching the main gate. Instead of being on
the wall the sentry was posted formerly near the wicket gate,
from which place he was able to watch the guard room, bell
of arms and magazine.
On the receipt of the news Major G. B. Scott, D.S.O.,
commanding the Northern Waziristan Militia left ]\tiranshah
immediately with a small column to re-garrison the post.
On arrival at Tut Narai at 9 a.m. on the 1st June the post
was found to have been but little damaged, and after rein-
forcing the post with militia the column returned on the
following day without finding any trace of the enemy.
The Tut Narai incident now raised the question of the
distribution of troops in the Tochi and
inlhf'T^hi.''''''^^'''^^' t^i^ P^^i^y *^ ^^ pursued in that area.
The Chief Commissioner of the North-West
Frontier Province considered that we should eitlier (a) evacuate
Datta Khel, Tut Narai, and Spina Khaisora, wliich were, he
contended, of no strategic im])ortance and would only draw
attacks, or (h) send a Brigade into Mashud country fioni tlie
Upper To.chi. Neither of these proposals was considered
desirable, and it was eventually decided that a stronger force
filiould be located at Miransliah to deal willi hostile i<iids in
the upper Toclii, ]>ii1 llial the ])oli(y should remain one of
active d(*fc'ncc.
Ah Major-(icncral Beynon iiad now assunu'd jxMsonal
command of tlie force wliich was to advance from Jandola,
it was decided to form the North ;ind South Waziristan VuAd
Forces, the troojm in the i>annn art a comitrising the hniner
and those in the Dcrajat Urea llie hitter, the w hoh' (oming
directly undci- ihr command of (Jcncral Sii- Aithui- l)aii'ctt,
47
O.C.B., K.C.S.I., K.C.V.O., A.D.C., Commanding the Nortliern
Army, wlioee headquarters werq to remain at Murree.
Troops of the South Waziristan Field Force remained as
shown in Appendix " B " while those of the Northern Force
were now distributed as follows : —
At Bannu —
31st D. C. 0. Lancers (less 1 squadron).
2nd Gwalior I. S. Lancers (less 1 squadron).
1 section 29th Indian Mountain Battery.
72nd Punjabis.
2/1 03rd Mahratta Light Infantry.
^ 95th Infantry.
At Miransliah —
I squadron 31st D. C. 0. Lancers.
1 squadron 2nd Gwalior Lancers.
29th Mountain Battery (less 1 section).
I /1st Kent Battalion.
10th Jats.
Shere Regiment.
Miransliah battalion (for protection of camp).
25th Punjabis.
For work on road —
12th Pioneers.
The whole under the command of Brigadier-General the
Hon'ble G. G. Bruce, M.V.O.
The lines of communications were organised as follows : —
(a) Administrative control from Rawalpindi to Kohat,
Bannu, Tank and Darya Khan Railway stations,
inclusive, under an Inspector -General of Communi-
cation with headquarters at Mari Indus, directly
responsible to the Northern Army Commander.
(b) In the Derajat area, under General Beynon's orders, a
defence commander and Inspector of Communica-
tions from Darya Khan and Tank stations.
(c) In the Bannu area, under the orders of General
Bruce, an Inspector of Communications from
Kohat and Bannu to Miranshah, who would also
be Defence Commander cis-frontier.
As this Northern Waziristan Force was not called upon
after this date to make any movement, we may now leave
it and return to the Derajat area and the events that occurred
there.
48
On the 1st June a Bhituiniii jirtjd was held at Tank and
it was decided to enroll one Jnmdred of the Thatta section
of the Daman Bhittannis for piqueting the two lower sections
of the Jandola road, which duty they began on the 16th June.
Early on the 7th June a piqueting detachment of two
A*f-.i,«« «;.,».t;«.T British officers and 89 men of the 2/lst
Attack on piqueting i i t-» • » t r n
party near Khirgi, 7th Gurkha Eiilcs procecdmg irom Zam post
•^"^®- towards Khirgi were attacked by a party
of enemy estimated at five hundred. The terrain where this
took place is flat and stony, and covered with small bushes.
The enemy attacked the advanced screen and attempted to
surround the whole party, but were driven of! after a fight
lasting twenty minutes and retired in the direction of the
Shuza. Our casualties were thirty-five killed, 2nd-Lieutenant
Forster and seventeen other ranks wounded and three missing.
2nd-Lieutenant Forster was shot by a w^ounded jVIahsud lying
on the ground after the fight was over. The Mahsuds were
reported to have lost heavily including two notorious Shingi
raiders and a ]\Ianzai maliks.
A few days later a WaJir havildar commanding Tiarza
tower occupied by a mixed detachment of the Southern Waziris-
tan ^lilitia succeeded in deserting with twenty-five rifles,
thirteen boxes of ammunition and four hand-grenades.
A relation who had chanced to be passing with some laden
bullocks was partaking of food inside the tower, when the
havildar on the plea that the reserve was insufficient sent
out the garrison except one Afridi sentry and the Adam Khel
Afridi muharrir to collect firewood.
The Wazirs seizing their opportunity disarmed the sentry
and overpowering the muharrir loaded their booty on the
bullocks and made good their escape to xMahsud country.
On hearing this news a party of ]\Iachi Khel ]\Tahsuds
removed the kits and rations and burnt the tower, which has
8inc(! n(jt been re-built.
The .MaliBuds had now bcci^nic alaini('(| at the concentration
of troops, and although certain of the maliks were undoubtedly
in favour ol \i settlement, tlic majority ol' tlic^ tribesmen,
encouraged by .Mulhi l^'a/l Din, were bejit upon (>|»p(>sing our
advance. The Wana and Toclii Wazirs were nioie or less
quiet, and had so far refrainctl from joining tin* Mahsuds.
On our side tin* concentration of trr)()]>s was complete and by
the 12tli June all |)r('pjnations for the advance were ready.
PLATE NO.
J^^-.
^■^
I'll.uo. 1..V X.i :il S.|ii:i.li'oi, l; \ I
VERTICAL PHOTOGRAPH OF ENTRANCE TO SHAHUR TANGI.
CHAPTER V.
Operations in the Shahur and Khaisara Valleys, between
12th June and 17th August 1917.
Frequent reports had been coming in that the Mahsuds
were collecting in large numbers to oppose
naSnceSjandX ^he advance of the striking force whicli
they anticipated would begin operations
in the valley of the Tank Zam and, as reliable information had
been received that a considerable body of the enemy had
arrived in the neighbourhood of the junction of the Shahur
and Tank Zam, the column moved out from Jandola on 12th
June to attack it. The enemy, however, did not make a stand
but retired up the Tank Zam followed by a detachment of the
11th Lancers which withdrew after destroying some hamlets
and stocks of fodder. Air reconnaissance showed that no
large bodies of tribesmen were in the vicinity so the force
returned to camp followed up by a few of the enemy who
contented themselves with sniping at long range. Our casual-
ties were three wounded. |
The following day the 43rd Brigade carried out a recon-
naissance to the eastern entrance of the Shahur Tangi, the
Sappers and Miners and 107th Pioneers, at the same time
clearing a double canal track up the river bed. Aeroplanes
co-operating with the troops reported all quiet as far as Haidari
Kach and information, afterwards confirmed, was received
that the lashkar up the Tank Zam had dispersed owing to
the heat and scaicity of food.
It had been arranged that whenever the column moved
forward it should* be accompanied by a convoy carrymg two
days' supplies for the whole force in addition to two days'
supplies in regimental and brigade supply column. In view
of possible opposition at the Shahur Tangi and uncertainty
regarding the state of the route through the defile, Major-
General Beynon decided to advance to Haidari Kach in two
echelons ; the first of which would occupy the heights com-
manding this dangerous gorge and protect the passage of the
second with the convoy. Accordingly on the 14th June the
Passage of Shahur 45th Brigade movcd from Jandola to
Tangi, 14th and 15th Chagmalai ou the right bank of the Mastang
"^"'^®' Algad at its junction with the Shahur
( 49 )
50
close to the entrance of the tangi and there pitched camp,
without encountering any opposition.
On the following day the main body of the force, the 43rd
Brigade accompanied by the 21st Punjabis, 127th Baluchis,
and the convoy marched from Jandola to Haidari Kach,
covered by troops from the 45th Brigade who occupied the
heights commanding the tangi, the majority of the piquets
being posted on the left bank. The rapid passage of the
lengthy baggage and supply trains demonstrated the value
of the double camel track which had been cleared so expedi-
tiously throughout the defile.
To assist the advance of the main force a detachment
from Sarwekai made a demonstration towards Turan China.
This operation was carried out successfully, three Mahsuds
being killed and two taken prisoners at Kamardin village.
The opposition was slight and the detachment returned without
casualties to Sarwekai.
The 4oth Brigade having joined the main body of the
force at Haidari Kach the troops were employed in improving
the double camel road through the Shahur Tangi and in
destroying villages, crops, watercourses, and mills, in the area
around Haidari Kach, Turan China, and the Danawat Algad,
and in reconnoitring the route towards Bar wand.
The Mahsuds evidently calculating on the force advancing
up the Tank Zam had not removed their stores of fodder
and wood, while the rice fields too had been planted recently.
The thorough devastation of this area had an excellent
political and military effect.
From information received it was now evident that the
advance of the force and the destruction
Advance to Barwand, ^ • ^^ ^|^^ Shaluir had rouscd the .Mahsuds ;
I'.iih Juno. .11 1 • • 1 1 11
convinced by this time that they would
not be attacked from the Tochi and they decided to oj)])()se
the advance up the Shahur. Tliis it was })robable they wuukl
attempt to do near Jiarwand, as it was reported that a large
laalikar was to assemble at Ispana Raghza on the 19th. Miilhi
llamzulhih too j)romised the assistance (►!" a contingent of
Wa/irs from Wana and Shakai. As there seemed no doubt
that considiirablc numbers of tribesmen wiM'e coll(»cting the
l/4th (lurkha Itilh'S and I section 'M)\\\ .Mountain J^;ittcry
were ordered t(i move froui Sarwekai on th(^ l!)tli and ymi
the force at Barwand.
51
It ap})care(I from reports and aeroplane reconnaissances
that the Slialuir stream at this time of tlic year did not reach
Barwand and that it woukl be necessary for tlie column to camp
in the neighbourhood of Ispana Raghza to obtain a water
supply.
On the 19th June the force moved forward from Haidari
Kach, where the 21st Punjabis and 127th Baluchis had been
established in a strong post. Air reconnaissances reported
that no enemy had been seen ahead of the column, and the
machines returned to their base at Tank. As soon however,
as the advanced guard reached the heights which rise above
the. left bank three miles east of Barwand considerable oppo-
sition was encountered. Here and on the plateau on the
right bank which is covered with small trees and bushes some
1.500 of the enemy had collected to oppose the advance.
The 45th Brigade which was carrying out the piqueting duties
drove back the enemy who attacked several piquets and
contested fiercely each vantage point.
The 2/6th Sussex Regiment advancing steadily cleared
the VA'ooded Barwand plateau and the 55th Rifles captured
the high ground on the left bank of the Shahur, both regiments
having several casualties. Just after noon a storm which had
been threatening all the m.orning broke and it rained heavily
for about twenty minutes. At 4 p.m. the opposition to the
advanced guard was such that further progress would neces-
sitate a general action, and as the river was coming down in
spate it was decided to camp on the plateau about one mile
north of the ruins of Barwand village. The guns were in action
till dark covering the construction of the piquets, which was
completed in the face of considerable opposition, and also in
supporting the rear guard which was hampered by casualties
received close to camp.
Spies reported at dusk that the Mahsud lasJiJcar had collected
at Ispana Raghza and intended to attack
Batw:nti9th°JuSr' tte camp that night. _ All that occurred;
however, was intermittent sniping into
camp, and a determined effort to capture a piquet of the 54th
Sikhs posted on a spur on the left bank of the stream. The
piquet was held by Subedar Hukm Dad and thirty Punjabi
Mussulmans. This party had been unable to sangar itself
during daylight as any movement brought down an accurate
fire from a near and commanding ridge, but it managed to
establish itself on a ledge of rock which commanded the slope
on the enemy side.
j2
\fter dusk tlie enemy who numbered several hundred,
made repeated efforts to rush the })iquet, creeping up to withm
twenty vards and calling on the defenders — their co-
reli^T^ionists —to relinquish their arms, on which they
\vould be allowed to withdraw unharmed. These attacks
continued throughout the night. Assistance was rendered
from camp by searchlight and gan fire directed by lamp signal
from the piquet. The day dawned and the piquet was at
U^st relieved, only one bomb and three rounds per man
remaining ; four men had been killed and the Indian officer and
twelve sepoys wounded. The courage and determination of
the defenders together with the possession of bombs and the
assistance rendered by the guns undoubtedly saved the piquet
from extermination.*
The success with which our troops and conv^oys in the
Gonial had been attacked had no doubt given the Mahsuds
^reat confidence in dealing with small bodies of our troops.
The gallant defence made by this undaunted piquet of the
o4th Sikhs and the casualties it inflicted did much to inspire
the tribesmen with respect for, and fear, of our troops, and
contributed in no small measure to the final settlement.
On the 20th the camp was moved to the western end of
the Ispana Raghza plateau where there is a perennial water
supply from the river, which just below this locality disappears
underground. The enemy made a determined attempt to
check the advance of the force and held a spur flanking the
Raghza on its northern side, and dominating it. From this
they were driven by the 43rd Brigade, the spur referred to
above being attacked and carried with conspicuous dash by
the l/25th London Regiment and l/4th Gurkha Rifles. The
Mahsud lakhsar withdrew to the north and the occupation of
the Raghza was not further disputed excej)t by a few snipers.
Our casualties were six killed and sixteen wounded. On this
day the force was joined by the 11th Rajputs from Sarwekai.
The climate was now more ]>leasant and the nights cool.
A halt was made iji order that sup])lies rnigbt be collected
for the next advance, and the work of devastation systemati-
cally carri<'<l (Mil in iIk' neighbourhood.
• Our total casualtioi f.r the 10th wore : 1» kill<<l iti.l :} :{ wouiidcd.
53
Due north of Ispana Jvagliza and about two iiiiles from it
over a ])ass, is tlie village of Nanu in a
la ^^^2^ Jmio^"^"" ^'^ valley of the same jiaiue running eastward
and joining the Spli Toi. This village was
the home of Kutab Khan, the chief nialik of the Manzai section,
a grandson of Umar Khan and son of Badshah Khan — names
well known in the history of our relations with the tribe.
Since the village was being used as a base by the lakhsar
now in the field, it was thought that its destruction would
affect the moral of the Mahsuds, and Major-General Beynon
decided to attack Nanu on the 21st.
On the night of the 20th-21st an alarm was raised on the
north face of the camp that about forty of the enemy had been
seen near the perimeter. Some wild firing broke out but it
was soon checked, and it was found that no attack in force
was being made. It is not unlikely that such an attack was
contemplated, but finding the camp prepared the enemy
abandoned the attempt. The drums of the Mahsuds in the
hills to the north could be heard distinctly, and in the morning
considerable numbers of the enemy were to be seen on the
ridges near the Nanu Pass. The pass itself is commanded
by three rocky eminences on the north-west and the whole
terrain is admirably suited to defence. The Mahsuds made
use of every advantage, and had constructed well sited and
constructed sangars on the forward slopes of the hills.
Shortly after the 45th Brigade had begun its advance
towards the pass air reconnaissance reported that about three
hundred of the enemy had been observed in the vicinity of
Nanu, and it was evident that the tribesmen had determined
to make a stand on this occasion. The 2/6th Sussex Kegiment
moved against the pass itself while the 2/1 st Gurkhas were
directed on the high ground to the south of the Pass and the
Mahindradal Regiment ordered to seize the rocky heights
commanding the pass on the north-west, the 55th Rifles being
held in reserve.
As it was soon apparent that considerable opposition would
be met the 43rd Brigade was ordered to reinforce the 45th
Brigade with its artillery, and to hold a battalion in readiness
to assist if needed. Some difficulty was experienced by the
2/1 st Gurkha Rifles and the Nepalese regiment in capturing
the rocky heights dominating the pass but by 10 a.m. with
the aid of steady and accurate gunfire the whole ridge had
been carried, the Mahindradal Regiment in particular dis-
54
tinguishing itself. .Major Harte., 6tli Gurklia Kitles, Senior
Su})ervising otHcer of the regiment was killed at the head of
his men, just before the summit was reached. The pass was
occupied and the Sussex Regiment pushed on to piquet the
hills commanding the village, and to pursue the enemy who was
being harassed in his retreat by the low-fiying aeroplanes.
Two guns of No. 1 British Mountain Battery now came up
the pass and were of great assistance in supporting the advanced
piquets, which were under heavy and accurate tire.
The work of demolition began and the village was com-
pletely destroyed by 2 p.m. In the meantime all animals
except those absolutely necessary were sent down the steep
and rocky track to camp. As the Lewis guns were to be
man-handled the mules were also sent back to camp. All
impediments were thus cleared away, and the withdrawal
began at 2 p.m. The piquets retired quickly and skilfully
and the whole brigade returned with slight molestation to
camp at 4-45 p.m. Our casualties were twelve killed and forty
wounded.
It appeared from information subsequently received that
the Mahsuds had intended to make a bold
First overturea for ^^^^ ^^ ^^ ^^^ advauce of the force.
peace by Mahsuds. . , ,. ,^ , t . , . ,^
Their defeat however, brougnt home to them
the futility of opposing the Government, and three days later
the first emissaries of peace began to come into camp.
On the 22nd June the 43rd Brigade destroyed a large
villafj^e in the Waspas valley known as Shah Salim Mela. This
was effected with little o])position although the enemy had
made careful preparations for opposing the advance of a force
attacking up the valley. The whole of the defence was turned
by the troops advancing along the hill commanding the valley
below. This action disconcerted the lAIahsiids who retired
ujjstrcam towards the Kliaisara. The village was deserted.
Its liuiidred houses and all proj)erty were effectively burned
and the force withdrew followed by a few snij)ers. Our
casualties were one killed and three wounded. A sulliciency
of HU])plie8 had by this time bc^en collected at Ls])ana JIaghza
to enable a })ost to be establislicd \\\vvv and a, raid made into
the Khaisara valley.
The general situation was now rcj)oi ((mI to be as follows : —
^ , , fjtsh/idrs numberinj:^ about four thousand
Situation, 22ndJuno. ,, ii i i , \ c xi •
in all were collected near the lorce their
numbers fluctuating as j>ortioiis went away for rations. Small
55
parties had been organised to harass the troops, but none
had come down below tlie Shahur Tangi. The routes threaten-
ing Jandola-Tank line w^ere said to be clear. According to
s})ies, the Manzai, Shaman Khel, and jnobably, the Bahlolzai,
were quite ready to open negotiations, if given full safe-
conducts. Fearing danger from Datta Khel, the AbduUai
and Bahlolzai whose homes lay towards the Toclii had not
joined the lashkars in the Khaisara. The Bhittannis were
working well in piqueting the Jandola-Zam line and our own
arrangements for convoys through Haidari Kach were, on
tlie wdiole, satisfactory ; the route through the Shahur Tangi
had been blocked on the 20th by spate and delays occurred
on several occasions, while there had been a good deal of
sickness, mainly diarrhoea, among the troops on the Line of
Communication.
On the 23rd, the 11th Rajputs, Mahendradal Regiment,
1 section 30th Mountain Battery, and half
RagMrdJune'''"' ^ squadron nth Lancers, were left to
guard Ispana Raghza post and secure the
passage of convoys, while the remainder of the force, namely
seven battalions, twelve guns, two companies Sappers and
Miners and a half-squadron, moving on light scale of baggage,
without tents and "with three days' supplies, advanced to
Narai Raghza, about seven miles, burning villages, destroying
water-mills and blowing up towers on the way. The 45th
Brigade furnished the advanced guard and piqueting troops
and left camp at 6 a.m. being followed by a working party of
the 7th and 11th Companies of Sappers and Miners to improve
the route where needed. The most formidable obstacle of
this stage is the Tangi below^ Narai Raghza, which is about
forty yards long and narrows down in places to twelve feet.
It is commanded by steep heights on both sides and it was
expected that the Mahsuds would meet our advance here.
But there were only a few of them on the hills by the Tangi
which W'cre cleared by gun fire and occupied by our piquets,
the Mahsuds retiring to the hills surrounding the Narai Raghza.
The advanced guard reached this plateau about 1 p.m. and was
heavily attacked from the north. The road through the
Tangi was now improved and all transport was through by
3 P.M.
The enemy meanwhile, were tenaciously holding the
heights on the west, north, and north-east of the plateau ;
the laying out of camp was done under fire ; and the piquets
56
were posted with difficulty. A piquet of the l/25th London
Kegiment on a liill to the west of camp, was hard pressed
for some time, but it was sujiported by gun fire and ultimately
protected by the advance of a company of the l/4th Gurkha
Rifles who occupied the spur on the north of it. This company
met with considerable opposition and made slow progress,
losing two men killed and seven wounded. It was relieved by
the 1st Nepalese Rifles and did not return to camp till 9-30
P.M. much hampered in the dark by casualties.* After
10 P.M. the attacks ceased and the night passed quietly. A
reconnoitring party of the l/4th Gurkha Rifles which had
gone out in the direction of the Shrawanai Pass returned to
camp a' 6-30 p.m. and reported that the heights on each side
were held by the enemy. Our casualties this day were three
killed and ten wounded.
On the 24th June the 43rd Brigade was ordered to seize
the Shrawanai Pass and hold it to enable
wan^l Pass,"2T4 W " the 45th Brigade to pass through and carry
out the work of destruction in the Khaisara.
At 5-40 a.m. the guns took up a position four hundred
yards north-west of the camp to cover the advance of the
43rd Brigade.
The position held by a body of the enemy on the north of
the pass was indicated by aeroplanes which dropped smoke
balls. As this position was seen to be some distance from
the pass, the 1st Nepalese Rifles were sent to occupy a hill
between it and the line of march to the pass. This was accom-
plished without any opposition and deceived the Mahsuds
into thinking that an attack on their position was intended.
The enemy regarding the Nepalese as an advanced guard
of this attack remained where they were. The l/4th Gurkha
Rifles now occupied the Jiills on the south of the ])ass which
they reached without o])position at 6-45 A.m. and began to
move west piqueting the route. The 54th Sikhs, at the same
time, seized the pass itself and occupied the hills on the north
of it with the Nepalese on their right flank. The enemy were
thus cut oil from the })ass and found their j)osition useless.
The piqueting of tli<' pass was completed by [D A.M., and
the 45th I>rigade then movcnl tluoiiirli tlic pi([ucts to the
summit and tlience to tln^ ridge, about, a mile further on,
ovc^rlooking the Khaisara villages. 'Hie rapid advance (►f this
brigade enabhid it to occuj)y the ridge before the .Mahsuds
could us.scTiible in sufficient strength to resist. 'I'liey were |
57
now streaniiiig down the western slope of the hills north of
the p«iss, but our guns posted on the hotal with the 43rd Brigade
gave effective su})port to the advancing troops and to their
piquets on the right which from this time to that of the retire-
ment were incessantly attacked. A few Mahsuds gained the
northern extremity of the- ridge and constructed samjars
there. During the piqueting and subsequent advance aero-
planes with Lewis guns harassed the enemy, and assisted our
operations.
The destruction of villages east of the stream and north
of Kundiwan was now begun. The villages of Abbas Kliel,
Warza, Manzai, Nana Khel, and Ghazi Kot were set on fire
and destroyed, and some of the Machi Khel towers to the south
were blov/n up. Most of the opposition came from the Mahsuds
who were attacking the right flank guard. While the 2/1 st
Gurkha Rifles and the Royal Sussex Regiment were carrying
out the destruction of Abbas Khel, which is a long and scattered
village, a determined rush was made on two platoons of the
55th Rifles, who were occupying a ruined graveyard, 1,000
yards to the north of the first group of houses. The enemy
came within three hundred yards before being driven off by
rapid fire.
The withdrawal had been ordered for 2 p.m. but casualties
among the 55th Rifles necessitated its postponement for half
an hour. The retirement was followed up closely to within
three hundred yards of the summit of the pass, which was
reached by 3 p.m. by the rearguard of the 45th Brigade. The
dangerous flank was the northern one where the ground is
much broken and covered with bushes. Here two sections of
the 23rd Mountain Battery, which had been covering the
retirement to the pass, found themselves in some danger of
being cut off, but on receiving orders to retire they limbered
up smartly and went at a rapid pace up the narrow track to
the pass and down to their original positions north of the camp
covering two miles in three quarters of an hour.
The rear guard of the 43rd Brigade was furnished by the
54th Sikhs and one of their piquets was also in danger for
a time. About thirty of the enemy had collected in dead
ground three hundred yards from the piquet, and, in spite oi
heavy covering fire from other piquets and supports, succeeded
in firing two volleys into the piquet on its retirement. The
enemy did not continue the pursuit beyond the summit of the
e2
58
pass, and camp was reached at 6 p.m. Our casualties this
day were five killed, twenty-six wounded, and one missing.
Two emissaries from a jirga at Kaniguram arrived this day
in camp to ask for the terms of peace and
emt'arTei ""' ^"'^ ^^^ armisticc. Major-Gencral Beynon had
intended to spend a second day in the
destruction of the Khaisara and had made his supply arrange-
ments accordingly. He was, however, now assured that the
damage already done in the Khaisara was sufficient for political
purposes and did not, therefore, consider that the further
loss of life, which a second move into that valley would have
entailed, was justified. A return to Ispana Raghza was,
therefore, ordered.
On the 25th, the 54th Sikhs with half a company of Sappers
and Miners left camp at 5 a.m. and in conjunction with the
30th ^Mountain Battery destroyed a large village one mile
north-east of camp, which had proved to be a nest of snipers.
The force then began to withdraw to Ispana Raghza, the
43rd Brigade moving first and piqueting
^WUhdrawaltolBpana ^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^j^-^^ ^j^^ ^.^j^ Brigade followed
the transport as rearguard.
A large number of Mahsuds who had collected on the
Shrawanai Pass with the intention of opposing a second raid
into the Khaisara, now seeing signs of a withdrawal began to
advance. A piquet of the 54th Sikhs and a covering party of
the l/4th Gurkhas therefore remained in position west of
the camp until the transport had passed through the tangi,
when the 30th Mountain Battery shelled the pass effectively,
information regarding the result of their fire being given
them from the piquet by signal. Two other piquets on the
north and one on the south of the camp also remained in their
positions till the tcmgi was reported clear of transport.
The retirement down the fangi was necessarily slow and
it was not till 9-30 a.m. that the rearguard could begin to
move. During the withdrawal of the piquets a |)arty of snipers
worked their way round the right (noith) flank of the first
gun ])OHition near cjinip to within 300 yards of the guns, but
tlie escort of the 54tJi Sikhs saved the section from the casualties
whicli it was in danger of suffering by a rapid advance, ])eforc
which the enemy retired. Almost immediately after this,
the last piquet was withdrawn, and the rearguard and gun.s
retired through the tunqi. The enemy at. once descended
from the hills and orcu])ied our cainy)ing ground. There
59
they were lieavily shelled by the centre section of the 30th
IMountain Battery, while both the centre and left sections
engaged targets of the enemy appearing on the heights north
and south of the tangi. The intention of the Mahsuds had
evidently been to envelope our rearguard, but the positions on
either side of the tangi had been occupied by our piquets
which were withdrawn under cover of the guns. The retire-
ment was completed without a casualty, though one sepoy
had been wounded in the attack on the village, and camp
was reached about 3 p.m. Towns and villages which had been
left standing owing to the hurried advance were now destroyed
and the work of devastation in this area completed.
During the operations of the striking force the B.E. 2 C
,^ , , , aeroplanes based at Tank proved to be
Value of aeroplanea. p,f ,, ., r\ ' iji
01 the greatest assistance. Owing to the
high temperature prevailing co-operation, which was requested
sparingly, usually took the form of a preliminary reconnaissance
carried out ahead of the column by one or two machines,
which summoned others from Tank when it was observed that
the force was being opposed.
Apart from co-operating with the column in this manner
independent raids were carried out almost daily on parts of
the country not being visited by the force. On the 22nd
bombs were dropped with considerable effect in the Kaniguram
valley and in a particularly successful raid on the 26th a
number of direct hits were obtained on houses in Makin and
Mar obi, the latter being the home of Mulla Fazl Din.
The political reports now available showed that the Mahsuds
were in a more reasonable state of mind ; the defeat that
they had suffered at Nanu, the destruction of villages and
the raids of the aeroplanes on regions formerly considered
safe from our attack, had disheartened them, nor could they
any longer hope for help from Kabul. A letter from the Amir
to the Viceroy dated June 23rd showed, indeed, that he was
endeavouring to check the spread of disorder.
On his return to Ispana Raghza on the 25th the Chief
Political Officer received messages to the
Mahsuds. ^^^^° ° effect that some of the principal maliks
were anxious to treat for peace, and also
that a representative jirga at Kaniguram had written asking
for a specification of the terms to be imposed by Government.
The jirga appealed too for a suspension of hostilities for five
days in order that the jirga might consider them. The terms
CO
of the Government of India which were sent thcni were
briedy as follows : —
(a) The settlement of Major Dodd's murder case by tribal
custom as against the Abdur Rahman Khel.
(6) All rifles captured from the military and militia since
March 1st were to be returned.
(c) The prisoners now with the Mahsuds were to be released.
(d) The outlaws from British territory were to be suiTen-
dered or expelled.
(e) A guarantee for future good behaviour was to be
given.
The military and political requirements now seemed to be
identical ; the operations had so far been successful, the troops
required a much needed rest, and an opportunity had occurred
for giving the Mahsuds that chance of coming to an
agreement which it was our declared policy to offer them.
Accordingly on the 26th June offensive operations including
aerial raids were suspended pending the
2GrhTuna'' "'"'^'^'^'^ ^csults of the Mahsuds' deliberations, the
days of grace to end on the 1st July. The
force remained halted at Ispana Raghza unmolested by the
enemy except for the sniping of a water party on the 26th
resulting in two British privates being wounded.
As it seemed probable that the force would be inactive for
some time, it was necessary to find a suitable camping ground.
The present site at Ispana Raghza was inconvenient and the
water was rapidly receding from the west side of the plateau.
The locality marked on the map as Boji Khel (or Ab])as Khel)
about 3 miles up stream was finally selected.
Before leaving Ispana Raghza 250 rifles of the 54th Sikhs
were sent out on the 27th to destroy all the water channels
near the site tjf the Barwand camp as this was the s[)riiig
Bettlement of the Bahlolzai, the only section which had stood
out against the rest of the Mahsuds in their desire for a settle-
ment Jind had refused to send emissaries with them on the
201 h. They were, therefore, considered as being outsiile the
terms of the armistice. On the 21)th and 301 h June tlie force
transferred its cam]) to Boji Khel tiu^ situation of which but
for tli(^ steep ascent to the camj)ing ground from the river
bed was excellent and tiie water supply ample and good.
CI
Events now turned on the peace negotiations which were
being conducted by the Political officers
sur"tlo"r'of SiT' ""' of the foFce. Tlic maliks agreed to the
terms imposed and as a token of good
faith 9 of them, three from each of tlie main sections of the
tribe remained as hostages in camp. On the 9th a first instal-
ment of 124 rifles was surrendered, and tlie maliks arranged
to send out parties to the various sections of the tribe to
collect the balance.
In view of the satisfactory attitude of the tribe the force
Withd It M 1 J^oved back without incident on the 11th
and I2th July to a camp at Manzal at
the junction of the Shahur and Danawat valleys thereby
enabling cultivation to be commenced and villages restored
in the Upper Shahur valley. Rifles and prisoners were now
being surrendered in batches to the Political Officers at Sarwekai
and finally on the 10th August a full ceremonial jirga was
lield at Sarwekai attended by the Force Commander, General
Beynon, Sir John Donald, Resident in Waziristan, and some
^ „ .. . , . , 3,000 Mahsuds. 208 Grovernment and 83
Full iirga interviewed m-,- -n i i j i ji iii
at Sarwekai 10th militia ritles, valucd at nearly three lakhs
^ii^^*'-th^^"^^ ^^^ ^^ rupees, had been surrendered and all
^ ' prisoners and kidnapped Hindus returned.
About 95 rifles were still outstanding, but of these 19 had been
taken to Afghanistan and were irrecoverable by the tribe,
40 had been sold to Wazirs in Birmal, and the rest could not
be traced. The Mahsuds however, handed over rifles of their
own as security for the return of all recoverable rifles, and
hostages v/ere also appointed for this purpose.
In connection with the murder of Major Dodd both men
suspected of connivance in the outrage were duly tried accord-
ing to tribal custom and acquitted. The formal written
agreement with the tribe was carefully explained and attested,
and a duplicate copy was handed to the leading maliks. Peace
with the tribe was then announced and
Peace announced. -r^-,-ii • , t j^ •^ c , ^•
British territory opened to them lor trading
purposes. The jirga led by the maliks having repeated the
solemn prayer on enduring peace was dismissed to their homes
by the Force Commander.
The force returned to Jandola, the 43rd Brigade with
force headquarters on the 11th, and the
Jandola. ''^"^^ *° 45th Brigade on the following day. The
demobilization of the force and return of
62
troops to India ^vas then begun in accordance with a programme
drawn up by Army Headquart<?rs.
The force had thus fully accomplished its task, and, al-
though the operations had lasted only a
H^itro\''troop"/*''''''' ^liort time, they were carried out during
the hottest and most enervating season of
the year in one of the most unliealtliy areas in the Trans-
Frontier Provinces w'here dysentery, diarrhoea, malaria and
sandfly fever are rife. Of all frontier expeditions there was
none in which the troops had undergone more adverse climatic
conditions, or in w^hich they had undertaken more continuous
hardship and fatigue. During the operations the troops were
marching at dawn, piqueting heights and fighting all day in
a broiling sun, and reaching camp late in the evening to con-
struct the defences of their bivouacs. The diurnal variations
of temperature too w^hich averaged from 20 to 43 degrees
and were sometimes even in excess of this, w^ere remarkable
and added considerably teethe hardships of troops on a reduced
scale of baggage. The British troops and Gurkhas and a
good proportion of the Indian troops were young and
unseasoned, and it is therefore not surprising that the arduous
campaign afiected the health of the force, and that a high
sick rate prevailed. Statistics show tliat in the South Waziris-
tan Force the general admission rate was 33' 22 per cent.
The admission rate for the British ranks was 55*39 per cent,
and for the Indian ranks 41-59 per cent. On the othei- hand
the death-rate was remarkably low.
A statement sho\Adng the casualties from 10th i\hiy to
15th July will be found in Appendix 'C
Another unique feature of the campaign was that H was
the first occasion on w^hich the Royal Flying Corps, British
Territorial battalions, and regiments of the Nepalese army
had participated in operations against the tribesmen of. the
North- West Frontier. 'J'he last-named troo])s wei'e accom-
panied in tlie field by llieir Glcneral, Sir Baber Shamsliere
Jang Jiahadur liana, K.C.l.E.
+
f
CHAPTER VI.
Events leading up to the Campaign of 1910-20.
During tlie period from August 1917 to tlie outbreak of
Plan of campaign in the third Afghan AVar on the Gth May 1919,
Waziristan during the situatiou ill Waziristau remained normal .
Afghan War, 1919. r|.|^^ beginning of hostilities with Afghan-
istan found the troops in Waziristan distributed as shown in
Appendix D, and the Bannu and the Derajat Brigades with
the Northern and Southern Waziristan Militias were brought
under the command of Major-General Woodyatt, C.B., C.I.E.,
and constituted the Waziristan Force, under the orders of the
General Officer Commanding, the North- West Frontier Force.
The plan of campaign allotted an active defensive role to
the Waziristan Force, and it was decided that if necessary,
the areas which lay betvv^een the administrative and political
borders and held by militia garrisons should be evacuated
temporarily ; for their retention would have involved us in a
series of sieges demanding measures for their relief and conse-
quent dissipation of transport from the principal theatre of
operations.
About the 21st May information was received of a concen-
tration in Khost, and of the movement of Afghan troops
towards the Upper Tochi and in the direction of Wana.
Major-General Woodyatt was instructed, therefore, not to
despatch troops up the Gomal valley to Wana or to operate
beyond Miranshah, as it was considered that the troops at his
disposal were not sufficient for any widely extended opera-
tions.
As it seemed probable that the presence of Afghan regular
troops on the borders of Waziristan would result in a general
rising of the Mahsuds and Wazirs, and since it was impossible
to despatch troops to support the militia posts in the Gomal
it was decided, in view of the uncertain behaviour of the
Khyber Rifles even when closely supported by regular troops^
that it would not be possible to trust the Waziristan Militias
when left unsupported. Orders were issued, therefore, that
should Afghan regular troops advance to the vicinity of Wana
and be joined by the tribes, Wana and the Gomal posts were
to be evacuated, the British officers withdrawing to India
with such men as remained loyal. Similar orders applied to
( 63 )
64
the garrison in the Upper Toclii, and to those at Spinwam and
Shewa.
On the *24lh ^lay Brigadier-General F. G. Lucas, C.B.,
D.S.O., commanding the 67th (Banmi)
w!di;il^°Maymr Brigade, desiiii.g to reassure the Militia
garrisons and the tribes in the Upper Toclii,
despatched the moveable column, which is held permanently
in readiness at Dardoni, the new cantonment near Miranshah,.
to Muhanmiad Khel. In consequence, however, of informa-
tion received that General Nadir Khan in Khost was preparing
to move either towards Thai or Miranshah, the General Officer
Commanding the North-West Frontier Force ordered the
immediate return of the column to Dardoni where it would be
more suitably placed to meet the threatened attack. On
receipt of this order, Brigadier-General Lucas decided to order
the evacuation of the Upper Tochi posts as he considered the
withdrawal of the moveable column would be followed inevi-
tablv bv the wholesale defection of the garrisons with their
rifles and anmiunition.
The evacuation of the militia posts began on the 25th
May, small columns of regular troops
T^hilTt^'' ^^ ^^^'' visiting Datta Khel, Tut Narai, and Spina
Khaisora. As transport was insufficient
only the more valuable stores were removed the remainder
being destroyed. The garrisons returned with the troops to
Muhammad Khel. Boy a post was also evacuated and handed
over lor safe custody to Khan jMuhammad Khan, a Daur
malik who was considered to be trustworthy.
The news of the evacuation of the Upper posts and the
destruction of the stores quickly spread amoug the tribesmen,
and by dusk large numbers of Wazirs had collected in the
vicinity of Muhammad Khel and Boya.
Troops had been out since 6 a.m. and it was necessary to
give them a rest so the return niiirch to Dardoni was ordered
to begin at 8 p.m., but by tliis time the Wazirs having over-
awed the adherents of Khan ^luliammad Khan seized the post
at Boya and began to sack it. Consequently the march of
the columji was interru])ted by a treacherous attack as the
transport was fording the river. Owing to the darkness
there was considerable confusion, and severjil transport camels
carrying iimnninition broke ;tway. After a short hult- to drive
oil thr* attackers and to re-organize the transjiort the column
proceeded unmolest.ed, except for occasional shots at the
65
reaiguiird, and readied Dardoni at 5 a.m on the 20th ]\Iay.
Here it was discovered that about 150 of the Militia taking
advantage of the darkness had deserted during the march.
The problem of evacuating the militia posts of Spinwam
Withdrawal of gnrri- (Kailu Kiver) and Shewa presented great
sons of Spinwam^ and difliculties as thcsc wcrc situated 21 and 29
^^®^^' miles respectively from Idak, the post to
which the garrisons were to withdraw. Owing to the absence
of water on the route there were no intermediate posts, which
might have afforded a sanctuary for the militia if hotly pursued
from Spinwam. It had been reported too by the political
authorities that the tribesmen of this area were very uneasy
regarding the situation in Khost and the Tochi, and that
comment was rife on the absence of reinforcements for these
outlying garrisons.
Lieutenant Poulton, Northern Waziristan Militia com-
manding the posts at Spinwam and Shewa who had been
made aware of the intention to evacuate these posts in the
event of Afghan regular troops crossing the frontier and being
joined by lashkars of local tribesmen, was keeping in close
touch with the situation. To assist the withdrawal of the
garrisons arrangements were made also for three squadrons
under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel B. P. Ellwood^
31st Lancers to move from Khajuri towards the Kaitu in
support of the militia when the necessity for their retirement
arose.
On the 24th new^s reached the officer commanding at
Spimvam that General Nadir Khan with his force including
artillery had left Spinkai Lashti, a village on the Kaitu, had
crossed the frontier and was expected at Spinwam on the
25th. Consequently orders were issued that the garrison of
Shewa should withdraw on Spinwam and preparations were
put in hand for the further retirement to the Tochi .
As was anticipated the invasion by the Afghan forces was
the signal for raising the standard of revolt and the tribesmen
of the Upper Kaitu, flocked to join Nadir Khan or collected
to assist his enterprise. The withdrawal of the Shew^a garrison
was harassed by Wazirs from Datta Khel (Kaitu River) and
a Mohmand subedar and 15 of his men were taken prisoners.
It was at first thought that these militia men had deserted but
the outcome of subsequent enquiries regarding their escape
from the Afghan forces before Thai, removed all suspicion
regarding their conduct on this occasion.
66
The retirement from Spinwam was carried out with .skill.
The small militia force had scarcely crossed to the right bank
of the river when it was seen that Afghan regular troops and
armed tribesmen were ^^dthin three hundred yaids of the burning
post. Supported by the squadrons from Khajuri the militia
withdrew across the open Sheratulla plain and by the after-
noon of the 25th had reached Idak, and the cavalry had returned
to Khajuri. The militia marched the folk)wing day to their
headquarters at Miranshah.
The timelv decision made by the General Officer Com-
manding the 67th (Bannu) Brigade to evacuate the Upper
Tochi posts was more than justified by the subsequent events.
Had the withdrawal not taken place when it did, the majority
of the garrisons thinking they had been abandoned would
have deserted, and the Wazirs having risen and being support-
ed by the Afghans, no troops could have been spared from
Dardoni to assist the retirement of the loyal portions of the
militia.
Consequent on the evacuation of the Upper Tochi Posts
and the withdrawal of the moveable column to Dardoni the
Upper Tochi Wazirs consisting of the Madda Khel, Manzar
Khel, and Khiddar Khel streamed down after the column,
carrying with them the Upper Daurs ; a large number of
]\[ahsuds also joined the lashkars which collected rapidly near
.Miranshah.
A most serious situation had now arisen in Miranshah
W ,. . ,j. post garrisoned solely by the Northern
shlh."* ^Attitude of Waziristau ]\Iilitia. Letters had been re-
Northorn Waziristan ccivcd prcviously from Afghan officials in
Khost calling on the Wazir officers of the
militia to desert with their companies, and to take part in
the expulsion of the British from Waziristan. The recipients
brought these communications to the notice of their British
Officers, and this action was takeji at lirst as evidence that
tiuj local elements of the corps intended to adhere to their
allegiance. The incidents of the last few days, however, and
the fact that their sections of the tribe were now in o])en
revolt had excited the Wazirs still in llu^ ])oat.
On tlie 20th, therefore, a (jctachment ol two hundred
rifles of the 1/41h1 Dogras was added "to the garrison with the
•object of steadying the Wazirs and KU])])(»i'ting thi^ loyal mem-
bers of the militia. During th(» following afti^'noon. however,
instigated by Jemadar Adjutant Tarin, a Tori Khel Wazir
67
and ISubodar l^it, u Madda Kliel Wazir, wlio liad frequently
distinguished liimsell in tlie field and had been awarded the
Indian Order of Merit, the Indian Distinguished Service Medal
and the Croix-de-Guerre, about six hundred Wazirs of the
militia mutinied and openly declared their intention of leaving
the post with their rifles and joining the jihad. The Khattaks
remained staunch, but it was by no means certain w^iat attitude
the trans-frontier portions of the corps would adopt. At the
request of the Political Agent a further detachment of one
hundred Dogras and one gun reinforced the troops in the
post.
Owing to the situation of the barrack rooms and the
scattered positions held by the loyal Khattaks, the doubtful
and much excited Afridis, and the hostile Wazirs, it w^as quite
impossible to isolate the rebels or to adopt any vigorous and
concerted measures against them, as any movement inside
the post led the Wazirs to indulge in much indiscriminate
firing. The Dogras had been disposed in commanding posi-
tions along the parapet wall and over the gateways, but under
cover of darkness the Wazirs dug holes through the outer
walls of the post and made good their escape with their rifles,
but suffered casualties in so doing. With the departure of
the rebels the situation was much improved and discipline
and order soon restored.
Communication with Bannu except by wireless had now
been interrupted by the hostile tribesm.en and the reported
advance of Afghan troops to the frontier above Dardoni
pointed to an impending attack on Dardoni itself. The
defences were improved, and a covered way protected by
wire w^as constructed from the camp to the water supply
some six hundred yards north of the camp.
The tribal lashkars, w^ho had been led to believe that our
military weakness would also necessitate
^^Attacks on Tochi ^^^ evacuation of Dardoni and Miranshah,
maintained their positions on the neigh-
bouring hills awaiting their opportunity to fall on the retiring
troops and sack the posts, looting the treasure the latter were
believed to contain. The bolder spirits sniped the posts and
burnt the deserted sarai, but any further enterprises were
driven off by the troops with loss.
On the night of 26th-27th May all the Low^er Tochi posts
except Saidgi were attacked and it was further reported that
the Militia garrisons of Thai, Surkamar, Isha, Khajuri. and!
68
Shinki had deserted with their rifles and aiuinunitiun. It is
only right to mention that the Khattaks of these garrisons
in nearly every case succeeded in reaching either Idak or
Saidgi with their equipment.
Such then was the grave situation caused by a policy,
which had demanded hurried retrograde movements of our
troops, accoinpanied by the destruction of much valuable
stores, without a single shot being exchanged with an Afghan
tribesman or reguhir, tims violating with lamentable results a
well-knowm principle in warfare against an uncivilized enemy.
This was the state of affairs in Northern Waziristan w^hicli
faced Major-General S. H. Climo, C.B., D.S.O., who had
assumed command of the Waziristan Force, with full politi-
cal powers, on ^lay 27th in relief of Major-General Woody att
who had been transferred to the conmiand of 4th (Quetta)
Division.
The situation in Southern Waziristan was not a whit less
„., ,. . ., ,^ serious. During the first fortnio;ht in May
Situation in .Southern , . . ® __- i • i n i
Waziristan. Attitude the Situation at Wana and m the (jromal
of Southern Waziristan j^.^j given no cause foi alarm. The Southern
Mihtia. A17-- -»r-T- -i-ii 1 J 1.
Waziristan Militia wath its headquarters at
Wana was holding twelve outposts. The corps consisted of 8
British Officers, 37 Pathau officers and about 1,800 rifles,
composed as under —
Wazirs 230
Khattaks 350
Yusafzais ........ 90
Bkittannis ........ 40
Afridis 780
Orakzais 130
Gaduns 90
Shiranis . 90
About May 21st reports had ])een received of tlie movement
of Atglian regular troo])H towards Mus:i Nika with the object
of advancing on Wana. Major (J. 11. IJussell. the ( 'ommaiidant
of the Southf^rn Waziristan .Militia was at head(|uarters, and
was in constant connnunication with the Political Agejit
Major C. G. CroHthwait(», O.H.K., who was paying th(» Mahsuds
their allowances at Sarwekai. On May 22nd Major J^ussell
received from the Political Agent the instructions issued by
the Ilon'hlc. the Chi^'f Commissi. »ncr ic^^nrding the |)olic\- to be
69
adopted in the event of /Vfglian regular troops crossing the
frontier and being sup})oi'tcd by tlie local tril)es. Tlie former
began his preparations l)y despatcliing officers to certain
important ontposts to await orders.
On May 25th the report of the evacuation of the Upper
Tochi posts arrived at Wana like a bolt
JwanrAgTnty" "' from the blue. The Political Agent on
learning the news conferred by telegraph
with the Commandant and Extra- Assistant Commissioner wlio
were both at Wana, and as senior officer in the Agency decided
that the evacuation of the Southern Waziristan Militia posts
should begin before the situation in the Tochi became generally
known and the Mahsuds had time to rise. The evacuation
was therefore fixed for 6 p.m. on the 26th May. The with-
drawal of these Militia garrisons was an operation of extreme
difficulty and danger. It had been arranged previously that
the garrisons of the posts west of, and including, Khajuri
Kach would withdraw into the Zhob ; those of the remainder
concentrating on Murtaza.
Captain H. E. Traill with Lieutenants R. E. Hunt and
A. E. Barker left Wana at 6 p.m. on May 26th with sixty
infantry and ten sov\^ars, and proceeded via the Tora Tizha
route to Karab Kot. There Captain Traill and Lieutenant
Hunt were to evacuate the garrison and move on to Tanai.
Lieutenant Barker in the meantime went to Khajuri Kach
with the object of withdrawing the garrison to Moghal Kot
in the Zhob.
At 7-30 P.M. Major Eussell assembled the Pathan oflS.cers,
at Wana and informed them of the orders he had received
and of his intention to move at once. The officers, though
somewhat surprised, appeared to understand the necessity of
the withdrawal and dispersed to make the necessary arrange-
ments for their companies, as transport was sufficient only
for the light baggage of the officers, and some treasure.
Everything appeared to be going well when several shots
were heard, and it was found that the Wazirs and some Afridis
with their officers had seized the Keep, containing the treasure,
aimiiunition (about six hundred thousand rounds), records,
etc., and the transport for the same. Efforts were made to
quieten the men in the Keep, but without success.
Great disorder now prevailed inside the fort and all that
remained of the transport were eight riding camels. As the
withdrawal to the Zhob was to consist of forced marches,
70
and there was a probability of the camels being required for
the transport of casualties no baggage was taken. Those of
the men ^ho remained loyal numbering about three hundred
paraded at 9-45 p.m. and shortly afterwards set out on their
perilous journey, accompanied by the following ofhcers : —
Major G. H. Eussell . . . >v
Captain C. T. Burn-Murdock . [> Southern Waziristan Militia.
Lieutenant C. S. Leese
Major Owen .... Medical Officer.
Lieutenant E. J. MacCorstie . Garrison Engineer.
A circuitous route tow^ards the Pir Gwazha Pass was taken
with the object of proceeding via Toi Khula post. On reaching
the pass the party was re-organised and it was found that
there was no Afridi officer present and only four or five sepoys
of that class. There w^ere no Wazirs present. The remainder
consisted of sepoys and recruits and about one hundred un-
armed followers, natives of India.
The column marched all night and at 7 a.m. on 27th May
arrived within 1,400 yards of Toi Khula post. Attempts to
gain communication with the garrison were greeted by rifle
fire from the east followed immediately by several ragged
volleys from the post. As it was apparent that the garrison
had been evacuated and that the local Wazirs had already
seized the post, Major Russell decided to continue the march
to Moghal Kot, a distance of fourteen miles.
The day was exceedingly hot, the ascent to the Tesh plain
steep, all were worn out after a night march of over twenty
miles and no water was procurable en route. Piogress was
consequently very slow, and it was only with the greatest
difficulty that the column w^as ke])t together. Parties of
Wazirs continued unceasingly to harass liie rearguard.
The Tesh plain having been reached, the going became
easier and it w^as here that a junction was effected with Ca])l;!in
'I'raill's party consisting of the loyal elemejils of the garrisons
of Karab Kot, Tanai, and Toi Khula The tribesmen a])pear-
ing in considerable; numbers became boldcM* in \\wav attacks,
and it was almost impossihh' to get the piquets into position.
F()rtunatcly for the weary column the Zhol) Militia from
Moj/hal Kot assisted in j)iqii('ting the hist two miles of the
route. Mu^dial Kot was rejiched at mghtfall hut stragglers
continued to come in during the night and a great many did
r
71
not arrive until the next day. Here Lieutenant Barker with
seven sowars, all that remauied of the Khajuri Kach party,
joined the column.
The situation was reported to the Political Agent in the
Zhob, who suggested that the post should be evacuated the
following day and the march continued to Mir Ali Khel. This
was, however, out of the question as the men were exhausted,
footsore, and incapable oJi marching. The total number of
rifles with the column was three iiundred, but about one
hundred of the men w^ere recruits and at least half of the
remainder were trans-frontier men and therefore of doubtful
reliability in the crisis which had arisen. During the night
of 28th-29th May the tribesmen sniped the crowded post and
inflicted several casualties.
On the morning of the 29th the only supplies available in
the post were flour for one and half days and gram sufflcient
for three days' animal rations. During this day heavy sniping
wounded eight men and killed the w^ater bullocks. Ihis
made it more difficult than ever to obtain water, and several
casualties occurred during the attempts made to fetch it.
The evacuation of the post was now imperative and arrange-
ments were made for the withdrawal to begin at 6-30 a.m.
on 30th May. One hundred and thirty rifles of the Zhob
Militia accompanied by one hundred mounted infantry of the
same corps were to leave Mir Ali Khel at 3 a.m. and piquet
half way to Moghal Kot. From this point the mounted troops
were to push through towards Moghal Kot, where it was
estimated they should arrive at 6-30 a.m. On the following
day as there was no sign of the mounted infantry at 8-30 a.m.
Major Russell ordered the evacuation to begin ; heavy enemy
fire was opened immediately by the tribesmen. Unfortunately
the first piquet to be posted went too far and, failing to return
when signalled to do so, moved in the direction of Mir Ali
Khel. This movement became infectious and soon numbers
of the militia were to be seen fleeing in the direction of Mir Ali
Khel, many abandoning their arms en route. The officers
attempted to stem the route but in no case with success, for
when an officer turned away from those he had collected,
the men immediately disappeared. After four or five miles
had been thus traversed the mounted infantry of the Zhob
Militia appeared in sight holding piquets to cover the progress
of the column. Efforts w^ere again made to rally and re-
organise the Southern Waziristan Militia party in rear of the
72
Zhob cavalry. These were partly successful but the men
were quite out of hand ; the Pathan officers and non-conunis-
sioned officers no longer had authority, and there were very
few men who were at that time in possession of their rifles.
The ap])earance and action of the Zhob Militia stopped
the onrusli of the Wazirs who had hitherto been carrying out
a vigorous pursuit ; and the survivors of the Waziristan Militia
made their wav to Mir Ali Khel.
The officer casualties during the withdrawal from Mughal
Kot were : —
Killed.
Captain C. T. Buru-Hurdock . S. W. Militia.
Captain H. R. Traill . . . S. W. Militia.
Captain A. F. Reilly . . . Zhob Mihtia.
Lieutenant C. S. Leese . . S. W. Militia.
Lieutenant E. J. MacCrostie . l-25th London Regiment,
Garrison Engineer, Wana.
Wounded.
Major G. H. Russell . . . S. W. Mihtia.
Lieutenant R. E. Hunt . , S. W. Militia.
The above casualties with the exception of Captain Reilly
occurred at the beginning of the action and within one mile
of Mughal Kot when the officers were attempting to stem
the route. The Extra- Assistant Commissioner Khan Bahadur
Muhammad Yar Khan was also killed. The casualties among
the other ranks are not known accurately but are believed
to have been about forty killed and wounded. Some of the
Column made their escape via Mani Khwa and the Sherani
country, and reached the Derajat some days later.
Regarded merely as a fejit of endurance at this period
of the year, the withdrawal of this party was, of itsi^lf a fine
achievement ; but taking into consideration the almost insur-
rnonnta})le difriculties which l)eset it on the road and the
dangers through wliich it emerged, the exploit stands out as
one of tlie finest recorded in the histoiy of the Indian frontier.
The success of the o])eration was due in Imge measure to the
p(»rsonality of Major il. II. Russell, li^fUh l)aluchistan Infantry
who conducted the withdrawal with ictn tka-ble skill, courage,
and enduranc^e, and set a line example to those under him.
Thc^ hteadfjist fortitude ol tli(*se men in cii-cumstances befon»,
wliich niost would have (juailed, is a stirring examj)l(» of t lu^
Jieight to which the devotion of the British oilicer can rise.
73
Tlie evacuation of the other Soutlicrii Wazjiristan Militia
posts was carried out without any further incident except
that hirge numbers of Alridis and all the Wazirs deserted
during the night of the withdrawal to Murtaza.
Of the original strength of the Southern Waziristan Militia
less than six hundred finally reported themselves at Tank
where the corps was reorganised. The number of desertions
was estimated as more than 1,100 and among the losses wxre
about 1,190 rifles, 50 muskets and about 700,000 rounds of
•303 ammunition. The Wazirs and Mahsuds busied them-
selves looting the evacuated posts, and as was anticipated,
this had deferred their incursions into British territory.
To return to the events in the Tochi where the posts at
ev *• • ^u rr , • Dardoni, Miranshah, Idak, and Saidgi w^ere
Situation in the Tochi . ' „ . ' ' ^
at the end of May. in a State 01 Siege.
On May 27th an aeroplane on reconnaissance from Kohat
over Spinwam arrived at Dardoni and landed. Although it
crashed when taking off the effect of its appearance on the
lashlcars investing Dardoni and Miranshah was considerable,
and large numbers of the tribesmen were reported to have
returned to their homes.
A local mulla created a mild sensation at this time by
claiming to be able to bring to destruction any aeroplane by
casting a spell on it.
His boast was short-lived however, as an effective bombing
air raid was carried out in the Tochi on June 2nd.
On the 28th May reports, afterw^ards confirmed, were
received that the Afghan force with its attendant lashkars
at Spinwam had moved from that place towards Thai. The
moveable column from Bannu however, remained at Kurram
Garhi, as it was possible that there might be a repetition of
an Afghan concentration at Spinwam or in the Lovver Tochi.
On this date the troops available in Bannu were three
squadrons of cavalry, one section of Sappers and Miners,
two mountain guns, two battalions of infantry and details
from the 2-2nd Gurkha Kifles and 112th Infantry ; of these
one squadron of cavalry, 2 guns and portions of both infantry
battalions were on moveable column duty at Kurram Garhi.
In view of the possibility of an incursion of Mahsuds into
British Territory from the Khaisora and Shaktu direction,
and the probability of encountering strong opposition in the
Shinki defile in an advance into the Tochi valley General
F 2
Cliino decided to x^ostpone any attempt to reopen communica-
tion with Dardoni and to relieve Idak wiiich was reported to
be closely invested, until the arrival of the Headquarters
43rd Infantrv Brierade and one mountain batterv and two
battalions which were then en route. The Militia garrison at
Saidgi, however, was reinforced by forty regulars from Bannu>
In the meantime Jandola post garrisoned by regular troops
was being besieged by a large Mahsud
lashkar headed by Mullah Fazl Cin-I" - 5^ f .
Consequent on the evacuation ©f the Southern Waziristan
^lilitia posts and the considerable quantity of booty which had
fallen into the hands of the Wazirs, the Mahsuds had become
very restless, and thinking probably that it was the intention
to evacuate Jandola had assembled in large numbers around
that place. A force under Brigadier-General P. J. Miles, C.B.,
had begun to assemble at Khirgi on the 29th May when it
became known that communication with Jandola was inter-
rupted. Other posts had also been threatened by Mahsud and
Sherani lashkar s, notably Murtaza, Gonial, Manjhi, and
Zarkani, and many urgent demands for military assistance,
for posts held by the Frontier Constabulary were received
from the civil authorities.
These problems demanded immediate solution and Major-
General Climo decided to deal with the Tochi first, as with the
troops at his disposal both operations could not be carried out
simultaneously. The garrison of Jandola had nothing to
fear so long as water lasted, and the post was not subjected
to effective artillery fire. ^^ i
On the Ist June the Waziristan Force was withdrawn
from the command of the General Officer Conunanding the
North- West Fiontier Force and came directly under the
orders of the Commander-in-Chief.
The Headquarters of the 43rd Infantry Brigade having
arrived in Bannu on the 30th iMay, the
Relief coiumn.^^ '^'''''' formation of the Tochi Relief Column
t)egan.
K(,']>orts liad been very persistent at Miranshah of an
impending advance of Afghan troo])S by the Upper Tochi
and Kanibogh, but these were discounted later by a reliable
report that tliese forces were short of transport and sup])lies,
and were ado])ting a defensive role.
Thf'ir lnad(ir however, continued to incite the Waziis t(>
contiinu! their attacks and by the 31st j\lay large numbers
75
of tribesmen were re])orted to have re-assembled in tlie villages
on both banks of the Toclii in the vicinity of Darpa Khel.
The General Officer Conunanding the 07th (Banim) Brigade
at Dardoni decided to disperse these lashkars and to destroy
-certain villages whose inhabitants were known to have com-
mitted offences, and to have participated in attacks on the
posts.
The following day the Dardoni Moveable Colmnn with 250
rifles of the Northern Waziristan Militia moved out and fought
a very successful action. The enemy was put to flight with a
loss of about 90 and the towers from which he had been sniping
Miranshah post were destroyed. Our casualties were : —
2nd-Lieutenant P. H. B. Furley, l/41st Dogras and two
Indian ranks killed, and five Indian ranks wounded.
The results of this action had a marked effect not only
^ , . \ ,. J on our own troops and the Militia, but
Tocni posts rebeved. , ,i , -i i
also on the tribesmen who were now
convinced that our forces could and would operate against
them, and also that no further evacuation of the Tochi was
contemplated. To this fact must be ascribed the almost
unmolested march of the Relief Column which left Bannu on
the 2nd June on which day Saidgi was reached without inci-
dent. The following day the column was able to traverse
the Shinki defile without opposition and re-occupy Kha.juri,
from which place a squadron of the 31st Lancers was sent on
a'head. The latter on reaching the vicinity of Idak village
sighted parties of hostile Daurs. The cavalry got to close
quarters and charged a party of fifty men killing 8 of them
with the lance. The remainder got into a nala with precipitous
banks where the cavalry could not follow but several were
seen to fall wounded or killed.
The main body of the column arrived at Idak at noon,
but the rear guard did not reach camp until 5-30 p.m. The
march w^as extremely hot and trying to the troops, and there
were sixty-four cases of heatstroke or heat exhaustion.
On the 4th June the column opened up communication
with the Dardoni force, which was now reinforced by the
l-103rd Mahratta Light Infantry from the Relief Column.
Punitive measures against the lower Daurs were now
undertaken by columns operatino^ from
Punitive measures t^j* JxI, i c t* ' t
against lower Daurs. Dardoni uudcr the orders of Brigadier-
General F. G. Lucas, C.B., D.S.O. These
76
operations, which were carried out in very liut weather, had
an excellent political cftect but were to some extent limited
by the necessity of keeping the troops ready to concentrate
rapidly for co-operation with the Kohat-Kurram Force,
but the villages of Spalga. Anghar, and Tughri were burnt,
and fines were inflicted on others which had not been so
dee})ly implicated in the attacks on Idak and Miranshah.
Had there been any immediate military C)bject in doing so,
it would have been po£>s:blc at this stage to luive re-occupied
the Upper Tochi posts with little opposition, as tiie tribes
were thoroughly cowed.
Meanwhile the situation in the Derajat had not improved •*
Large lashkars of Wazirs and Sheranis
Derajat."^^ '^ ^ ^ Were reported to have assembled in the
district with the object of attacking posts
and villages.
Mahsud raiding parties were operating also in the Murtaza
area. One such party consisting of about fifty men was
observed on the morning of the 30th May returning to the
hills north of Murtaza post. This gang, pursued immediately
by a squadron of 27th Light Cavalry under the command of
Captain 8. Dudley, was overtaken and lost about twenty
killed and- many more wounded. The remainder sought
safety in flight. The losses of the cavalry were two Indian
officers killed and four Indian other ranks wounded.
This exploit, full of a fine cavalry spirit did much to restore
the situation in the area, and to calm the excited inhabitants.
A force despatched to the relief of the Gonial police post
Bucceeded in evacujiting the garrison, and Draband and
Kulachi were occupied by mixed detachments on the night,
lst-2nd June. On the following day a Wazir lashkar of al)out
four hundred was driven into the hills with a loss of thirty
men, and Manjhi i)Ost was reinforced by a column from Tank
after sonn* fighting. On the 4tli a laslihar of five hundred
MaliHuds which was threatening Girni ])()st was driven oiY
and th(* ^'arrison reinforced. Jandola, though tlu^ water
Huj)ply had been cut and the post surrouiuhnl by Malisuds
and lihittannis, had not been seriously assaulted. The garrison
had ftuj)j)lies up to the LMth June, and watci- storage* for 15
(hiys from the 2(Mh .May. Wholesale desertions IkmI (Kcuired
from the Frontier Constabulary at J)omandi, Moghal Kot,
Drazinrla, and TiUni. Chaudhwan was attacked on t h(» night,
4-5th June, and partially hufted l»v about two hundred Sherani?.
f I
77
Witli the arrival of Ihiee Indian infantry battalions from
the Tochi, Major-General Climo was enabled
Gth^Juni. ""^ '^'"'^''^"' ^'^ arrange for tJie relief of Jandola. Con-
sequently a force undci' the command of
Brigadier-General P. J. Miles, C.B., left Khirgi for Jandola on
the 9th June. An aerial reconnaissance the previous day had
reported the route between Khirgi and Jajidola practically
deserted and very little movement in the village of Jandola.
The latter fact was due to the Bhittanni inhabitants having
learnt of the assembly of a relief column at Khirgi, and fearing
punishment for their misdeeds had removed their families
and cattle to the hills. Little opposition was anticipated,
and, in fact, Jandola was reached without a shot being fired.
The post of Jandola was under the command of Captain
K. C. Anderson, 76th Punjabis and had a garrison of —
British officers
Indian officers
Indian other ranks
Sub-Assistant Surgeon
Followers .
2
4
170
1
15
There were also in the post a few members of the Postal Depart-
ment and two Supply Agents. The garrison was found to be
in excellent spirits despite their experiences since the post
was cut off on May 28th. The water ration had been limited
to two-and-a-half water bottles daily for drinking, cooking
and washing. The discomfort and privation entailed by such
a limited water-supply at a time of the year when the ther-
mometer stood sometimes at 115° Fahrenheit can well be
imagined. To conserve the water-supply all animals were
turned out of the post at the beginning of the siege.
A gallant detachment of ten rifles under Havildar Bari
Sher, 2-7 6th Punjabis, in the isolated tower about eight
hundred yards from the post, proved itself equal to the
occasion and in spite of an uncertain water-supply defended
the tower for fourteen days against frequent attacks.
During the siege a havildar of the local Bhittanni Levies
succeeded occasionally in eluding the enemy at night and
conveying water to the tower in three or four water bottles
at a time. For his gallantry this havildar was promoted
and. was awarded the Indian Distinguished Service Medal.
The post having been re-victualled and the garrison
relieved, the column returned to Khirgi without incident on
the 11th June.
78
About tlie 9th June reports were received and were subse-
... . „, quentlv confirmed that, in spite of the
Afghans m ^^ ana. / * r ,i - .- i . ,i t t
terms of the armistice between the Indian
and Afghan governments, an Afghan force of about three
hundred men with two six-pounder mountain o^uns had reached
Wana and occu]ued the deserted post. This detachment
a])peared to have been given a purelv passive role and to have
confined its activities mainly to anti-British propaganda
among the tribes.
On the 11th June, on receipt of reliable information that
^ . , Tx • . the village of Drazinda in Sherani country
Kaid on Drazinda. •' ,i r i i /*
was servins: the purpose oi a supply depot
for the various Sherani and Wazir gangs in the vicinity, an air
raid was carried out asainst it and a number of bombs dropped.
This raid was followed bv another carried out bv four squadrons
of cavalry and a section of mountain artillery with two
aeroplanes co-operatinfj. The large village was destroyed
and over five hundred head of cattle captured. The effects
of these raids was considerable and for a time the activities
of the tribesmen showed a marked decrease.
Towards the end of the month active operations except
when forced on us ceased on account of the great heat that
was prevailing, and of a severe outbreak of cholera, which
originating at Kohat spread to Bannu and the Tochi valley
and finally to the Derajat. This epidemic accounted for
1G9 deaths out of a total from all causes up to this date of 319.
Early in July a small force of all arms was concentrated
at Dardoni with the object of co-operating
vaLXt^KT^t" ■""■ ^vitl. the Kohat-Kurra.n Force in' an ad-
vance into Khost should the peace negotia-
tions then being conducted between the Indian and Afghan
governments fall through.
The assembly of this column was interpreted by Iho tribes
as preparjitory to an advance into the Upper Tochi, nnd on
the 7th July the Political Agent reported that a large Jashlar
rif Wazirs and ^Tahsnds were taking up a ])()siti()n near "Roya.
Next dnv a half-hearted attitck was mnde on the North AVaziris-
tan Aliliti;!. pirjuets ns tliev inovefl out from Ishn. 1'he
inililia casualties were fniii- Killed, and on
•erl^rto. "" ^'''""" ^^'^- l'*<^' <^ cleverlv organised night attack
on Ihe aeroplane shed at "Bannu was carried
out by a band of about seventy Wazirs and IMahsuds.
J
79
The aerodrome, wliich is situated about five miles out of
Bauiui on tlie Toclii road, was guarded by a platoon of 2/27th
Punjabis. llc])orts ha,d been received that such an attack
was contem})lated and in consequence a barbed wire entangle-
ment surrounding the hangar was in ])rocess of construction.
At about 1-30 a.m. the tribesmen rushing through a gap in the
'wire made a determined attempt to break in the doors of the
hangar but were counterattacked with bayonet and bomb
and driven off with loss. No damage was done to the aero-
planes. Our casualties were two Indian other ranks killed
and five Indian other ranks wounded.
On the 24th July consequent upon the capture by Wazirs
of a convoy at Kapip in Zhob, and subsequent reports that
large Wazir lashhars were harrying that district, Major-General
Climo concentrated at Murtaza a force of one squadron of
cavalry, one section of mountain artillery and one and a half
battalions of Indian infantry, as well as a large amount of
supplies, his intention being to give the impression that pre-
parations were on foot for an advance irp the Gonial and thereby
to draw the Wazir lashhars back to oppose this force. The
strategem was completely successful.
Several minor enterprises were carried out by the tribesmen
against our road piquets in the Tochi
y^^^^oJ:'^ between the 28th July and the middle of
August. On the 29th July a Northern
Waziristan Militia piquet was ambushed near Khajuri losing
three killed, and seven wounded and nine rifles ; on the 3rd
August piquets south of the road between Isha and Miranshah
were engaged all day with tribal lashhars and suffered some
casualties ; on the 8th August a detachment of the 82nd
Punjabis moving out to piquet the road between Saidgi and
Shinki was cleverly ambushed by about two hundred Abdullai
Mahsuds under their well-known leader Musa Khan, and
suffered heavily losing one Indian officer and nineteen Indian
other ranl-cs killed and four other ranks wounded. The
enemy's casualties were estimated at about twenty including
a prisoner who died of his wounds.
The situation in the Tochi was unchanged, and on the
morning of the 23rd the piqueting troops from Saidgi were
attacked by about two hundred and fifty Wazirs who finding
their line of retreat threatened withdrew vdth their casualties
estimated at thirty -five killed and wounded. Armoured cars
from Bannu co-operated in this action with considerable
effect.^
so
These incidents and notably the hist-nientioned can he
attributed to a hick of experience in observing the princi])U^s
of frontier warfare, and a faihire to recognize the necessity
for careful scoutinc: ^^nd scrutiny of the ground to be traversed
and for constant vigilance when dealing with enemies like
the ^lahsuds and Wazirs, who are experts in the art of ambus-
cade.
During this ])eriud Malisud and Wazir gangs, varying in
strength from seventy to two hundred siiowed increased
activity in the Derajat and troops were constantly on the
move endeavouring to intercept them. Several of these bands
were encountered but thev invariablv retired to the hills as
soon as they observed any sign of converging movement
against them.
The climatic conditions were bad and although the cholera
epidenuc had been stamped out, the troopswere subjected to a
great strain owing to the daily piqueting of routes for the
passage of convoys, and to minor operations during the intense
heat. A noticeable and reassuring consequence of the keenness
and good moral of the troops was the vigorous co-operation
of the police and village pursuit parties during this period.
About the middle of August Mahsud raiding gangs became
especially active and Tank Citv was attack-
ia August. ^'^ *'^'^'"'^' ed on the nights of the 14th and loth. On
the first occasion the raiders succeeded in
carrying off cloth and other articles valued at Rs. 15,000 but
on the following night the thieves were driven off with a loss
of six killed, several wounded, and one man taken prisoner.
By employing the ancient ruse of demonstrating at one
side of the ])Ost to induce the garrison to concentrate there
while another party dug a hoh' through the oj)j)()site wall, a
gang of about fifty Mahsuds effected an entrance into CJirni
post during the jiight of the 27tli. The Mahsuds were finally
ejected at a cost to the garrison of two kiUcd and four wounded
and two rifles. This incident was followed bv an outrage
tvpir-al <')^ the wanton cruclt v so fi-ecjucut l\' (lisj)lavo(l bv
Mahuuds.
A gang consisting princij)ally (^f Shaman Khcl .Mahsuds
returjiing from a raid at Isa Khcl in the Mianwali district
where it had secured sixteen rillcs from the local police^ attached
a Labour CV>rpK camp jiear (jiambila on ilic ni«_ilit of the 29th
August, ni tlic Labour Corps fil'tcj-ji were killcjl -aiuI fouitccjj
wounded, but on the arrival (.f troojis and police the laiders
i
81
retired towards the boi'der. During tlie running figlit tliat
ensued Iresli ])rirties of Ki'ontier Const«n,l)ulary took up the
pui'suit a.nd tiie IMalisuds finally reached theii' hills having
lost 15 killed, several wounded, and two ])iisonerB.
From re]H)rts subsequently received it was estimated that
at least thirty Mahsuds died of thirst, heat exhaustion, or
wounds.
The first half of September was marked by a comparative
freedom from raids, and on the whole that month was con-
siderably quieter than the previous one. Climatic conditions
began to show improvement though the heat by day was
still severe.
The chief event of the month was an action which occurred
near Zarkani on the IQtli. On receipt of a
iGu'september^^'^^''' report that a party two hundred strong,
consisting of Mahsuds, Zalli Khel Wazirs,
some militia deserters, and a few Sheranis had collected near
the Sheikh Haidar pass Major W. G. W. Durham, 27th Light
Cavalry, with one squadron and a Stokes mortar left Draband
and arrived at Zarkani at dawn. Major Durham accompanied
by_ten sowars and twenty rifles of the Southern Waziristan
Militia proceeded to reconnoitre the approach to the Sheikh
Haidar pass. While traversing some broken country covered
closely with tamarisk bushes the party was attacked. Major
Durham was killed, some of the militia captured, and the
cavalry detachment fell back. Part of the troops at Zarkani
advanced to the scene of the occurrence and gained touch
with the enemy but in the face of superior numbers were com-
pelled to retire to Zarkani with slight loss. Our casualties
in this action were one British officer, one Indian officer, and
four Indian other ranks killed and five wounded. Nine rifles
and a Hotchkiss gun were also lost.
During October the tribesmen showed a tendency to collect
in large numbers and on four separate
OctobeTioir'' ^^^''^^'' occasions actions of more than minor im-
portance were fought.
The beginning of the month was marked by serious reverses
to our arms. On the oth three troops of the Bhopal Imperial
Service Lancers and a platoon 1/1 50th Infantry under Captain
C. E. Broughton started from Manjhi post at 8-20 a.m. as an
escort to a telephone construction party. On arriving some 5
or 6 miles from Manjhi the telephone wire Was repaired and the
post informed that the party would begin its withdrawal at
82
•2-30 P.M. An hour later the Manjhi post commander heard
heavy tiring, and at 4-45 p.m. a survivor reached the post
and reported that Captain Broughton had been killed and
his party exterminated. The actual facts u'i wliat occurred
are ditiicult to obtain, but what appears to have happened
is that when about four miles from Manjhi the party was
attacked suddenly in ditiicult country covered with high
standing grass, by about two hundred tribesmen some of
whom opened fire at a range of twenty yards. Ca])tain Brough-
ton was killed innnediately and the enemy charging over-
whelmed the remainder of the party, causing casualties
numbering twenty-eight killed and ten wounded. During the
night some stragglers made their way to Manjhi post.
On the following day a force of one squadron of the Bhopal
Imperial Service Lancers and two companies of infantry under
the command of Major J. M. L. Bostock, Special Service Officer
with the Lancers, left Kaur Bridge to bring in the wounded
and dead of the previous day's action. Manjhi was reached
at 12-45 P.M. and at 1-30 p.m. when preparing to continue
the advance to the scene of the fight of the 5th the troops
were iired on by some tribesmen who however, quickly dis-
appeared.
The column proceeded without further investigation and "
with an inadequate flank guard. At 3-50 p.m. while moving
across country much broken and intersected by nalas con-
taining clumps of high standing grass the rear-guard was
suddenly attacked and the rear platoon of the 109th Infantry
taking u]) a position on a sand dune was over])owered and
annihilated. The su])])orting platoon also sull'ered heavy
casualties., and was reinforced by a platoon of the 3rd Guides.
Meanwhile the cavalry was ordered to cover the withdrawal
of the remainder oi the com])any of the Guides which had
been instructed to ])ush on into more open country. L^nfor-
tunately the cavalry failed to y)erform its mission and left
the infantry isolated. 1'he tribesmen mnnbering about three
jiundrcd now closed iji. Sharj) fighting ejisued in which
Captain F(;rguson commanding the comj)any of the (Juides
was killed, but in spite of many gallant stands the infantry
Avas forced to withdraw, each wuiw fighting f<n- liis life, until
the open eountry was reached.*
I
• In tliiii action wo lost throo oflTiconf, Captains For^uHon, (JuidoH, aiul .Mof tram, lOOkh
nfantry, and Lioutonant Bbagavan, I.M.8., and eighty Iiidiun otht-r ninkti.
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83
The reverses sufTered on these two days are attributable
to a great extent to the inexperience of the officers in command
and the consequent rehixation of precautions while there was
even a remote possibility of encountering the enemy. The
protective detachments too failed to perform their duties
efficiently.
As a reprisal for the attacks of the 5th and 6th the 52nd
Wing, now 1st (Indian) Wing, Royal Air
pw '"'^ "'" ^^'""^ Force, carried out on the 9th a bombing
raid with sixteen aeroplanes on villages
near Wana to which the lashkars belonged.
As the small villages on the Wana plain do not offer faTOur-
able targets, the moral effect of* the air raid was considerablv
greater than the material, while the fact that the aeroplanes
used incendiary bombs created a considerable sensation among
the tribesmen.
Emboldened by their successes, a further large lashhar
collected in the vicinity of Murtaza post on the 17th and cut
the water channel which provides the water-supply of that
place, Jatta, and Kaur Bridge. This necessitated the dispersal
of part of the moveable column of the Line of Communication
Defences which was then assembling at the last-named place.
After suffering at least twenty casualties at the hands of
the garrison of Murtaza Post which itself suffered none, this
gang moved to the vicinity of Girni on the night of the 20th
October.
On the following day a column of three companies with a
Attacks on convoys seption of mountain artillery proceeded to
near Girni and Khajuri, Girni from Manzai to withdraw one hundred
2ist October. ^^^ ^^ ^^^ Labour Corps from the post.
On the column beginning its retirement about two hundred
and fifty tribesmen left the hills and pressed closely on the
column. A well-timed counter-attack put the enemy com-
pletely to rout and they fled to the hills with a loss of about
seventy casualties. Our losses on this occasion were six
Indian other ranlcs killed and sixteen wounded. As a result
of this action the lashhar withdrew from Girni and dispersed.
On the same day a convoy was attacked near Khajuri by a
body of about three hundred Wazirs who had also piqueted
Shinki in such a way as to prevent the garrison of that post
from rendering any assistance. The situation was undoubtedly
critical until the arrival by motor vans of reinforcements of:
84
the 43rcl Brigiule from Idak, when our superiority was estab-
lished and the convoy proceeded.*
The conchision of the peace negotiations with Afghanistan
on the 8th August did not affect the situation in Waziristan.
In fact, at this time the hostility of the Wazirs and Mahsuds
towards us was increased by a widespread belief that the
British Government had agreed to transfer Waziristan to the
Amir six months after the peace had been signed.
The tribesmen who had depended on General Nadir Khan's
oft-repeated promises that the peace terms would include a
general amnesty for those tribes that had supported the Afghan
arms, now called on that official to redeem his pledge, or at
least to occupy parts of Waziristan with detachments similar
to that at Wana.
Consequently at the beginning of October General Nadir
Khan summoned the leading Wazirs and
Maliks visit Kabul. ^r i i j. at j_ i ^^
.Mahsuds to luatun, where the more nn-
portant headmen were selected to accompany him to Kabul
to be presented to the Amir.
On their arrival at the capital the maliks were received by
the Amir in ])erson with every mark of honour and conducted
to a sarai which had been reserved especially for their use.
Later at a durbar the Amir announced that peace had
been concluded with the British and thanked the maliks for
their services in his cause and that of Islam. He flattered
the Wazirs on their success in driving the militias from AVana,
tJie Gonial, and from the Upper Tochi. He also twitted the
Mahsuds on their failure to make the most of their oppor-
tunities; Subsequently the Amir issued rewards and presented
medals io the maliks. The latter were similar to those issued
to his own troo]>s for the recent operations against the British.
Of the ofhcers who had deserted from tlic militias each received
a sj)ecial award of lis. 300 and the Hc))oys Ks. 100. He con-
cluded his 8])eech by advising the tribesmen to come to an
agreemejit with ihe l>rilisli. Subsocpienlly th(^ maliks were
interviewed by Gejieial Nadir Kliaji and ollici' oflicials, ajid
the maliks returucd to VVaziristaji at llie hcgijinijig of
*0ur caHualtifrM in thiH action wore (a) Captain AndrowH, T.M.S., and two Indian
otlior raiikN killed, and on<; IJritiMli oflicer, on«' HritiHh other raiilc, ten Indian other ranks
and hix followi-rn wound»-<|.
The eii' 'H were eMliiimted lit ahotit fifty.
(a) ('ttj>i irewM wuM awar(lr<l a p. )HthuiinMiM Victoria CroHa for oxccntional ^allnn*
try and devotion to duty in attending woiind<(| undur lieavy lire in an expoMxJ
position until ho himvcif was killed.
85
November, convinced tluit hostilities between tlie Amir and
the British \voidd soon be resumed.
The tribesmen thougli deprived of their main hope of
assistance still maintained their contumacious attitude and
continued committing outrages.
A brief summary of cffencea con\niitted by the Mahsuds
Summary of offences '^^^^^ Wazirs froui the beginning of the
by Wazirs and Mahsuds, third Afghan War to the beginning of
May to November 1919. November 1919 is given below, many of
which are described in detail in this, and the preceding chap-
ters.
Tochi Wazirs, — Fifty raids and offences of various natures,
resulting in our losing approximately thirty-five killed, sixty
wounded and five missing, and in the carrying off of an enor-
mous amount of loot in the way of cattle, stores, and money.
Mahsuds. — Over a hundred raids and offences of various
natures, in which we lost approximately one hundred and
thirty-live killed, one hundred and ten wounded, and thirtv-
eight missing. Some four hundred and forty-eight camels,
one thousand six hundred and seventy-four cattle and property
valued at about Rs. 35,000 were looted.
Wana Wazirs. — Thirty- two raids and offences of various
natures, resulting in our losing fifty-five killed, one hundred
and six wounded, and eighty-three missing. A very large
amount of property was looted including a number of camels
and cattle.'
The casualties sustained by the AVaziristan Force during
the period from the conclusion of the Afghan War to 2nd
November, 1919 were —
Killed 139
Wounded ........ 159
The proportion of killed to wounded is very remarkable and
is attributable to the close fighting and to the possession by
the tribesmen of high-velocity rifles.
The recapitulation of this list of wanton outrages emphasises
., , . . the conclusion that punitive measures could
Necessity for punitive . , • t i
operations. HOt be aVOidcd.
The defection of the Mahsuds and Wazirs was not due to
any particular grievance ; they were merely acting under
the stimulus of a feeling, deeply rooted in the psychology of
the borderland, that every true Muhammadan must rise and
86
fight for Islam whenever there is an opportunity of striking
a blow at the unbeliever, and this feeling was uirned to full
aecount by Afghan adventurers in AVaznistan. It must be
remembered that these tribesmen are fanatical in the extreme,
and easily excited to hostility against us at the mere whim of
their religious leaders.
The defection of the tribal Militias had also had a disturbing
efi'ect on the tribesmen. It led to some two thousand six
hundred modern rifles and at least eight hundred thousand
rounds of ammunition falling into their hands, and this measure
of success tended greatly to embolden them.
The question of our attitude towards Waziristau and of
the punishment to be meted out to the
poU^'tTbeirpt^* tnl^esmea liad uo%y to be taken up. There
seemed to be two courses open, which may
be conveniently described as the maximum and the minimum
policy. The tormer was to take over and administer the
whole country up to the Durand Line, and to crush and disarm
tlie tribesmen. This drastic measure, which of course, involved
the complete and permanent occupation of Waziristan, was
that generally favoured by the Government of India, but it
presented certain serious difficulties.
From a military point of view, the troops were every-
where in need of leave which had been denied them for five
years ; demobilisation of British troops was in rapid progress
and units were being relieved by young troops from England
who were not acclimatised : the Indian Army was furnishiiit/
large garrisons overseas as well as troops for internal security
in India, with the result that many units with frontier expeii-
ence were not available and lastly preparations jiad to be
made to meet the possibility of further operations agaii.st
Afglianistan. From a iinanciai point of view the adoption
of the maxinmm })olicy of total occupation would involve
large additional expenditure.
In spite ol these obvious drawbacks the polili(al elYects
of inaction on our part had to be borne in rtiind, coupled with
the fact that Afghan adventurers were still intriguing among
the tribesmen and sparing no effort to misrej)resent our in-
tent iciiis and lower our prc^stige. Moreover, iho. measure of
Buccess wiiicli tlic tribesmen had secured tended to einboldcn
them, and compcHed us to win security for our iiarassetl border
p(»])ulation and convince thci wliok' Irontier of our strengtiu
Alter Buch fiagrant offences ijnniiijiily of the tribesmen would
87
make our ])()siti()n very difficult, particularly in the event of
further trouble with Atghauistan.
In the light of recent events it seemed possible that the
^ , Government would be forced shortly to re-
Policy decidod on. . ,■, i i , • c ', t
examine the whole basis oi its policy
towards Waziristan, and to consider whether in the long run
permanent o('cu])ation and administration of the country u[) to
the Durand Line would not be advisable. But as this would
necessitate much discussion and extended operations, it was
decided to adopt the minimum policy and to summon and
communicate the following terms to the Wazirs and Mahsuds.
First. — There was no foundation for the report of the
Amir having secured an amnesty for the
Ma^S ^^ ^^^^'^^ ^"^^ tribesmen, and that there was no question
of their country being made over to the
Amir.
Seco) id. — '^nch. reparation and compensation as might be
fixed for damage done would be demanded.
Third. — The tribesmen were to be informed of our intention
to make roads and locate troops in any part of the so-called
'' protected areas " which we might consider necessary.
Regarding the third term the proposal was to locate mixed
brigades in Northern and Southern Waziristan, respectively,
probably in Miranshah and Sarwekai, and to undertake if
finances permitted the construction of the following roads
for mechanical transport : —
(1) Thai to Idak.
(2) Khirgi to Sarwekai.
(3) Sarwekai to Tanai and Khajuri Kach.
(4) Murtaza to Khajuri Kach,
with extensions in the early future to link Tanai with Wana
and Khajuri Kach with the Zhob.
Punitive operations against the tribesmen in Waziristan
Measures taken on having been Sanctioned, the following mea-
Banction of punitive ^^^^^^ ._
operations.
(a) Toclii Wazirs.— A. Jirga was summoned to be held at
Miranshah on the 9th November to hear Govern-
m^ent's terms. The troops would advance to Datta
Khel and the tribe's reply be received there on
17th November. Should the terms be refused,
G
88
intensive aerial bombardment and punitive measures
by troops would take place to enforce acceptance
of our terms.
(h) Mahi<uds. — A jirga was summoned to attend at Kliirgi
on 3rd November, when our terms would be
announced, and the ]\lahsuds' reply was to be given
bv the 11th November. If the answer was un-
favourable the whole of ]\Tahsud country would be
subjected to intensive aerial bombardment followed
by punitive measures by land.
(c) ]yana Wazirs. — Terms were to be announced later as
it was thought that, in case of an unfavourable
reply being received, a lengthy period should not
intervene before condign punishment could be
meted out.
The terms announced at the Durbars held at Miranshah
and Khirgi will be found in Appendix '' E."
In the event of the terms not being accepted the plan was
first to deal with the Tochi Wazirs and then wdth the Mahsuds,
CHAPTER VII.
Operations of the Tochi Column.
The operations of the Waziristan Force from 3rd November
1919 fall under two heads, — namely, the advance to Datta
Khel in the Tochi Wazir country, and the operations of the
Derajat Column against the Mahsuds.
In the advance, two infantry brigades, the 43rd Brigade
under Brigadier-General Gwyn-Thomas,
N^^vfrnt'tm ''''^'' C.M.a., D.S.O., and the 67th Brigade under
Brigadier-General Lucas, C.B., D.S.O., with
attached troops were under the command of Major-General A.
Skeen, C.M.G., and formed the striking force, which was
designated the Tochi Column. See Appendix '' F."
The remainder of the Waziristan Force was employed in
guarding the Lines of Communication. Railheads were at
Bannu in the north and Darya Khan and Tank in the south.
From Darya Khan supplies and stores were taken across the
Indus to Dera Ismail Khan and thence by Decauville railway
to Tank. The value of this line which was laid along the
side of the main road was again clearly demonstrated. Besides
removing wear and tear of the road by transport carts, its
carrying capacity was 200 tons of stores daily, or the equivalent
of one thousand camel loads.
The Force was not only responsible for the defence of com.-
munications west of the Bannu and Tank, but also for the whole
area between these places and the Indus as far as Kalabagh
on the north, some sixty miles east of Bannu, and the borders
of the Dera Ghazi Khan district on the south. This necessitated
the protection of about 350 miles of communications.
As regards the 52nd Wing, now 1st (Indian) Wing, Royal
Air Force the total machines available were : — At Mianwali
east of the Indus, a detachm^ent of 3 D. H. lO's and a flight of
9 D.H.9 A's and at Bannu and Tank a squadron of 18 Bristol
Fighters.
Concentration of '^^^ Tochi Column was concentrated at
Tochi Column 8th Nov- Miransliah by the 8th November, with a
^^^^^' strength of-
Officers and other ranks . . « . . 8,444
Followers 6,464
Horses and equipment animals .... 1,382
( 89 )
g2
90
The transport consisted of 2.288 mules and 5,087 cameh.
Tents were carried.
On tlie 12th November the Cohunn
Kh^eU2tl^\ovember.*'' ^^^g^^ the advance to Datta Khel in tliree
ccheh-ns.
The tirst echelon, whicli comprised the bulk of the force,
formed the main column. The second echelon composed of
two battalions, including Pioneers, a field company Sappers
and ^Miners, and an armoured motor battoiy. was formed for
the purpose of improving the unmetalled road during the
advance for the use of Ford van convoys. The tliird echelon,
which consisted of an infantry brigade with attached troops,
was detailed to guard the road and expedite the collection of
supplies at Datta Khel.
The advance encountered no opposition. On the 14th
November the first echelon reached Datta Khel, the second
Degan and third Boya. Permanent piquets for the protection
of the road between ]\Iiranshah and Datta Khel were estab-
lished without incident. A ten days' reserve of supplies,
ammunition, and stores for the whole column, was moved
from Dardoni to Datta Khel, in readiness to carry out punitive
operations if our terms were refused.
In the meantime notices had been diopped from aeroplanes
in Tochi Wazir country warning all the tribesmen that
non-acceptance of our terms would be followed by immediate
air operations. They were also warned that if they declined
to accept our terms, their women and children should be
moved to places of safety.
Major-General Climo reached Datta Khel on the 17th
Tooi.i Wax-irB accept Novcmbcr, and met the jirga on the same
our terms, 17th Nov- dav. Tlic jir^a wliicli was lullv re])resen-
®°^ ^' tative except for the iMadda Khel and two
minor sub-tribes in the Kaitu valley accepted our terms.
The K'lzlia Madda Khel inhabit ji valley north west of Datta
Khel, and as these in a false sense of theii* security had not
submitted by the 18th they were bombed the next day by
seventeen aeroplanes. 'I'his had the desired r(\sult. All Iheir
representatives made complete subniissioji the SMine evenijig.
The two minor sub-tribes — the Titti Madda Khel and the
Hassan Khel --live in the Kaitu valley 20 miles jiorth-east of
MiranHliJih.
They were not dealt wilh luiiil ihc middle of December
when they were effectively bonjbed Irom I he air. .iiul iji conse-
quence made a verbal submission.
91
In view of the decision not to re-occupy the Upj)er Tochi
posts it ]iiid been proposed in event of tlie tribesmen accepting
our terms tluit tlie colunm should miike ix march by way of a
demonstration through the Madda Khel country which had
not been visited by reguhir troops since 1897. Besides teaching
the Wazirs that their country was not inaccessible it was
anticipated that the young and inexperienced troops of which
the cohimn was composed wouki gain valuable training in
mountain warfare and be well fitted to
iitkNolemben^ ^^^^^' eucounter the Mahsuds whose jirga on the
11th November had assembled at Khirgi
and rejected our terms in toto.
The political authorities, however, deprecated the march
as likely to excite the tribesmen to acts of hostility, and to
delay the fulfilment of our terms. It was also urged that
the recalcitrant Mahsuds should be dealt with as soon as
possible in order that the operations against the Wana Wazir
should not be delayed until the late spring. Orders were
Withdrawal of Tochi therefore issucd for the withdrawal of the
Column to Dardoni, column to Dardoni. This was carried out
6th November. -^ echelons similar to those formed for the
advance, and the whole column was back at Dardoni by the
evening of the 26th November.
On the morning of the 27th November the Tochi Column
Troops transferred to ^^^ broken up and rc-namcd the Derajat
Derajat and Derajat Column on the samc date and began its
Column ormed. march from Dardoni to the Derajat via
Bannu and thence by road via Pezu to Tank. The march
of 140 miles was carried out in nine groups each of approxi-
mately two battalions with additional transport. The con-
centration of the Derajat Column on the line Tank- Jandola
was completed by the 13th December, its composition and
location on that date being as shown in Appendix '' G."
CHAPTER Vlll.
Operations of the Derajat Column — First Phase.
Although Kaniguram is only thirty miles in a direct line
vuntr^r^ „^^«r«j«„ south of Datta Khel, there were several
r actors governing '
choice of Takki Zam rcasoiis agaiiist imdertakiiig an advance
^°"**" into ^lahsud country from that direction.
It would liave entailed the crossing of the Razinak Narai —
fifteen miles south-east of Datta Khel — which in winter is a
snow-covered pass, some 7,000 feet above sea level, — and the
construction of a camel road over difficult country. Besides,
there were no suitable intermediate camping grounds for a
force of the size of the striking column, and there was a gTeat
scarcity" of water. It would also have entailed the protection
of about 95 miles of Lines of Communication from the railhead
at Bannu. Further, it was hoped that the concentration of
our striking force in the vicinity of Jandola following on very
intensive air operations, would cause the Mahsuds to accept
our terms and so make an advance into the heart of their
country unnecessary and admit of the operations against the
Wan a Wazirs beginning forthwith.
The methods adopted in 1901-02 of employing sniiill con-
verging columns moving on bivouac scale hacl to be rejected
for several reasons, the chief of which was the possession
by the tribesmen of large numbers of high velocity rifles thus
endangering the safety of a small column temporarily isolated,
also the vast amount of transport for the carriage of the winter
scale of baggage and the impediments which ]niblic opinion
now demands shall accompany our unseasoned troo])s in the
field. Owing to the conditions which obtained on other parts
of the frontier, the available transport was just sufficient
for the needs of the Derajat Column and the Lines of Comnm-
nication beyond railhead.
An advance on a single; line is economical from every
standpoint, since one line of comnmnication demands fewer
defence troops, a smaller number of admiuistrative establish-
mf^nts. and consorpiontly a lessoiK^d dcitiiind on 1raTis-|)()rt
and .'^u})j)lies.
From the ])oint of \'iew of ojxTations IJic single line fully
justified its adojjtion, and ])rodu('cd the situations and (►])])or-
tunities it was intended to hring about.
( 92 )
PLATE NO. I.
93
Namely it left the tribesmen in no doubt as to which line
to defend and consequently they were encouraged to coUeiit
in the greatest available strength and to stand their ground
n)ore stoutly than they would have done had they been look-
ing over their shoulder anxious as to how the defcniders of
other approaches into their country were faring : the latter
is the effect produced by converging columns and generally
results in manoeuvring the tribesmen out of their positions
without inflicting punishment.
The casualties sustained by the Mahsuds and Wazirs (when
the latter joined the former in the field) have never been ap-
proached in any previous campaign, and never before have
the dead of any tribe been left on the ground in such numbers ;
it is justifiable therefore to assume that a single line of advance
by encouraging a vast display of tribal force and inducing a
sense of security from other points, enables our forces to bring
the tribesmen to battle and to inflict casualties which in every
action of importance were considerably heavier than our own.
Rinderpest and foot-and-mouth disease greatly reduced
the amount of transport and it was only the arrival of six
Ford Van Companies and the construction of the Decauville
railway from Dera Ismail Khan to Tank which enabled the
Lines of Communication to keep the Force in advance of
Tank fully supplied with all requirements.
In order that the narrative of subsequent operations may
Measures adopted \o ^c Understood it is necessary to explain
secure L. of c. west of shortly the measures which were adopted
^^^^^^' to secure the Lines of Communication west
of Khirgi.
Under normal -conditions, to maintain a column of the
size of the striking force, daily convoys of pack animals had
to be despatched along the Lines of Communication, and their
protection was rendered more difficult owing to the abundance
of modern rifles in the hands of the tribesmen. The large
number of troops required to ensure adequate protection by
means of escorts prohibited their use. A system was there-
fore introduced of establishing permanent piquets at fairly
close intervals on the most commanding ground on each side
of the route used. These sangared posts were strongly built
for all round defence, provided w^ith traverses and protected
w^ith thick barbed wire entanglements. Their construction
led to the majority of the actions which took place during
these operations. The full strength of the Derajat Column
94
had, on occasions to be employed to drive the enemy off the
ground selected for tlie various piquets and then to cover
and support the working ])arties wliilst the defensive works
were being constructed. Several days were often required
to make the locality selected thoroughly strong against attack
and, until its defences were completed, all the troops had to
withdraw to camp each afternoon.
As convoys sometimes amounted to over 4,000 pack
animals, it was necessary to improve and provide several
tracks in the river bed along which the advance was to take
place, in c>rder tliat the animals could march on a broad front.
C)ihei v/ise. they had to move in single file, which so increased
the length of the column, that it would have made the comple-
tion of a stage during daylight impossible.
For this reason, on the 11th December, to prepare for the
„ ,. . advance, a force of two battalions and one
Preliminan' prcpara- , • <• , • i ^ l^
tions for advance over scction 01 mouutain guus made gooQ the
Sjpinkai Raghza uth- ;Spinkai Ea^hza, Ij miles north of Jandola
13th December. ^ o ' - ^ .
camp and work on the road and of its
defence was begun. During the day the enemy snipers were
busy and when the troops withdrew on the same afternoon
the rearguard became actively engaged with bodies of tril)es-
men estimated as one hundred. These advanced down the
deep nalas which intersected the Spinkai Raghza and attacked
fiercely any small parties crossing these depressions.
Our casualties during the day were Second-Lieutenant
Douglas of the 3rd Guides, one Indian officer, and two Indian
other lanks killed, and one Indian Officer and eighteen Indian
other ranks wounded. The enemy casualties are not known
but were probably not heavy. On the 12th and 13th December
the work w;is continued. During those three days we sustained
46 casualties, chiefly from enemy snipers.
Duiiiig the past month Ai available aeroplanes had been
carrying out a programme of intensive air
Air operations. i.- -x • it • ix -j • 4. .1
activity including night raids, against the
Malisud villages until it was ascertained that these had been
vacated. Damage was done to material and ])ersonnel, and
t]ir(;n^di(»ut the country the greater pro])ortion of th(^ inhabi-
tants left their homes and took to caves and to the hills. To
cnabh* tlie liarassing of tlie tribesmen to !)e methodically
carried out the Mahsnd coiiiitrv was divided iiilo 1 hire sub-
areas, each ol which was allotted to one squadron, at least
ere machine being over each area all day. This {)roved
efTertive, and nnieh damage was done to fhuks and personnel.
95
All iiitcresliiig outcoiue of tliis ])i(jgiaiiime was that cattle-
and sheep were distributed in small herds to miniaiise targets.
"JMiis entailed a large increase in shepherds and watchers,
hindering the assembly of any lashkar or large raiding parties.
Between the 25th-29th November three more Bristo
Fighter aeroplanes were lent to the Force and a specially
intensive programme of aerial bombardment was made, a
daily average of over 10,000 lbs. of bombs was dropped but
in spite of these endeavours at no time did it appear possible
that the Mahsuds w^ould submit from the effect of air operations
alone.
As the employment of aeroplanes on the frontier had not
been carried out on a large scale prior to these operations,
the experiences gained are of much interest. It is not intended
to go fully into the technical side of the question here ; let
it suffice to record the fact that aeroplanes had dealt success-
fullv with the recalcitrant tribes in the Tochi, and that al-
though considerable moral effect and a certam amount oi
damage to personnel and property had been obtained against
the Mahsuds it had not been sufficient to bring them to terms,
and it was therefore necessary for the land forces to take to
the field to bring them to submission.
A noticeable feature of the air operations was the readiness-
of the inhabitants sheltering in the vicinity to re-enter their
villages after a raid. This applied to the smaller villages as
the bigger ones having received so many visitations were
practically deserted. A possible solution for this is the pro-
vision of bombs with delay action fuzes of various lengths.
Judging from the results seen later at Kaniguram and
Marobi which were frequently bombed, it would appear that
the heaviest bombs only are effective against these frontier
villages, and that the effect is not really worth the explosive
used. Even the damage done by the biggest bombs is very,
little as the mud roofs and walls localize explosions to a great
extent. Some form of incendiary bomb would therefore
probably be more effective than those emnloyed during these
operations which have done little harm except to dry fodder
and similar inflammable materials. The total w^eight of bombs
dropped on Kaniguram, a perfect target for aerial bombard-
ment, was about 16 tons, which was out of all proportion to
the material damage done.
The ability to fly at low a Ititudes depends greatly on the
employment of sufficient mac hines, the dispersion of targets
96
and consequently of lire. The rate of flight of h)w Hying
machines at close quarters and the feeling of danger induced
by the noise they make militate against accurate Hre on the
part of the tribesmen. These ])oints were exem])litied in a
marked degree during the air raids in the Kazha valley on
lOtli November 1919 where our machines were handled with
a singular boldness and escaped unscathed.
Before beginning the narrative of the operations against
the Mahsuds, a few points regarding the
jatCoiX'''^''^^'''" equipment of the Derajat Column will be
of interest.
The (Column marched on winter scale with tents and in
-addition were carried : —
one extra blanket per man,
one extra pair boots,
one extra pair socks,
two sandbags on the man.
Each battalion was supplied with sixteen Lewis guns and
sixteen lifle grenade discharge cups.
A laige amount of barbed wire, stakes, and explosives
accompained the Column, also of ammunition and supplies.
The Striking Column normally consisted of : —
two moimtain batteries,
one company Sappers and Miners,
one Signal company,
one battalion of Pioneers,
six battalions Infantry,
accompanied by
one Indian Field Ambulance,
one combined Field Ambulance,
one Bearer Unit,
with a supply column carrying four days' supplies.
Although camels carried six maunds each, the transport
for the striking force alone aggregated 2,800 camels and 1,400
mules.
At the beginjiijig of lJeceml)er it was estimated that
Strength ami anna- ^ ''<* ^V'^'^^Y ^'^^''''^ available to op])08e the
ment of r>f,j,f>«in(f forroH. I )<'ra jat Colll Illll \V<'I(' ! -
I'^i^hting iDon. Mod«'rn riflei.
MaliHuds {iM<:hidiiig UrmarH of Kaiii-
giir'.m) l(;,()(i() S.(UH)
Wan.i Wazir'^ 7,000 3,000
PLATE NO. 4.
97
but that no lashkar of more tliaii 3,500 ti'ibesmeii was likely
to take the Held, owing to diiliculties ol' obtaining su])pl;'es
locally.
At no time in their history had the Mahsuds and Wazirs
been so well armed as at this juncture, since in addition to
their normal armament considerable quantities of government
rifles and ammunition had fallen recently into their hands.
To supplement their stocks the tribesmen had received large
supplies of ammunition through the agency of anti-British
officials in Khost. These tribesmen have long been remarkable
for their courage, activity, and hardihood, and when the
mountainous and difficult nature of their country is considered,
together with the fact that their numbers included about
1,800 deserters and others highly trained in our tactics and
methods of fighting, it will be realized that they constituted
a formidable enemy.
It is interesting to note that although the Mahsuds and
Wazirs were in possession of large numbers (approximately
10,000) of Martini and other large bore breech loading rifles,
their use was forbidden in the field except at night ; General
Skeen, who was present in every engagement in the Takki
Zam, states he saw only two black powder discharges by day
during the four months campaign. The number of small bore
rifles owned by the Mahsuds did not exceed 3,500, and this,
together with supply difficulties, made this number {viz., 3,500)
the usual strength of the lashkar opposed to us. Large con-
tingents armed otherwise were usually in close attendance to
replace casualties and bring up food and water. It is esti-
mated that not less than 8,000 Mahsuds and Wazirs collected
in the neighbourhood of Marobi on the 7th February 1920 to
dispute our advance on that village. This was the largest
number assembled by them up to date and was encouraged
by the presence of Shah Daula's guns. High hopes were
built on the results these guns were to achieve. Their abject
failure accounts tor the melting away of the tribesmen and
the feeble resistance made to our advance.
The moral of the Mahsuds at this time stood at a high
level. This w^as due to the failure of aircraft to force their
submission, to their successes in several .encounters with our
troops during the summer, to their still fervent hope that
the Amir ^vould compel Government to discontinue punitive
measures, and to the belief that, as in the past they would
succeed in gaining a reduction if not an abrogation of Govern-
98
merit's terms by adopting a threatening attitude. Added to
this was their belief that the Great War had reduced our
army so greatly both in numbers and training that the ]\Iahsuds
could defeat any force whicli we could bring against them.
The Wana Wazirs, who had not yet received the terms
that Government intended to impose, were liand in glove
with the ]\lahsuds and ready to assist them in opposing our
advance. The Tochi Wazirs liad accepted our terms, but
were unable to prevent the hot-heads of their sections, of
whom there were a considerabla number, from ioinino; the
?\Iahsuds.
On the 17th December the Headquarters of the Derajat
Headquarters of ^^1^^111 with the 67th Brigade and attached
Derajat Column moves troops ^iiarchcd witliout incident from
toJandoU. j^j^-^.g- ^^ jandoUi aloiig the bed of the
Tank Zam which had been secured by the establishment of
seven permanent piquets.
On the same day, as several representatives of the tribesmen
professed to be desirous of submitting, Major-General Skeen
interviewed them and ascertained that their only object
appeared to be to secure immunity for their own property.
While these men were still in camp, numbers of Mahsuds were
observed on the northern portion of the Spinkai Raghza,
and on the Sarkai ridge whence they were moving eastward.
At this time the construction of the camp protection piquets
on the left bank of the Tank Zam op])osite Jandola post was
being pushed on as rapidly as possible.
Suddenly at 3-30 p.m. a determined attack was made on
tliese pi([uets and their coverinoj parties.
jaailrNTThEmrr' ''''"^ castcinnu.st ,.iquet was cvenvh.'l.ned,
altei- the covering })arty had been driven
in. Allhoufrh the attack was made in the face of the close
fire of mountain and machijie guns from the vicinity of the
post and of the fire of the covering troops, it was pressed home
with the utmost gallantry, the leaders shouting and waving
tlicir swords liigli in the air, and dashini^ in among iUo tr()0])S.
Alter h'onie lumd-lo-hand fii/hting the .Mahsuds withdrew with
a loss of eight killed and twelve wounded.*
Tljcie can be liltfii! doubt that this incident was due to
the ignorance of the troops of the psychology of l^ithans and
Our caiualtiM Win thirty-four killod and wounded.
PLATE NO. 4.
Z J
»
PLATE NO. 5.
HeliO . S. I. O . Calcutta.
99
to the false sense of secuiity into wliicli they liad been lullcid
by the presence iu camp of Malisuds ostensibly sueing for
peace, and for a siniihir reason the significance of the Malisuds'
movement across the Rpinkjii Raghziv to gain a covered line
of approach for their attack was not ajjpreciated at its correct
value.
Information was received on the night of the 17th December
and confirmed the following morning, that a Mahsud lashkar
about 2,000 strong v/as at Mandanna Kach and that about
1,000 Wana Wazirs were in the Shahur on their way to join
in opposing the advance of the Derajat Column.
The presence of these tribal gatherings in strength so near
Jandola both on the Shahur and the Tank Zam gave some
hope that a decision might be forced at our very doors, if the
tribesmen stood their ground.
At the time the Mahsuds were under the impression bhat
we only required the Shahur for the passage of troops to
Sarwekai and Wana, and to this reason was ascribed the
assembly of the lasJiJcars at Do Tak at the junction of the
Shahur with the Tank Zam.
Major-General Skeen decided to advance across the Spinkai
Raghza, but detailed the 68th Brigade (less-
isfh^DeceLber^^^"''''"' 1* battalions) with two scctious of guns,
under Brigadier-General J. L. R. Gordon,
€.B., to make good the river route to Do Tak in case it should
be required by the transport. This was accomplished without
difficulty and the brigade returned to Jandola that afternoon.
The main column which consisted of —
Column headquarters,
1 squadron (less 1 troop) 21st Cavalry,
No. 6 British and No. 27 Indian, Mountain Batteries,
55th Field Company Sappers and Miners,
67th Infantry Brigade,
2/19th Punjabis (from 68th Brigade),
3/34th Sikh Pioneers with attached troops
advanced at 8 a.m. to clear the Sarkai Ridge and then to
secure the Spinkai Ghash in order to cover the occupation
of a camp on the Palosina Plain, three miles north-north-
west of Jandola cam.p.
The 1/1 03rd j\Iahratta Light Infantry advancing steadily
See panorama No. 1. ^^'^^-^^^ ^^^^ north-eastern portion of the
Sarkai Ridge and the broken ground w^here
100
the Sagar Algad trends soutli from Sandar-band. Here the
smoke of fires had disclosed already Iha presence of parties
of the enemy, and the contact aeroplanes were informed
accordingly.
On the left the l/55th Rifles having secured the dominating
point of the ridge continued their advance against the steep
Spinkai Ghash with the 2/ir2th Infantry on their right moving
against the ridge to the east of the Spinkai Ghash, which
by 1-30 P.M. was in our possession. The Mahsuds retired
mainly up the Tank Zam pursued by our aeroplanes. By
4-30 P.M. the trans])ort which consisted of 2,330 mules and
2,750 camels had reached the camp without incident. During
the day our casualties amounted to 78, including 7 killed.
Those of the enemy w^ere reported to have been thirteen killed
and wounded but this was probably an under-estimate.
There seems no doubt that up to the actual moment of
an advance the Mahsuds expected us to advance by the Shaluir.
The discovery of their mistake probably accounted for the
plight resistance which they put up.
As the column was ol)liged to remain in camp at Palosina
_ . . , for some time, and several minor engaoje-
Descnption of coun- , , -, i ' ■ .-, • -,- , • • -Y
to' round Palosina, see mcuts took placc lu the immediate Vicinity,
sketch map No. 1 at ^ short description of the ground will be
^^^ ' of interest and will enable the difficulties
of the operations of the ensuing days to be followed and under-
stood.
The right bank of the Tank Zam, opposite the Palosina
camp ris3S in steep cliffs to a small plateau, some 200 feet
above the river bed. The north end of this plateau terminates
in a rocky bluff, called Mandaima Hill overlooking Mandanna
Kach and the river to the north. Tlie plateau, which is about
300 yards broad, is bounded on the west by a steep-sided
ravine. This ravine starts from a tangled mass of broken
ground known as '' Broken IJill," (UK) yards south-west of
Mandanna Hill, and runs iov a])out 2,000 yards in a south-
eahlfilv direction until it joins the Tank Zam.
()n the west of the ravijie is a ridge whicli forms the main
feature in tlie vicinity. The southern end of this ridge consists
of two features known as " Black and White J I ill "and" Black
and Wliite I'reasts." Goin;.^ iioith ;dong the lidi't' thcic are
four decided features; u group of rock.:> which luns east and
west and was known as " Jted Jvocks " ; " Sandbag Jlill " a
rciUgh and commanding j)oint some 700 yards west of '* Kcd
PLATE NO. 6.
UNITY OF MAN
f s
I 1
NG SOUTH WEST FRO.^/^ SPINKAI GHASH RQGE SHOWING COUNTRY OVER WHICH ACTIONS IN VICINITY OF
o Illustrate operations in vicinity of
MANDANNA KACH.
MAP No.
Map to illustrate operations in vicinity of
MANDANNA KACH.
Furlongs
101
Kot'ks " ; and '' Comb Rocks " 200 yards nortli ol" " Sandbag
Hill." ^JMie intervening s])acc between '' Sandbag Jiill " and
'* Comb lloeks " comprises a steep drop of 150 feet, then an
exposed strip of Hat ground up to the foot of the latter. The
fom'th feature on the ridge is known as '' Broken Hill," and
covers Mandanna Hill from the south-west.
North of '' Broken Hill " tlie ridge ends in an abrupt
drop to '' Pink Bowl " on the right bank of the Tank Zam.
The slopes of Tsappar Ghar, 3 to 4 miles west of Mandanna
Kach overlook the whole neighbourhood.
On the 19th December a permanent piquet was established
Action near Man- ^^ Sarkai Ridge witliout opposition. The
danna Hill, 19th Dec- sauic day a forcc, which consisted of two
^°'^^'"- battalions of the 67th Brigade, crossed the
Tank Zam from Palosina Camp with the object of establishing
a permanent piquet on Mandanna Hill to cover the advance
up the Tanli Zam. The ravine immediately west of the
plateau was cleared by shell fire from three sections in action
on the camp perimeter, and the 1/1 03rd Mahratta Light Infantry
rapidly seized '' Red Rocks " and " Sandbag Hill," and at
the same time a company of the l/55th Rifles occupied the
lower slopes of '' Sandbag Hill " and '' Broken Boulders."
The remaining three companies of the l/55th Rifles were in
position on the left of the 1/1 03rd Mahratta Light Infantry.
Although a certain amount of movement down the Tank
Zam and in the vicinity of '' Broken Boulders " and '' Sandbag
Hill " had been seen there was nothing to indicate that any
large numbers of the enemy were holding '' Comb Rocks."
The original plan was to rush the ridge from '' Sandbag Hill "
and '' Broken Boulders," but it was discovered that the broken
nature of the ground made this impossible. The Mahsud?
in force were now in position on '' Comb Rocks " and '' Broken
Hill " from which they were bringing a heavy and eflective
fire to bear on the attacking troops. For nearly an hour
the 1/1 03rd Mahratta Light Infantry reinforced from Red
Rocks made several gallant but unsuccessful attempts to
resume their advance on '' Comb Rocks " despite the intense
and accurate gun and howitzer fire w^hich was directed on
the objective. The battalion had now suffered heavy casual-
ties including the commanding officer and two British ofiicers
killed and two wounded. Under cover of the deadly fire from
" Comb Rocks " some Mahsuds moving up the depression
between '' Sandbag Hill " and '' Comb Rocks " delivered a
102
Tiio<t deti'iniiiu'd itttark (»ii the tiuop.s lioKliii^^ tho former
eminence. The battalion was forced to withdraw. In a few
moment!-' considerable numbers of Malisuds emerging from
*** Comb Rocks " seized '* Sandbag Hill," and poured in a
lieavy lire on the retiring troops. As the 1/1 03rd Mahratta
Light Infantry had exhausted its su])ports in reinforcing the
attacks on *' Comb Rocks " there was no definite line on
which the battalion could fall ])ack. The companies on the
riglit and left being outflanked were compelled also to
withdraw. Parties attempted in vain to seize '* Red Rocks "
and the vicinity to cover the general retirement which was now
in progress. ^leanwhile the enemy who had develo])ed great
strength estimated at 900 riflemen, pressed the whole line back
to the river, and forced our troops to re-cross to the east
bank. Our casualties were heavy and included 95 killed a.nd
1-10 wounded while our loss in material totalled 131 rifles and
10 LeTsns guns. The Mahsuds admitted a loss of 13 killed
and 40 wounded which is probably a fair estimate.
The reverse was due to several causes the chief of which
was the neglect to observe the principle of distribution in
depth. There was no reserve of troops and the small local
su])]K)rts were insufficient to restore the situation when the
retirement became general. The behaviour of the troops
showed that the men were not masters of their weapons, and
they did not know what to do when their officers had become
casualties.
It was now necessary to re-estaldish confidence by re])eating
Operations to estab- the Vlay's Operation and by using every
lihh piquet onMandunna available uicaus to cusurc succcss. Accord-
HiiJ, 20th December. |^^,|^, ^^^^ ^^^^ ootli December the attack was
resumed by the folh)wing troops under Brigadier-General
Lucas : —
2/1 9th Punjabis,
l/55th Rifles,
109rh Infantry.
2/1 12th Infantiy,
2 sections 55th Comj'any Sa])|)ers and Miners
and two com])anies of thc^ 3/31lli Sikh Pioneers.
Tlie line of advance was priictically tiie same as that taken
on the j)revious day.
Shr)rtly after the attack began, t. lie 'J I IlMIi I iifant ly si'«iired
the outlying fi-atures known aF *' V>\;uk and White " hi
By 10 A.M. the troops were in possessioji of " lud Rocks
mz.
FROM SPrNKAl RIDGE
.N.E.
'5-- A-
NS2
,*/ o-^
I
103
and the jiortliern end of the ])liiteau and half an hour later
the l/55th Eifles had estal)lished themselves on the eastern
end of *' Comb Rocks " and in the viciiiity of '' Broken Hill."
The success of the o})eration was largely due to the pre-
cision and thorougliness with which the Royal Air Force co-
operated with the attacking infantry. The accurate bombing
and machine gunning of the reverse slo])es of " Comb Rocks "
combined with the fire of the guns and howitzers on '' Sandbag
Hill " and Mandanna Hill, greatly lightened the task of the
infantry and must have saved many casualties. Indeed up
to this point our casualties were only 3 killed ajid 15 wounded
while the enemy's were believed to have been heavier than
on the previous day.
Considerable numbers of Mahsuds could be seen retiriniic
up the Tank Zam and many more were observed advancing
from Kotkai. These latter, however, halted on seeing the
heavy bombardment that .was taking place. Work to put
Mandanna Hill into a state of defence for the permanejit
piquet was begun at once. By the afternoon it was decided
that the defences, though incomplete, were sufficiently far
advanced to establish a piquet there for the night, and 100
rifles under a British officer were accordingly posted. The
piquet was exposed to enfilade fire from '' Comb Rocks " and
'* Broken Hill " at ranges from three to six hundred yards but
no suitable traverses had been built.
The troops which had covered the construction of the
piquet were then withdrawn covered by the fire of guns and
aeroplane co-operation, and by 4-30 p.m. they were back in
camp without having sustained a single casualty.
At 4-45 P.M. Captain Cuthbert, 2/1 9th Punjabis, commanding
Mandanna Piquet reported tribesmen collecting at a distance
north and west of his position, and at the s.ime time about
thirty tribesmen some of whom were unarmed, were seen
from Spinkai Ghash running across the Tank Zam to the foot
of Mandanna bluff.
Attempts were made immediately to warn the piquet
commander of the presence of this party but without success,
as the telephone suddenly failed.
It appears that at this time the majority of the garrison
having deposited their rifles and equipment in the piquet were
employed in carrying up their blankets, water, and reserve
ammunition which had been dumped some distance from the
piquet. Suddenly fire from enemy snipers on *' Comb Rocks "
H
104
and ** Broken Hill ** forced this working party to seek shelter
among the rucks. Under cover of this accurate lire the above-
mentioned luirty of ^hihsuds swarmed up the hillside and
reached S'>me dead ground within a few yards of the northern
end of the piquet ; at the same time another small party
delivered a determined attack on the piquet from the west.
Captain Cuthbert and sume oi liis men charged these tribesmen
but he and his party were all killed. On seeing tbis the
remainder of the garrison became disorganised and, leaving
the piquet, retired acrcss the river into camp many of them
having their arms and equi])ment wrenched from them by the
^lahsuds who showed great boldness in the pursuit. Heavy
gun and rifle fire was at once brought to bear on the tribesmen
looting the piquet.
It is difficult to arrive at the true story of this incident,
but it appears from subsequent reports that the 31ahsud
attack on the piquet was not pre-arranged, and that the
tribesmen who approached the position from the river thinking
that the troops here had delayed their withdrawal to camp
too long, hoped only to achieve some small success.*
It was now more than ever necessary that the confidence
Operations to estab- ^^ ^^^^ ^^'^^V^ ^^^ themSelvCS should be
lihh piquet on Black restored. SO an Operation was arranged for
Hill. 21st December. ^|^^ following day to establish a permanent
piquet on the feature known as '* Black Hill " or Tarakai,
a tumbled mass of ridges running west of Sagarzai peak and
commanding the camp at a range of 1,700 yards.
The area surrounding Black Hill is difticult and rocky
X. « affoidinf^ excellent cover for an advance
See panorama ^o. 2. ,. . , *^ • \ i. \ i. i r»rv j i. i.i
in m Sagarzai. but about 120 yards to the
north of the piquet is a low ridge which commands nust
(A the ground in which bodies of the enemy could collect and
over which they nmst debouch. 'J'he steep rise to the piquet
and the flanking ridge an<l the formation thence towards,
camp, made it easy to cover a withdrawal or organise and
cover an attack. The distance of the ridge from camp, i.e.,
2.100 yards from tlie river bank, made support by gunfire an
easy mattci-.
By 10-30 A.M. *' i>la(k Hill " and the nci^^liboui ing ridges
were occupied without opposition by the 82nd Tunjabis and
•Our cn«iialti»M for tin? llnh and JOih December amounted to 113 kilU'J including
5 Uritiii)) ofliccfH, and 200 woundud.
105
- •
109tli Infantry with the co-operation of aeroplanes, and work
on the piquet was begun in spite of some long range sni])ing
fire. AVhen the construction of the post w^as half finished
and tlie wire entanglement almost comj^leted, some enemy
were seen massing at a ])()i]it halfway between " Black Hill "
and the ^^agarzai peak. Prior to this considerable numbers of
tribesmen had been observed crossing the Tank Zam from the
direction of '' Pink Bowl." These concentrated at Ibrahim
Gul and subsequently advanced against Tarakai Hill. Shortly
after 1-30 p.m. sniping from close range increased and was
followed almost at once by a rush of tribesmen from three
directions which caused the troops covering the right of the
piquet to recoil, uncovering those in the centre w^ho withdrew
followed at once l^y those on the left. Meanwhile the officer
in command of the working party of the 3/34tli Sikh Pioneers
took all his men into the half -finished post where they were
immediately attacked fiercely at close range by the Mahsuds
in front and on both flanks. Four attacks were beaten
off and the fifth had developed when the officer in command
finding that ammunition and grenades were running short,
withdrew down the hill towards camp. At this time it was
estimated that the Mahsuds on the ridge were about 800
strong. These w^ere now^ engaged by the fire of guns and
howitzers, that of the latter being especially effective, and
being responsible for the heavy losses suffered by the enemy.
The covering troops, w^ho had been reorganised and rein-
forced on the ridge half way to camp, launched a counter-
attack which reached the foot of the steep rise to the piquet,
but failed to make further .progress owing to the fire of well-
concealed riflemen, and, accordingly, at 4 p.m. our troops
were withdrawn under orders, to the camp on Palosina plain.
The redeeming feature of this engagement was the behaviour
of the working party of the 3/34th Sikh Pioneers and 1st
Sappers and Miners and of the stretcher-bearers of the Field
Ambulances and Bearer Unit. The gallant staunchness of
the former showed that the old fighting spirit of the Indian
soldier still existed, and a splendid example was set by the
devotion of the latter who traversed the bullet-swept slopes
with cool courage and recovered many a wounded man w^ho
had been left behind.
The inability of our troops on this occasion to repel the
advance of the tribesmen and the failure in the counter-attack
to recover the lost ground must be ascribed once again to the
inadequate individual training of the soldier especially in the
h2
106
cftective use of his riiie. A tour of tlio sjrouud on the followiiior
day disclosed the fact that the i)c»s:tion occupied by the cover-
ing troops in the vicinity of the piquet did not afford a good
field of fire or view.
The sangars constructed by these troops were of the most
perfunctory nature, and besides being ill-suited as firing rests
they were not proof against the modern bullet. Had our
troojis been able to recapture and hold their position it is
possible that the ]\lahsuds would have sustained a reverse
which would have nnich accelerated the end of the campaign.
Their losses were severe, and were reported later at 250 killed
and 300 seriouslv wounded. These were much in excess to
nur own, which amounted to 66 killed or missing and 256
vrounded. l)ut undoubtedlv the moral victorv remained with
the enemy.
The Mahsud attack on Black Hill is one of the best ex-
amples of combination of fire and shock action. The organi-
zation of their fire power was perfect. At ranges up to 1,500
yards, and from positions on u^hich our artillery fire could be
brought to bear, their riflemen developed a volume of aimed
fire under which their swordsmen scaled the hill unseen and
unscathed^
Bv this date, the 21st December, five battalions had been
heavily engaged with the enemy, and although severe losses
had been inflicted on the Mahsuds, three of these battalions
were badly in need of rest. It w^is therefore decided that
they should be replaced in the column by other troops. Accord-
ingly the 2/1 9th Punjabis, the 82nd Pimjabis, and the 2/1 12th
Infantry were withdrawn into the Lines of Communication,
and the 4/39th Garhwal Ptifles, 2/76th Punjabis and the 2/152nd
Punjabis from the 43rd Brigade took their place.
On the following day '* Black Hill " was reoccu])ied with-
T> ♦ ;. .wf ^'iit much o])position and from tluit date
permanent inqnct 11 . ,
e«taUiHhod on Jiiack was held })ermanently by a piquet. iMity
Hill, 22nd December. j^^.^j Mahsuds and umnv rifles were found
on tlie hill and in its vicinity, and durijig the day many burials
were seen to take ])lace near Kotkai four mih\s away, and
reports were received that many de.id and wounded had beoji
carried oil by their relatives to their homes.
No operations were undertakcji oji the two following days
as owing to low clouds and rain close
Ne«otiat>>ni for (.o-oi)eration with aeroplanes was impossible.
uetllement. . ' . ' • i r i
Intimation was jiow received irom the
' 1
107
Mahsud maliks that they were prepared to visit Jandola witli
the object of effecting a settlement and they asked that the
operations might be suspended pending the result of the
jirga.
The real object of the maliks seemed obvious. The lashkars
which had been in the field since the middle of the month
were now dispersing owing to casualties and lack of supplies,
while the inhabitants of the Kotkai area were hurriedly remov-
ing their families and cattle to distant Galleys. The maliks
watli a view to recovering their standing among the tribesmen
and with Government lioped to effect a settlement which
w^ould ensure at least the immediate withdrawal of the troops
to Jandola. This sanguine expectation was probably based
on a similar concession gained by the Mahsuds during the
operations in 1917.
In soite however, of bein^ told that our advance w^ould
J. ' o
not be stopped pending the outcome of
D/cember.'^'''''^''^''^^^^ ^^''^ meeting, the maliks arrived at Jandola
during the 28th and on the 29th December
Major-General Climo held a jirga. Representative maliks
were present from nearly all the tribes and sub-tribes ; the
only notable exception were the Abdullai, who inhabit the
country in the neighbourhood of Makin.
In view of the opposition that had been encountered the
severitv of our original terms was increased.
hancer'^ ^'''^' '"" These " additional terms demanded the
surrender of one hundred more riues which
would be confiscated permanently. In addition the represen-
tatives were told that our advance w^ould continue until the
„ ,., sincerity of their submission was proved
Submission of Mahks. i,i" , c ,^ n -\ ,^ t
by the payment oi the line and tne surrender
of the tribal rifles. In spite of these terms complete submis-
sion of the Mahsuds was made, and vv'as signed and sealed
by those present.
In the meantime the work on Mandanna Hill was continued
on the 25th. Numbers of tribesmen vrere seen near Kotkai
and on the slopes of Tsappar Ghar. These v\'ere continuously
harassed by aeroplanes and probably for that reason did not
interfere in any way with the operations. In the evening
all the troops returned to camp. The following day the work
was completed without opposition and the piquet occupied.
The period from the 17th to 28th December formed the
first phase in the operations against the Mahsuds.
108
The losses which they had sustained on the lilst December
TT . tc . X, caused most of the lasJthir to disijerse to
h id of first phase. ^t • i i • i i i i •
then- homes, and without doubt their
heavy casualties made them for a time at least, desist from
pursuing the rusliing tactics which had up to this time proved
. o successful in their encounters with our troops. This breath-
ing space enabled our troops not only to establish several
im])ortant permanent piquets without opposition, but also
made them realize that the losses of the tribesmen had been
heavier than our own.
It must be emphasised that the tribesmen had fought in
a way they had never done before, and this was due to their
high state of moral and knowledge that our battalions w^ere
composed of inexperienced soldiers. Their attacks were well
organized, and their combination of fire and shock tactics,
the latter carried out wath remarkable recklessness, was
excellent. This undoubtedly w^as due to the presence in
their ranks of many ex-militia and retired recfular soldiers.
ji
PLATE NO. 7.
PLATE NO. 7.
CHAPTEll IX.
Operations of the Derajat Column — Second Phase.
In accordance with the decision coniinunicated to tlie
jirga on the 29th December at Jand(jla a
29^fDecembtr. ^^''^^^'' column Consisting of Column Jieadqiiarters
with the 43rd Brigade and attached troops
left Palosina camp and advanced with little opposition to
Kotkai, a distance of four miles, a third of which was covered
by permanent piquets established during the operations round
Mandanna Kach. The remainder of the striking force halted
at Palosina to admit of supplies being accumulated at Kotkai
camp.
The column remained at Kotkai till the 7th January.
During this period permanent piquets were established* at
various points between the latter place and Jandola, in order
to complete the defence of the road and give adequate protec-
tion to the convoys. Permanent piquets were also occupied
north of Kotkai in preparation for the next advance. These
operations were carried out with little
2nd jlnuary.^"" Kotkai, opposition from the tribesmen except on
the 2nd January, during the construction
of a permanent piquet on Scrub Hill about 2,500 yards north-
west of Kotkai camp situated on the Kalwa Raghza.
The 4/39th Garhwal Rifles who were detailed to form the
,, „ covering troops reached their positions on
See panorama No. 2. ^ . ^V • ^ -.i , i
Spm (jrhara ridge without much opposi-
tion. But between 11 a.m. and 3 p.m. sniping was conti-
nuous and three determined attacks were made on their
right company. Each of these attacks was pushed home
in a most resolute manner and the enemy who had got to
within stone throwing distance were only driven off after
severe fighting. Difficulties in the removal of the wounded
down a very steep slope necessitated some delay in the with-
drawal to camp, which began at 3-15 p.m. Under a heavy
covering fire from the peaks to the north and west, a body of
Mahsuds succeeded in establishing itself immediately below
the forward crest of the position held by the covering troops.
The latter made several attempts with bombs and stones to
dislodge this party, but without success owing to the accu-
( 109 )
no
racy of the Malisud covering fire which had already caused
several casualties. When the rearmost party of the Garhwal
Rifles bei^an its withdrawal, the above mentioned bodv of
^lahsuds rushed forward in close pursuit. Seeing this
Lieutenant Kenny* with about ten men turned and counter-'
attacked the tribesmen with the object of gaining sufhcient
time for the remainder of the Covering Party to get away.
This gallant party fighting to the last was annihilated, but
its object was achieved, for the ]\Iahsuds fell back and being
subsequen.tly shelled effectively by the supporting guns were
prevented fn^m following up the withdrawal. Tlie enemy
casualties were estimated at 77 killed and wounded whilst
the 4/39th Garhwal Rifles lost 35 killed (including two British
officers) and 43 wounded. The battalion displayed in this
action great endurance and gallantry and taught the tribes-
men a wholesome lesson.
It was now reported that a fresh lashhir had collected in
the vicinity of the Ahnai Tangi, and that the Jalal Khel and
Haibat Khel whose homesteads were within striking distance
of the column had decided to co-operate from the direction
of the Shuza valley where their families had taken refuge.
On the 5th the 43rd Brigade moved out to cover the re-cons-
truction of Scrub Hill and Whitechapel piquets, the walls of
which had ])een demolished by the tribesmen. These piquets
had not been occupied on the day of their construction
as Whitecha])el was uncompleted and it was not intended
to hold Scrubb Hill.
These mistakes, which were too frequent at the outset
of the operations were due to the inexperience of the
junior officers, British and Indian, and their inability to
recognise the important part that time plays in mountain
warfare. Operations such as these must be carried out with
the utmost des])atch and according to a ])re-arranged programme
in order that the advantages gained by sur])iise should not i)o
hst. The piquets were occuj)ied and the troo])s returned to
ramp, the rearguard on the Whitechapel side being followed U])
closely. Our casualties were eight killed ajid forty wounded,
attrilnitable to the fact that the enemy was ])re]'>ared this
day for the re])etitir)n of the operation. On the Oth January
the 67th lirigade reached Kotkai cam]) from Palosina cam]).
♦ Thin officer wnn awarded a poitumoui Victoria Cross for his extreme gallantry
and devotion on this occasion.
PLATE NO. 8.
I- ^
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51
PLATE NO 9.
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The next task before tlie Coluinn was the captiirc of the
Preliminary opora- ^^1^^^'^^ '^^'^^^gi' '^'.^^^ I'^^^ei' is a})OUt four
tions for capture of the luiles fi'oiu Kotkai Caiiip. 'I'he actual gorge
Ahnai langi. j^ aboiit eiglilj yaids in length and only
thirty yards wide. The sides are precipitous and rise to a
heii^ht of 150 feet above the river bed.
A description of the country traversed in approaching the
,, ^ Tan^ji will enable the progress of the
beo panorama No. 3. n t j- , -i -i r n i mi
nghting to be more easily toilowed. ilie
Spin Ghara range, a series of prominent hills rising to ^
height of 700 feet above the river, runs in a south-westerly
direction from the Tangi and commands all the approaches
from the south and south-w^st. Between the range and the
river, the Tangi consists of a plateau intersected by numerous
deep ravines which can only be crossed at a few points by
troops moving in single file. Opposite the plateau, on the
left bank of the Tank Zam, the Konr range, a mass of crags
rising to a height of 1,200 feet above the bed of the river,
commands all approaches from the east.
It was decided to make the main attack across the plateau
and seize the w^est flank of the Ahnai Tangi protecting the
right of the attack by occupying the country on the east bank
of the river with another body of troops. Accordingly on the
7th January, the 43rd Brigade made good the east bank for a
distance of some three miles from the camp thereby protecting
the advance of the 67th Brigade, which at davv^n moved across
the plateau and by 11 a.m. was in a position to attack the
west flank of the Tangi. By this time, however, the enemy
had massed on the lower slopes of the Konr range, south of
the Tangi, w^here the conformation of the ground gave him
every advantage and where his line of retreat up the Tank
Zam or the Shuza was secure. It then became evident that,
before the Tangi could be secured and a camp formed forward
of Ghurlama Kach, it would be necessary to occupy the heights
on the left bank. The short period of daylight now left made
it impossible to carry out this operation so the troops vrere
ordered at 1 p.m. to withdraw^ to Kotkai camp. During the
withdrawal a party of the enemy rushed a small covering
party of our troops but coming themselves under crossfire
lost about thirty killed. Except for this incident there was
no serious action by the enemy. Our casualties on the left
bank of the river w^ere eight killed and eighteen wounded,-
and the remainder two killed and sixteen wounded.
112
Altliougli the enemy's tactics of massing on the left bank
made it ap})ear desirable to launch the main attack on that
side of the river, yet the ground was so dillicult and so suitable
for defence by a few well-posted men that any idea of attack
in that direction had to be abandoned. Accordingly, it was
decided the adhere to the original plan and
Ln.succe.ssful attempts ^ , , • x • x xi
to establish strong point to make a tumiug movement against the
s. E. of Zcriwam. 9th western flank of the Ahnai Tangi. But to
and 10th January. i • i i- i. t
ensure success, orders were issued to estab-
lish as a preparatory operation, a strong point south-east of
Zeriwam in order to protect the flank of the subsequent main
movement, and at the same time to establish the 67th Brigade
in a camp to the north of Kotkai in order to make the approach
march towards the Tangi as short as possible.
Witli this object in view, the 67th Brigade left Kotkai
Camp at 8 a.m. on the 9th January and formed a camp two
miles upstream. ^leanwhile the 43rd Brigade began the
construction of the permanent piquet south east of Zeriwam.
The work proceeded rapidly and the garrison with its stores
moved up towards it by 11 a.m. Hostile rifle fire, which had
been desultory all the morning against the covering troops in
position on the main ridge of the Konr range, about this time
became intense, and the troops on the right flank were attacked
and driven back with loss. Assistance was sent up by the
67th Brigade from Ghurlama Kach but as the defences of
the piquet had not been completed the 43rd Brigade w^as
withdrawn at 3 p.m. The tribesmen, w^ho immediately rushed
into the half finished work in search of loot were shelled with
great effect by our artillery from Kotkai ])lateau, they also
suffered heavily in some close fighting with the 4/39th Garhwal
Kifles on the northern slopes of Kafir Luta.*
Another attempt to establish tlm piquet was made on the
following day but was again unsuccessful. The enemy ad-
viiJicing again from the directioji of the Shuza attacked the
covering troops on 1lic ui.Tui lidge with great determination,
and eventually overbore tiieir resistance by heavy and accurate
siii])ing. The advanced troops having fallen back on the
])i(juet, and as lliere was no time to organise an attack on
the rocky ridg(; from which the covering troops had been
driven, the Brigade was ordered to withdiaw to vi\\\\\) which
was reached at 5 r..M. Om- hjsses on tliis dny wci'c twenty-
♦ Our caHualtie« in thiw action wcro ci^rhloon killed, including ono Britirth oflicor
and forty-two wounded, including four Britinh Ofliccrs.
/ //
I I
I !
I
f/8 3
VIEW FROM KOTKAI CAMP look,
^—^ ' |-T-> '
■ ■ : s__L_ ': ; • ; I :
I illustrate operations in vicinity of
AHNAI TANGI.
^lAP No. 2
I
Map to illustrate operations in vicinity of
AHNAI TANGI.
MAP No. 2
113
five killed and eighty-four wounded. The enemy casualties
were estimated at forty-seven killed and wounded. The
^/9th Gurkha Eifles arrived at Kotkai from Jandola on this
day, and two ('()m])anies of the battalion were employed to
cover the withdrawal of the 43rd Brigade to camp.
Although the establishment of the permanent piquet south-
east of Zeriwam had not been achieved,
Capture of Ahnai ]\ia jor-Geueral Skeen decided that it was
Tangi, nth January. / i • ii x j i i xi
not advisable to delay any longer the
capture of the Ahnai Tangi. Without the necessary protec-
tion on the right flank the advance of the column to the Tangi
would be a difficult and hazardous operation. The moon,
however, was in her last quarter and as this favoured a night
march General Skeen decided to make use of this advantage to
surprise the enemy and secure the difficult ground before the
tribesmen had time to organise an attack.
The 43rd Brigade under Brigadier-General Gwyn-Thomas
which consisted of —
4/39th Garhwal Rifles,
109th Infantry,
2 Companies 2/1 50th Infantry (joined the Column on
29th December),
2/1 52nd Punjabis
was therefore ordered to move from Kotkai at 5 a.m. on the
11th January so as to be in position at dawn, about 7-15 a.m.
ready to develop an attack against two prominent features of
the Konr Eange overlooking the eastern flank of the Ahnai
gorge but at some distance from it.
The 67th Brigade, under Brigadier-General Lucas, composed
of—
l/55th Coke's Rifles,
57th Wilde's Rifles,
2/76th Punjabis,
2/5th Gurkha Rifles (joined the Colamn on 4th January)
was at the same time ordered to occupy during the night the
Spin Ghara range and to be ready to attack at dawn, the
western side of the Ahnai Tangi in conjunction with the attack
of the 43rd Brigade.
The 67th Brigade was clear of its camp by 3 a.m. The
operation proved entirely successful, and the enemy, being
completely surprised, sought safety in flight. By 10 a.m.
the west bank of the Ahnai Tangi was in our possession and by
114
11-15 A.M. the occupation of the east bank was successfully
accomplished. Piquets were quickly established to hold the
Tangi. Rain had begun to fall at 1 p.m. and visibility became
very bad, but the withdrawal of the covering troops including
that of the 43rd Brigade t»» Kotkai Camp was carried out
without a casualty. The GTtli Brigade formed a new camp
west of Zeriwam afterwards known as Ahnai Camp. Our
casualties on this day amounted to five killed and twenty-
eight wounded. Bearing in mind the great difficulties of
the terrain over which our troops had to operate the success
of this important operation at so small a cost reflects great
credit on both leaders and troops, and also on the Royal Air
Force whose co-operation with the troops by means of D. H.
9 A.'s and Bristol Fighters was excellent.
Reports were now received to the effect that the determined
opposition shown by the Mahsucls on the 9th and 10th was
due to a rumour that had reached the tribesmen that the
Derajat Column was about to raid the Shuza valley. The
lashkar which during the week had been joined by Wazirs
from Wana and Tochi had now split up, some being at Shil-
manzai Kach and in its vicinity and others in the Shuza.
The 12th January was occupied in the construction of
several roads to the river bed and the relief of piquet garrisons
so as to allow the 67th Brigade to move forward complete in
the next advance. On the following day Column head-
quarters and Column troops joined the
See sketch map No. 2 g^^j Brigade at Ahnai Camp where final
at page 113. ^^ p , i i t i- ^i
preparations, had been made tor tne
advance through the Ahnai Tangi. During the afternoon
a hostile attack which cost us three killed and three
wounded, was made on an observation post detached from
the Ahnai left bank piquet.
The advance through the Ahnai Tangi took place on the
14th January, and a short description of
the country will help to make clear the
account of the next day's fighting. Run-
ning north from the Tangi, on the east
bank of the 'I'ank Zam is a long narrow
simrcuhiiinating iji a flat tojiped iiill, some 150 yards in length
called " Flathead Left." Tiie latter over 900 feet above 1 he
Tank Zam (•oiiL])U'tely domi]iales the bed and the right bank
of the river. Any fiirtlier advance upstream from " Fhithead
L(;ft '' is threatened from a mass of clifls known as '* iMarble
Advance tlirough
Ahnai Tan^'i, Mth
January.
See panorama No, .'{.
No. 4.
No. 4.
AHNAI TANGI .pom
^-Nti^^^^^
^,^^J^
115
Arch " ajul, more to the east, by a hill which is separated
from *' Flathead Left " by a steep and preci})itous nala.
This second hill was known as '' Flathead Right."
A reconnaissance from the high ground in the vicinity of
the Tangi showed that the country beyond was very difficult,
and that the most important tactical feature in the area was
the ridge on the left bank culminating in " Flathead Left "
and that it was necessary to hold this point to secure the
passage of the Column towards Sorarogha.
In accordazice with orders, a strong advanced guard con-
sisting of l/ooth E-ifles, two companies of
K.?ruthJan"^ 2/5th Gurkha Rifles and two guns of
No. 27 Mountain Battery advanced up the
bed of the river on the morning of the 14th January. Mean-
while the remainder of the 2/5th Gurkha Kifles under Lt.-
Colonel Crow^dy, D.S.O., starting from Ahnai Left Bank at
7-30 A.M. moved along the spur to secure '' Flathead Left "
where it was proposed to establish a permanent piquet.
The main body was under Major-General Skeen and con-
sisted of —
1 troop of Cavalry,
4 guns,
3 battalions,
1 Field Company Sappers and Miners,
and attached troops.
Brigadier-General Lucas with four guns and two battalions
was detailed to protect the route from the camp to Ahnai
Tangi and to escort the transport which numbered 1,480
mules and 2,800 camels. The detail of troops engaged is
show^n in Appendix '' H."
The advanced guard under Lieutenant-Colonel Herdon,
i/55th Rifles, met wath, opposition on reaching the cultivation
near Asa Khan and shortly afterwards its progress was retarded
by accurate rifle fire from the '' Marble Arch " cliffs and
'' Flathead Right." On the special flanking detachment
reaching " Flathead Left " at about 8-30 a.m. it encountered
considerable opposition from the direction of ''Flathead
Right." At the same time the advanced guard pushed for-
ward to establish a piquet on a steep spur running down from
" Marble Arch." Immediately afterwards some forty tribes-
men emerging from a nala on the left bank rushed this piquet-
ing detachment and threw the vanguard, moving in the river-
l)ed, into some confusion. Hand-to-hand fighting ensued
116
but eventually the enemy was driven of! with heavy loss and,
thanks to the guns with the advanced guard, gave little mor&
trouble in this part of the lield. It was now seen that to
ensure the safe passage of the column il was imperative to
hold ** Flathead Right " and orders were therefore issued to
the flanking detachment to occupy this dominating feature.
But this detachment had for some time been heavily engaged,
and was now calling for reinforcements and ammunition.
A company of the 2/76th Punjabis was consecjuently sent
up but before its arrival the Gurkha detachment having run
out of ammunition had driven back the enemy wit h the bayonet,
but in doing so had lost their Commanding Officer, Lt. -Colo-
nel Crowdy, D.S.O.. who was killed. On the situation being
known the remainder of the 2/76th Punjabis was sent up
from the river bed at 11-30 a.m. under Lieutenant-Colonel
Chamberlayne under orders to restore the situation and make
good " Flathead Right " so as to facilitate the capture of
'* ]\larble Arch,"' which menaced the whole of the area in
which the Force was now concentrating. In addition to the
above troops a company of the 2/9 th Gurkha Rifles had also
been sent to '' Flathead Left " by Brigadier-General Lucas
from Ahnai Tangi. The steep ascent of over 900 feet was
scaled rapidly and the reinforcements arrived in time to
ensure the retention of " Flathead Left." The attack on
" Flathead Right " was resumed but the hostile fire proved
too heavy and accurate. Several gallant efforts were made
to advance but these were of no avail, and orders were
therefore issued to consolidate the ground gained.
As it was then 1-30 p.m. and as the transport was through
the Taugi and well closed up in the river bed it was too late
to return to Ahnai Camp. A further advance was impossible
as ** Marble Arch" had not been captured. Major-General
Skeen too was reluctant to surrender important ground gained
at tlie price of severe casualties and decided to form a camp
where the force then lay, although the locality was most
un-^uitable. 1'he camp, afterwards kjiown as Asa Khan Camp,
was in the bed of the Tank /am and was not only closely
surroiuid(Ml l)V hills, tjic loss of any of which might have
created a critical situatioji, l)ii1 was also cramped and con-
fined.
During the afternoon the enemy was reported massing^
in a ravine to the west of the camp. On Dazzle I Fill, au
imj)ortant height about a mile from caiuj) two Comj)anios of
PLATE NO. 10.
i /
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117
the 1091 li Infantry, llie only troops in hand, were sent to
drive tliein off. Too weak to carry out their mission, th<y
sustained lieavy losses but held to ground gained, and by so
doing enabled the eanij) defences in tliat direction to he coni-
])leted, and secured the cam]) from attack from the west.
IMeanwliile the position on '' Flathead Left " liad become
more critical. The tribesmen made four more determined
attacks supported by powerful and accurate covering fire,
and it was only witli difHculty that our troops maintained
their hold on this vital point. Another company of the 2/9 tli
Gurkha Eifies originally destined for picquet garrison had
just arrived at '' Flathead Left " in time to turn the tide in
our favour and helped to beat ofT a last determined assault
in which bayonets, stones, knives, and grenades were freely
used. After this the enemy pressure died down and no
further attacks were made. Our troops on the ridge spent
the whole night in consolidating their positions.
This action proved to be the most stubbornly fought of
the whole campaign. Our casualties amounted to nine British
officers killed and six wouiTded, two- Indian officers, and three
hundred and sixty-five Indian other ranks killed or wounded.
Owdng to the necessity of escorting the transport and
securing the road only a few units were available for the
actual fighting, but the heavy casualties that those units
suffered, especially in British officers, in no way shook their
moral. The enemy's losses w^ere reported later at about four
hundred killed or seriously wounded. Forty to fifty enemy
dead w^ere found in front of our lines, and a large number ot
our own and tribal rifles were recovered as late as two days
after the action.
The Mahsuds fought wdth their usual reckless gallantry.
They took full advantage of the difficulties of the ground and
by accurate fire covered the concentration and assault of their
braver spirits. Many of these assaults were pushed home,
but in the hand-to-hand fighting that ensued our troops proved
themselves superior to the enemy.
The co-operation of the Royal Air Force w^as most effective
and rendered material assistance tow^ards
Air FoTcr*''''' ''^^''^'^ ^^e success of the day's action. The offen-
sive spirit of the pilots w^ho recognised the
fierce nature of the fighting had a remarkable effect on the
enemy as is exemplified by the following episode. Tw^o
aeroplanes, finding good targets finished their bombs and_
118
aininunition some time before their reliefs were due to arrive.
The enemy was then harassing our troops and the aviators
knew that the departure of the aeropUmes would be the signal
for the renewal of the attack. They therefore remained and
by continually diving low at the enemy succeeded in pinning
him to the ground thus preventing the development of any
oflfensive movement against our hard pressed troops. Un-
fortunately two of our aeroplanes were shot down by the
enemy but the occupants, though slightly wounded, succeeded
in reaching our lines. On this day too a machine had to
make a forced landing in the Shuza withi.n Bhittanni limits.
The occupants were taken in safety to Khirgi by three Mahsuds,
Avho were in our employ as intelligence agents.
During the next three days Column Headquarters, with
column troops and the 67th Brigade remained at Asa Khan
Camp, whilst the wounded were evacuated, supplies collected
and preparations made for a further advance.
The action of the Ahnai Tangi is a good example of the
Importance of train- ^espcratc nature of the fighting that had
ing as shewn by Asa taken place up to this stagc of the opera-
Khan-6 operations. ^-^^^ ,^ ^^^^ which would liavc tried highly
trained units, even the pre-\var Frontier Force or similar
regiments with long experience and training on the frontier.
It is very essential for us, even those w^ho fought on the
frontier as late as 1917 and 1918, to realise to what extent
conditions have been altered with the great improvement in
the armr^.ment of the tribesmen. Their tactical knowledge
and training have greatly improved. The presence of a large
bcdy of .Militia deserters forms a strong nucleus of well tramed
men on which to build their tribal gatherings. We must
appreciate the standard of individual training that is re-
quired for infantry in the conditions that prevail on the
frontier to-day. The standard of training that we had per-
force to be content wdth in France in the later years of the
Great War, .although it enabled us to gain a final victory,
does ncit suffice o]i the frontier to-day, nor are the tactical
methods that we adopted suitable in many respects, though
t he principles underlying these tactics apply etjually. Tacti-
cal methods and trainijig are interdependejit, and wliere
large bodies of men can be employed the actual numbers
alone give the more timorous a sense of safety and })ower.
In an action sucli as lias beeji described however, masses
cannot be used and ii man's fighting value and his own safety
PLATE NO. I(.
PLATE NO. II.
119
depend on his own efforts and on his ability to use his
weapons. The paramount importance of sound muske try-
training and all that pertains to it is well exemplified in this
particular action.
From reports received later it appeared that the very lar ,e
numbers of tribesmen, (said to have been at least 4,000),
sheltering in the numerous caves near Sarwekunda and in the
Shilmauzai Kach area had appreciated the tactical value of
'' Flathead Left " and anticipating that a permanent piquet
would be established on it, and they made their preparations
accordingly to dispute the possession of this important feature.
Consequently on the 14th when shortly atter 7-30 a.m. the
Mahsuds heard the continuous '' precautionary " fire of the
Lewis guns and rifles of the 2/5th Gurkhas clearing the spur
for the advance of the special flanking detachment, consider-
able numbers of tribesmen hurried to their selected positions
and prepared to put up a stout resistance. Wifchin an hour
in the desperate fighting that ensued the detachment had run
out of ammunition, and but for the bayonet charge carried
out under the personal leadership of their gallant commanding
officer, the whole detachment must have been overwhelmed.
As is usual after an important action such as that of the
, ^^ ^, Ahnai Taneji the lashkars of both Wana
Disposal of Lashkar. -,tt • i t» r i t i
Wazirs and Mahsuds began to return to
their homes with their dead and wounded, and the former
too expressed an intention of not returning. At this time
too peace overtures were made to the Force Commander
through the Political Officer who was then at Jandola. The
genuineness of these offers was suspected at the time, and
later intelligence proved that the overtures were insincere,
and that their object was to stay our advance. The period
of the halt at Asa Khan Camp was employed in establishing
permanent piquets in advance of camp, including one on
" Marble Arch," which on this occasion was not held by the
enemy. Except for a few minor brushes with the enemy,
little real opposition was encountered as most of the lasJihirs
had dispersed, but our daily casualties averaged about four
killed and ten wounded.
On the 18th January the Striking Force, with the addition
of the 3rd Guides, who had joined the
isth^anuary.^''"''^^'' Column froui the 68th Brigade, left Asa
Khan Camp and moved forward some
four miles to the Sorarogha plateau. The enemy offered but
120
little resistance to the advance. Several good camel tracks
leading from the Sagar Algad to the plateau having been
rapidly constructed by the Pioneers, 1,500 mules and 2,vS00
camels were soon passed through to camp. Later in the
evening the enemy attacked the two most advanced camp
piquets, interfering seriously with their construction and,
in the case of the piquet on the left bank of the Tank Zam
preventing its occupation that evening. The work was i om-
pleted during the night and the piquet occupied. Our
casualties this day were eight killed and fourteen wounded.
The Sorarogha plateau, some three hundred feet above
the river, formed an excellent open camping
atto'r^r^gh" '""'' g^ouud. The disadvantage of having to
bring up water to the plateau was more
than compensated for by the ease of protection, the ample
space and the good surface of the whole area. The space was
sufficient to include an aerodrome which was of the greatest
value in the subsequent operations, especially as it permitted
pilots who had flown from Bannu or Tank to learn before
beginning operations the position of our troops and the state
of the situation. The striking force halted at Sorarogha Camp
until the 27th January.
This long halt was necessary to collect ten days' reserve
of supplies, ammunition, and stores for the striking force.
It had originally been decided to advance by stages of from
ten to twelve miles and not to embark on a new stage until
ten days' maintenance for the striking force had been accu-
mulated at the head of the old stage. This was a necessary
precaution to take, as, although every possible arrangement
had been made to ensure the protection of the Lines of Commu-
nication, they were always liable to temporary interruption
by weather or the enemy. But, fortunately for us, the hitter's
strategical knowledge had not increased with his improvement
i n tactics and no serious attacks on the Lines of Comnmnication
took place.
The period, 29th December 1919 to 20th January 1920,
, , formed the second phase of the operations
Knd of Hccond phaeo. -iiiTiTi j t^ i. t
against the Mahsuds. It was a phase of
steady progress and hard fighting which broke down the
resistance of the enemy.
During these tliirty days there had been twenty actions
ill nearly all of which more than one Brigade had been
employed. Although this had naturally imposed a great
PLATE NO. 12.
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strain on battalions already depleted in numbers, it was a
period of practical training for all ranks and many lessons
were learnt. The initial phases of five of the larger opera-
tions had been successfully carried out in the dark, during
the early hours of the morning and over difficult country.
This alone was a high test of discipline and efficiency.
These numerous and successful actions inspired the troops
with confidence and made . the Column a really formidable
force, ready to undertake with determination the most difficult
operation.
I 2
I
CHAPTER X.
Operations of the Dera.iat Column — The Advance to
PiAZHA Raghza.
Ill spite of repeated appeals, sometimes accompanied witli
., , . . threats from tlie Wazirs and Malisuds, Sliah
Afghan mtngues. -r^iii i ri*ri'
Daula the commander of the Afghan irre-
gular force at Wana had steadfastly declined to lend his guns
to the tribesmen for use against the Derajat Column. He
had occasionally distributed small amounts of rifle ammu-
nition to the Wazirs but up to this period that was all
the material help he was able to give the tribesmen and
all they now expected of him. As a result of the severe
reverses they had suffered, the Mahsuds sent several
messengers to Khost to report their plight and to ascertain,
what hope there was of help or intervention from that
quarter, but these men returned with empty messages of
sympathy and good-will from the officials of that district.
Finding, however, that the Mahsuds w^ere weakening several
prominent individuals with anti-British leanings now
apfjeared in Mahsud country from Khost with large amounts
of rifle ammunition and promises of reinforcements in the
form of lashkars accompanied by artillery. Among tliese
emissaries were the fanatical jMullah Lala Pir and Haji Abdur
Kazak, once Court Mullah at Kabul but now a prominent
agitator. Letters from Khost also reached Shah Daula who
immediately busied himself with the collection of a Wana
Wazir lashlar, which he promised to supply with ammunitic n
and to accompany with his two mountain guns.
About one and a quarter miles north of Sorarogha Camp,
^ . . ,^ . the 'Tank Zam cuts through the Sarkai
Description of Baiari ^,, . ^ ,. ^ n i i i
Tangi. Oliar ridgc iornnng a gorge called the
HeehkttchmapNo. 3 Jjaraii 'J'aiii'i. The latter is some tliree
at page 122. , ,, i-i ,i ii i
Jmndred yards in length and sixty yards
wide, witli sides which rise precipitously to an a\erage height
(>i \i>i) feet. The bed of the river here turns almost due west
and is joined l)y the Barari Algad from a north-easterly direc-
tion. After passing through the 'J'angi there are three inijior-
tant features which c(jjnmaiid any advance up the 'I'ank Zam.
These are "Barari Centre" and "The l^arrier " between
the l>arari Alga d and the Tank Zam and " Gibraltar '' opposite
( 122 )
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PLATE NO. 13.
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PLATE NO. 13.
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SOUTHERN ENTRANCE TO BARARI TANGI.
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PLATE NO. 14.
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123
the latter oji tlie right bank of the river. The last-named
feature is a rocky and bushy bluff, whose existence was not
discovered dui'ing the preliminary reconnaissances from Sora-
rogha Camp. Before attacking " Barari Centre " it was
necessary to secure the Sarkai Gliar ridge on both sides of
the river. The part of the ridge on the right bank, tliough
the most formidable, was higher and less exposed to dangers
than the part on the left bank and gave observation over the
latter and its intricate surroundings. \
On the 20th the Mahsud lashhars which had retired to
Ahmadwam and Sarwek numbered about two hundred in each
place, but since that date these had been reinforced by small
. , , parties of tribesmen including some Wazirs
Preparations for the ■}; od i • a i • Z^
advance through Barari from Shakai. Activc Operations prepara-
Tangi, 23rd and 25th ^ivc to the further advaucc began on the
*^^*^'^* 23rd January when Brigadier-General
Lucas with the —
l/55th Rifles,
2/oth Gurkha Rifles,
2/9th Gurkha Rifles,
moving out at 5-30 a.m. traversed the intricate nalas and
bush that lay north of the Sorarogha plateau and, ascending
the precipitous slopes of Sarkai in the
atendKor^ ^''* ^ ^^^k, established himself without loss in
positions covering the site selected for the
construction of a permanent piquet which was named subse-
quently the '' Bluff Piquet." Meanwhile two companies of
the 3rd Guides were disposed to protect the left flank against
the small lasJikar previously reported in the Sarwek valley.
Shortly after daybreak the 2/9th Gurkha Rifles, who were
covering from above the construction of the piquet, became
engaged with the enemy who had appeared from the (Jirec-
tion of Ahmadwam. Compelled to occupy a ridge to the
north-west of the Bluff Piquet to cover the ridges in rear,
the advanced company of this battalion soon began to sustain
losses from hostile fire from the northern slopes of Sarkai
Ghar. These casualties continued until the piquet was finished,
equipped, and occupied. The withdrawal began at 1-45 p.m.
The Mahsuds then attacked the advanced company with
determination undeterred by shell fire, bombs, or Lewis gun
fire from the aeroplanes. The company, however, was skil-
fully handled and completed its withdrawal with the loss of
its British officer and seven Gurkha other ranks killed. The
124
remainder of the witlidrawal was carried out over the most
precipitous and broken ground, but the fire of the supporting
artillery especially that of the 2- 75 guns was most effective
in keeping the tri])esmen under cover. Our losses on this
day were ten killed and twenty-one wounded. During the
operation the assistance rendered by the aero]>lanes was of
the greatest value and was undoubtedly responsible for the
comparatively small losses sustained. They used the new
aerodrome at Sorarogha for the first time, and the pilots were
thus enabled to maintain the closest touch with the troops
with whom they were co-operating. Heavy rain accompanied
by snow on the night of the 23rd January precluded opera-
tions on the following day as low clouds and bad visibility
pi evented co-operation from the air.
' On the following day a permanent piquet on the Karkanai
ridge was established at a cost of five killed and fifteen
wounded. The majority of these casualties were incurred
during an attack at 11-30 a.m. by about two hundred
Mahsuds from the Shuza who drove in the advanced troops
of the 57th Eifles, but with the assistance of the artillery
the situation was restored, and the covering troops re-
occupied their position. The enemy who had apparently
suffered casualties failed to follow up the w^ithdrawal in spite
of the nature of the terrain which was admirably suited to his
tactics. _
A hold on both flanks of the Barari Tangi having thus
been secured the construction of three camel tracks to the
river bed in preparation for the next advance was undertaken.
I'his was completed on the 26th January without opposition.
On the same day the 43rd Brigade arrived at Sorarogha from
Kotkai having been relieved by the 67th Brigade from
Jandola, the latter forming No. 2 Section, Tank Line of
Communication Defences.
During the stay of our troops at Sorarogha several attempts
were made by the ]\Iahsud maliks to open up negotiatiojis
with a view to effecting a cessation of liostilities. Tlie maliks
alf^o hoped that the presence of Afghan emissaries iji their
country might induce Government to forego or modiiy its
terms to the Mahsuds. These overtures, however, met with
no res]>onsc as it was evident that the tribesmen were entirely
out of cc)ntrol of their maliks jind liad no intcjitions of fulfillijig
the conditions to which i]\v. maliks had already agreed at
Jandola. Major-General Climo, therefore, ordered that puni-
I illustrate operations in vicinity of
BARARI TANGI.
MAP No. 3
2/150tli Infantry under Brigadier-General Gwyn-Tliomaa ,
Map to illustrate operations in vicinity of
BARARI TANGI.
MAP No. 3
Yards
■^ — Picquet
2000 Yards
125
tive measures involving the destruction of property should
be carried out wliezi the force advanced from Sorarogha.
Tliis decision had been dehiyed as long as reasonable hope of a
settlement had remained.
In consequence of the propaganda of the Afghan adven-
turers, and the energies of the Mahsud leaders, Mullah Fazl
Din and Musa Khan, a lashkar composed chiefly of Shabi
Khel and AbduUai and amounting to about 1,200 rifles was-
concentrated at this time in the vicinity of the Barari Tangi.
The hope was therefore entertained that the lashkar would
make a stand and give the column an opportunity of inflicting
on these recalcitrant sections the punishment they so richly
desorved.
The possession of the Sarkai ridges paved the way for a
further advance and covered the approaches to '' Barari
Centre." The capture of the latter feature was an essential
prelude to an attack on '' The Barrier " which threatened
to be a formidable obstacle and a likely position for the enemy
to hold. The crest of the ridge was nowhere more than a
few feet wide with natural cover in the rocks and an easy
slope falling away on the far side providing easy lines of retreat.
The southern approach to the crest of '' The Barrier " was^
difficult, especially the last part which involved a precipitous
climb. It was estimated that an attack on this position
would cost at least one hundred casualties so Major-General
Skeen decided to seize '' Barari Centre " at daybreak and
push the attack against '' The Barrier " before the enemy
could concentrate for its defence.
Accordingly Brigadier-General Lucas with the following
troops who had become accustomed to
TanX28th sL^t^'' ^^g^^ Operations in this area moved from
Sorarogha Camp at 5-30 a.m. on the 28th
January —
1 /55th Rifles,
2/5th Gurkha Rifles,
109th Infantry,
2 companies 3rd Guides.
By daybreak '' Barari Centre " was in our possession, and
Brigadier-General Lucas was in a position to cover the attack
on '' The Barrier." At daybreak, about 7 a.m., the advance
guard of the main column, consisting of the 57th Rifles and
2/150th Infantry under Brigadier-General Gwyn-Thomas ^.
126
entered the Tangi and pushed on towards '' The Barrier ''
and " Gibraltar."
Immediately behind the advanced guard came the S])ecial
flanking detachment composed of the 4'39t]i Garliwal Rifles
and two companies of the 2/9 th Gurklia lliiies detailed for
the capture of '' The Barrier." As the advanced guard cleared
the Tangi the special detachment swung to the right on to its
objective. The former met with opposition in the Tangi, but,
after dispersing about fifty tribesmen com])osing an enemy's
piquet, pushed forward as directed. The tribesmen had been
taken by surprise, and by 10 a.m., with practically no opposi-
tion. '' The Barrier *' was in our possession, and our position
there was rapidly consolidated. Meanwhile the vanguard
had got well past '' Gibraltar " and was approaching Bangi-
wala, when a detaclnnent from the 57th Eifles despatched to
piquet the former feature was held up by accurate sniping
from a network of nalas and wooded plateaux some GOO —
1 ,000 yards to the south and north-west. Reinforcements were
sent up without avail, and finally two companies of the 2/9th
Gurkha Rifles were employed. Skilfully handled these two
weak companies passing through under close artillery support,
drove back the^ enemy and at 1 p.m. captured " Gibraltar."
Owing to persistent hostile rifle fire consolidation was not
comi)leted until after dark. The column camped at Alimad-
wam, iust north of Barari Tangi, except
Camp at Ahmadwam. .-, in jij.ii. j. i * i
the bulk of the transport which, owing
to the limited extent of the camp, had to return to
Sorarogha Camp. Our losses were seven killed and sixty-
two wounded, and the enemy's casualties were reported as
twenty killed and sixteen wounded. In the meantime the
C7th Brigade having established the permanent piquet on
'' Barari Centre '* returned to Sorarogha Canlp.
During the 29th January the construction of jjosts on
the localities selected for permanejit piquets
Enemy guns in action (:om])leted. Considerable numbers of
againHt our troopB. J i • i i
the enemy were seen duruig the day up
the Tank Zam and confirmatioji was obtained of the reports
previously received that a VVana Wazir hishJcar accompanied
by tlie \()(d\ Afghan commandei" Shah Daula with his two
mountain guns liad joined the Malisud lashkur. These two
Hix-j)OUii(ier guns firing fixed ammunition came into action
at Shin Konr against us for tin; first time, but did Jio iiann
to our troops. They liad a range of about 2,000 yards and
PLATE NO. 15.
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--- 127
the majority of the shells did not burst. Heavy rain during
the night of the 29tli made the camp a morass and impassable
for the transport and operations had to be postponed until
the 1st February, the intervening period being utilized for
reconnaissances and tlie construction of causeways through
tlie cam]) to enable the transport to move at the earliest
opportunity.
On the 31st January all ])reparations for the advance
were complete, the 109th Infantry having taken over all the
permanent piquets in this area.
Orders were issued for the advance to continue on the
following day. Considerable opposition
isfrlbruaVv'!'^^^^^'^' was cxpcctcd, as hearing of the arrival of
Haji Abdur Razaq, Lala Pir, and Shah
Daula with his guns and a Wazir lashJcar estimated at 1,600,
Mahsuds from every quarter began to rally and by the 30th
a lashhar as large as any that had previously collected,
amounting to some 4,500 armed and unarmed men, was
distributed between Dwa Toi and Bangiwala.
The character of the country north of the Barari Tangi
changes, the hills are thickly covered with scrub and bush
which afford good concealment for hostile snipers and prevent
accurate observation from aeroplanes. The area too is much
intersected by deep, precipitous ravines affording covered
ways for any enemy movement against the flank of an advanc-
ing column. Further it appeared that the main body of the
lashhar was at Shin Konr, and that the villages between that
place and Ahmadwam were occupied by small bodies of the
enemy. For these reasons and to avoid severe casualties
Major-General Skeen decided to carry out the first stage of
the advance under cover of darkness.
On the 1 st February an advanced force of three battalions
with a proportion of Pioneers and Sappers and Miners under
Brigadier-General Gwyn-Thomas moved out from camp at
3-15 A.M. just after the moon had set, and advancing in column
of route up the river bed under close cover of the right bank
occupied the difficult country overlooking the latter. Thus
two miles of ground had been secured without the enemy
suspecting the presence of troops, and by daylight the piquets
on this side were practically completed. Another force of
one-and-a-half battalions and one section of No. 27 Mountain
Battery moved out at 4-15 a.m. to piquet the left bank of the
river from Bangiwala past '' Slug Hill " to the ground cover-
128
in^r Aka Khel from the xiortli and west. Just before dawn a
small party of the enemy occupying Aka Khel village dis-
covered this force and opening a wild and inefl'ective lire
fled upstream. The troops pushed on rapidly and gained
their positions without casualties. By daybreak all objec-
tives had been secured and were being rapidly strengthened,
thus affording especially on the right bank, a series of succes-
sive strong })oints against which it was lioped the enemy
would concentrate and offer good targets. This unfortunately,
did not happen, the enemy being apparently discouraged by
the loss of the strongest tactical features in the area and by
the obvious failure of Shah Daula's guns, which opening
shortly after daybreak from a position in front of a cave at
Shin Konr were silenced by a couple of shells from a section
of 2-75 guns in action on the Aka Khel plateau.
The Eoyal Air Force during the day reported the presence
of large bodies of tribesmen close to our advanced troops and
these were dealt with by the Howitzers and the 2-75 guns,
the latter using half charges with good results. The Royal
Air Force too played an important part in harassing these
hostile j^arties and preventing their concerted action, though
snipers continued to prove troublesome throughout the day.
This action was an excellent example of a successful sur-
prise and of the great demoralizing effect it has on un-orga-
nized tribesmen. The approaches to the piquet positions
which were traversed in the dark were most difficult and
the success which attended the night movements shows the
high standard of discipline and moral to which the troops
had now attained.*
During the following day six permanent piquets were
constructed and occupied jjreparatory to the renewal of the
advance on the 3rd Februaiy. The country was even more
difficult than that afready traversed and Major-General
Skeen was obliged to decide on another night operation of a
more hazardous and intricate nature than the former; the
performance of his troops, however, on the 1st February
makijig him confident of success.
Reports received showed that the tribesmen who had
retired towards Dwa Toi wci'c (lis])ersing to their homes.
• Tho onomy'H caxualtioH in tho diiy'H oporatioiw wore MuhHotiuuiitly roportod as aovonty
cljiofly (Uui \() (iro from th«« aoropUriOM. Our oasuiiltUH w^r*; loii Uill(<d iii(:lti(liiij» iv Brili^U
ofDcor and ninfjt<M)n wuuadod including un Obsorvcr ollioor of Liio Ituy.il Air t'oro.
4
PLATE NO. 17.
129
The considerable number of Mali suds who had collected at
Shin Konr only to witness the complete failure of the Afghan
guns and their inability to stay the advance of the Derajat
Column, were nuich disheartened and realised that their
hopes had been buoyed up with the false promises made them
by their prominent mullahs and by the minor officials in
the neighbouring Afglian districts. It appeared that the
majority of the Mahsuds had been led to believe too that
Ilaji Abdur Raziq was an accredited agent of the Amir and.
that he had come empowered to effect a settlement for them
with the British, also that it was in order to give the Haji an
official status that the Afghan guns had been brought from
Wana.
It was evident from reconnaissances and intelligence-
reports that although the main body of the tribesmen had
withdrawn bodies of them were still in the vicinity of Shin
Konr village. At midnight of the 2nd/3rd February the 3rd
Guides occupied Cliff End village and
3rd arsa Februt^'"' to^er, followed by the 2/5th Gurkha Rifles
•who left camp at 1 a.m. to secure Cloud
End over a mile distant. These battalions were to be sup-
ported later by a force leaving camp at 5 a.m. Shortly
after 1 a.m. sleet began to fall. This was accompanied
by a biting wind. By 4-30 a.m. it was apparent that,
apart from the cold, visibility and movement would be
so affected by the weather conditions as to make operations
impracticable. The Guides were ordered to consolidate
their positions but the 2/5th Gurkha Rifles were recalled
as they were undesirably far from camp although the
battalion had reached its objective with only one casualty.
These two battalions suffered considerably from the severity
of the cold, and all the troops underwent much discomfort
during the day from the snow ^nd mud. Bad weather con-
tinued to prevent operations from being resumed until the
5th February. On that day the advanced troops moved
out at 1 A.M. the main column leaving camp at 5-30 a.m.
The heavy rain and snow had ceased but the cold was very
severe and the night march ranks as a very fine feat of endu-
rance on the part of all ranks. Not only was the temperature
25 degrees below freezing point but a strong bitter wind added
to their discomfort. The Tank Zam had to be forded many
times, and each time the troops emerged from the river their
boots and putties were encased immediately in ice. Icicles
formed on the cables where they crossed and were struck
130
by the stream, and all rliaunels of the Tank Zani, except for
A very narrow stri]) of the main stream, were thickly crusted
with ice. The men working in the dark on the construction
of defences on the high ground had first to wrench up the
stones which were frozen fast to the ground and then liandle
tJiis icy material without respite or means of warming them-
eelves. In spite of the hardships so bravely endured by
the troops the operation proved a most signal success and
6o thoroughly disheartened the enemy that he offered no
combined opposition.
Prominent features dominating the route were promptly
fiecured by the advanced troops and the column proceeded
rapidly, concentrating at Janjal by 5 p.m. with the loss of
only one casualty during the day. On the following day a
camp was formed on a good site, on a plateau west of the
Piazha Algad and on the 7th daily staging between the latter
l^lace and Sorarogha, a distance of nine miles, began.
The column remained at Piazha Raghza Camp until the
14th February, in order to collect a reserve
Ra^hTi! *^ ^'^^^^ ^^ supplies and improve the roads to the
river bed. Permanent piquets were estab-
lished with a loss of seven casualties up to Dwa Toi where
Punitive operations ^^^ ^^ra Toi and Baddar Toi streams join,
and preparations for Considerable punitive destruction was
advance to Makin. carried out especially in the villages of the
Shabi Khel, much firewood being collected from the villages
as they were destroyed. The weather continued very cold
with much snow and rain and the accumulation of the reserve
of supjjlies was only completed with considerable difficulty.
Sniping into this camp occurred almost nightly, and
occasionally into the permanent ])iquets but for short periods
only and with little effect. Up to this period there had been
very little sniping by night into camp and this was attri-
buted to the fact that the tribes men realised fhat unaimed
fire is a waste of ammunitioji, and that what had been
suitable and comparatively effective with inferior wea])ons
is uiK-Juitjible with modern weapons when a much better
result witii equal saf(ity to the firer can ])e obtained by aimed
Hnijjiii^. Day sui])ing in (consequence had increased and was
resp(j]isible for muny casualties, especially during the first two
days' halt at Palosina Cam]).
On the 13th Fe})ruary news reached the Column of the?
•collapse at Kotkai of a village tower o(;ciipied by a j)iquet,
WVZ IX>IVi
PLATE NO. 18.
WZHOVd VHZVU
= <
5 I-
PLATE NO. 19.
131
wliicli lost fifteen killed and seven injured.* On the following
day the 67th I^rigade moved from Sorarogha to Piazlia leaving
a l3attalion of the 43rd Brigade at Sorarogha. Preparations-
for the advance on Makin were now complete.
* The accidoiit was due to excess of sandbags on a roof already woakoned by rain.
CHAPTER XI.
The Advance to ]\[akin and Kaniguram.
Wliile the column was at Piazha the tribesmen were in-
formed that, as their attitude continued to be unsatisfactory,
the original terms handed to them and all amendments thereto
were now null and void, and that negotiations for ])eace would
not be re-opened until the stipulated number of tribal rifles
had been handed in and all fines paid in full. Further, that
Makin and Kaniguram would be destroyed unless a specified
number of government rifles were surrendered in addition
before our arrival in those areas. This was fixed at two
hundred for Makin and two hundred for Kaniguram. Duiinoj
our advance every ])ossible facility had been given to the
Mahsuds to comply with our terms, but nothing we could do,
and no steps we could take, would convince the tribesmen of
the reality of our intentions.
The intense cold still continued and the troops were issued
with leather jerkins which greatly added to
isfh^FeWry' '^'''^'" ^hcir comfort. Leaving the 43rd Brigade,
with its base at Piazha Raghza to become
No. 3 Section, Lines of Communication Defences, the column
consisting of : —
Column Headquarters.
Headquarters 67th Brigade.
* 2/5th Gurkha Rifles.
2/9th Gurkha Rifles.
4/3rd Gurkha Rifles (joined the column on 12th Febru-
ary).
l/55th Coke's Rifles.
3rd Guides.
3/34th Sikh Pioneers.
No. 6 Mountain Battery.
No. 27 Indian ^fountain Battery.
.55th Field Conij)any Sappers and Miners.
Medical and Suj)])ly and Trans})ort Units.
commenced its advance towards Makin on the Ljth Febriiaiy.
\n oiditv to combine the protection of the left flank iluring
this movement with the establishmc^nt of ])ermanejit ])iquets
protecting the route where mont exposed to attack from
Alaidan, Brigadier-General (Jwyn-TIiomas with a force of
( 132 )
PLATE NO. 20.
133
two-and-a-half battalions and some Sappers ajid Miners moved
out at 5 A.M. and pre])ared and occupied ])ermanent piquets
on the ridges, known as '' Dwa Toi East " and '' Oxford
Circus," without opposition.
The main column jnoved off at 6 a.m. the advanced guard
under Lieutenant-Colonel D. M. Watt, D.S.O., 2/5 th Gurkha
Eifles, moving into the narrow Dwa Toi defile at 7-30 a.m.
Opposition from snipers commenced at once. These though
quickly driven back, continued to harass the advance until
Marobi was reached and piquets had been established well
ahead of that place. The piqueting troops having been used
up about a mile from Dwa Toi, the main body under Brigadier-
General Lucas, took up the task of making good the route,
and camp w^as formed on the Marobi spur and in two hack
areas south-east of it, all troops and transport reaching camp
before 4 p.m. though the operation of establishing camp piquets
was not complete till 6 p.m.*
Seven- permanent road piquets had been established on
the 15th instant ; these were completed,
ChfntTeth Fe'bru^a'r^^' garrisoucd, and fully equipped under cover
of the rearguard of the main column on
the following day during the advance to Tauda China, a
distance of one and three quarter miles. The move com-
menced at 8 A.M. and was completed by 5 p.m.
The 3/1 1th Gurkha Rifles from India joined the column at
^-30 A.M. and were sent forward to assist in securing camp.
Opposition to the advance and to the establishment of camp
piquets w^as encountered, which resulted in casualties amounting
to one killed and twelve wounded. The enemy were reported
to have lost three killed and eight wounded. The force
encamped on a RagJiza a few hundred yards east of the Tauda
China stream, and about two miles from Makin town and
less than that distance from the other villages in the area
and the cultivation w^hich occupied most of the extensive
valley.
On the 17th February additional permanent piquets were
established and empty transport animals returned to Piazha
Kaghza. At 2 p.m. about 50 Mahsuds attacked a detach-
ment of the 4/3rd Gurkha Rifles covering parties collecting
firewood from a demolished village to the southwest of camp.
* Our casualties for this action were three killed, and twenty wounded. Enemy
casualties are stated to have been eight killed and wounded.
134
The enemy was driven off but a dozen of them took refuge
in a vilhige where they put u]) a stout resistance — necessitating
the employment of the whole battalion. The village was
carried without many casualties but these could not be removed
owing to the accurate fire of snipers ensconced in the vicinity.
Eventually it wasiound necessary to await dusk before carry-
ing out the withcftawal which was effected without further
incident, our casualties totalling ten killed and thirty-seven
wounded.
As the recalcitrant tribesmen of this area had made no
Punitive measures in attempt to hand in the number of rifles
Makiu area, i9th-28th demanded by Government to be Surrendered
*^ ^"*^' at Makin, punitive measures began on the
19th February. Makin is the name given to the whole of this
valley area up-stream of the camp a distance of about two-and-
a-half miles. This area contains extensive cultivation consist-
ing of well-terraced fields above which lie the town of Makin
and the large villages of Umar Khel, Band Khel, and Manzakai.
As a prelude to the major operations it was necessary
to occupy the prominent features of " Tree Hill " and '' Split
Hill " north-west and south-west of camp respectively and
this w^as done under cover of darkness. The success of the
operation effecting the occupation of '' Tree Hill " was
delayed for a while by the failure of a detachment of the
4/3rd Gurkha Rifles to secure its objective and begin the
construction of its piquet before daylight. Dawn found this
detachment on a feature several hundred yards to the east of
its objective.
This was the first and last occasion during these operations
on which a unit taking part in night movements missed its
objective, and the mistake on this occasion is attributed to
the fact that there had been no opportunity to reconnoitre
the difficult ravines which lay between camp and the objec-
tive.
Tii(^ remainder of the force left cam]) at 0 a.m. whih' it
was still dark and under cover of *' Tree Hill " piquet aimed at
penetrating Makin trusting, to the enemy being unable
to concentrate in sufficient force to take advantage of the
confined nature of the country. By 7-15 a.m. the advanced
tro(jps were approaching the vicijiity of " Tree Hill," but
the ground in advance of this hill ])roved much more dillicult
than had biMm anti(i])ated. To the jiorthwest iji a valley
lay falUnv fields flanked on both sides by wooded s[)urs which
PLATE NO. 21.
135
were dominated by three villages and several towers which
were occupied by the tribesmen.
To clear the spurs of the enemy took time, but by 10 a.m.
the 3-1 1th Gurkha Jxilies were in possession of the most im-
portant position and were preparing for an attack on the
easterly end of Makin. Shortly after this the enemy attacked
the Gurkhas but were driven off with loss. As the 3/1 1th
Gurkha Rifles were concentrating to resume the attack their
front line came under the fire of our howitzers which were in
action in camp. This unfortunate accident caused casualties
and obliged the leading companies to recoil. The evacuated
positions were seized promptly by the enemy who by heavy
fire also compelled the 2/9th Gurkha Rifles on the right to
fall back. A considerable time elapsed in removing our
casualties, and it was decided that no further operations
should be undertaken. Four towers were demolished,
several hamlets burnt, and " Hill Tree " piquet established,
and the troops were withdrawn to camp, which was reached
at about 3 p.m.* During the following night a party of
Mahsuds bombed '' Tree Hill " piquet causing four casualties
but they themselves lost heavily from the fire of the piquet.
The operations for the 20th were intended to deal with the
villages south-west of the Dara Toi and west of the Makia
gorge, and to cover the construction of a permanent piquet
on '' Split Hill." A force consisting of the l-55th Rifles and
a company of Pioneers with a section of Sappers and Miners^
left camp at 2-30 a.m. and occupied without opposition '' Split
Hill " and a number of points covering the southern flank
of the projected operations. Work on the '' Split Hill "
piquet was progressing well when at 6-45 a. m., v/hile it wa&
still dark, the Mahsuds attacked the covering troops. The
enemy, however, was driven ofi, and the piquet was established
without further incident.
The main column under Brigadier-General Lucas gained
its objective by 9-40 a.m. and the work of destruction con-
tinued until 12-30 P.M. The advanced troops again experi-
enced considerable hostile rifle fire from the cover of houses
and cultivation walls which caused several casualties. The
withdrawal however, was completed by 3-30 p.m. The des-
* Our casualties for this action were thirty-four killed and twenty-eight wounded
Several parties of the enemy came under our shell fire during the day and the tribesmen,
eventually acknowledged a total loss of sixteen killed and thirty- eight wounded.
136
tructivc work on this day included seventeen towers, one
hundred and sixty houses and a hirge number of retaining
walls in the fields.* The heavy losses suffered by our troops
durinoj these two days showed clearly that
Losses from snipers. ,, •.- , ,. rr ±- -ii-
the destruction of a frontier village is a
much more dangerous operation than it used to be in frontier
expditions. A very much larger number of troops must be
employed to keep the tribesmen at a distance from the scene
of destruction. The villages are generally situated in open
spaces surrounded by high rocky hills thickly covered with
undergrowth affording ideal cover for snipers whose accurate
fire at known ranges is concentrated on the troops working in
the villages and takes a steady toll.
Time therefore is a most important factor in this type of
operation. Towers should be demolished as soon as prepared
and any attempt to obtain a spectacular effect should be
repressed, but no house should be fired without express orders
as the dense smoke emitted is liable to interrupt communica-
tion and mutual support of bodies of troops, and also to hinder
the essential artillery support during the withdrawal. Should
it appear likely that the retirement w^ill be pressed, signals
by Very lights denoting permission to begin firing the village
can be employed with good effect.
On the 21st February the Umar Khel section of the Balilol-
settiement by Umar ^^1 Hving on the right bank of the Dara
Khel section to save Toi scnt in a deputation which offered to
their property. surrender immediately twelve Government
rifles on condition their property was spared from further
destruction. The deputation also promised that no sniping
would take place from their area. This offer was accepted
by Major-General Climo who was visiting the column.
Partly to test the value of the Umar Khel undertaking,
and partly to cover the re-victualling of the piquets, two-and-
a-half battalions and two howitzers proceeded on the 21st to
*' Spht Ifill " to destory some prominent towers in the Makin
frorge })y shell fire. At the same time a small party covered
tJKi re-victualling of " Tree liill " ])i(juet. There were no
casualties and the Umar Khel fullillcd their agreement. On
this day Marobi, the village of the recalci-
2ii't RWry.""'^*''"*''' ^rant Alullah Kazl Din and of his notorious
father iMullah I'owindah was razed to the
* Our oaiualtiofl were twenty -Mven killed and sixty-three wounded. The eiioiuy
loMet were aclcnowlodgod as nix icillod and ton iiuvoroly wounded.
137
groimd, the mosque only being spared. This was the village
in which so many plots involving tlie murder of British officials
had been hatched, and it was hoped that the destruction of
the place would break permanently the temporal power of a
relentless enemy to Government.
On the 23rd February operations were resumed against
the Makin villages on the left bank of the Dara Toi. The
Umar Khel villages and fields held no snipers, and within two
hours all preparation for the withdrawal having been made
the villages were set on fire. The withdrawal was carried
out without untoward incident, our casualties amounting to
live killed and seven wounded. The two following days were
also employed in carrying on the work of destruction with
small loss to ourselves.
On the 27th an imposing tower known as '' Eddystone "
standing on a prominent and imposing bluff at the very junc-
tion of the Upper Dara Toi and the Dashkai Algad, was des-
troyed by howitzer fire at a range of 4,700 yards with an
expenditure of ten shells only.
On the following day all remaining towers in sight except
those belonging to the Umar Khel were levelled to the ground
by gunfire, thus bringing the total destruction in this area up
to 51 towers and about 450 important houses. The villages
in the Makin gorge were not visited by the column. The
steep crags and slopes in the gorge overlook every move in
the advance to this area, and the troops operating in the
villages would have been exposed to snipers at ranges of
from three hundred yards upwards, and judging by previous
experiences it was decided that the results to be obtained
would not justify the heavy losses the operation would entail.
During the first few days our troops sustained over two hundred
casualties but after that opposition decreased to such an
extent that w^e only had some twenty casualties during the
last two days.
It was decided to evacuate Makin area on the 1st March
and to advance on Kaniguram, which we had told the tribes-
men we intended to do in the event of their not complying
with our terms. On the 29th February the preliminary
arrangements for the withdrawal from the Makin area were
set in motion.
The 3/llth Gurkha Rifles.
3/34th Sikh Pioneers.
1 section 27th Mountain Battery
K 2
138
proceeded to ^larobi to pass up camel transport required for
tie column to return the surplus stores to Piazlia. and to
arrange for the reduction of the stores in permanent piquets
near !Marobi. ISimilar steps ^vere taken at Tauda China camp.
Several permanent piquets had been established well
forward to facilitate the daily operations against ]\Iakin and
the withdrawal of these piquets, especially *' Tree Hill * and
*' Split Hill " was a difficult problem. It was undesirable to
,,, ,. disclose our intention to withdraw bv
Lvacuation of Makin. . , , . , . , ■, ^
removing the piquets previously, and a
withdrawal by daylight on the 1st March would have added
two miles to a withdrawal which it was anticipated, would
be followed up closely by an exasperated enemy. Major
General Skeen decided that these forward piquets should
withdraw after the moon had set, about 2 a.m., trusting to
darkness for immunity. Shortly before nightfall on the
29th February the '' Tree Hill " piquet reported one man
killed and another wounded by snipers between the piquet
and the camp, and later signalled that it expected difficulty
in withdrawing to camp. It was too late to despatch a party
to evacuate the casualties. " Split Hill " piquet also reported
enemy in the vicinity of its proposed line of retreat. For-
tunately the piquet commanders had studied the ground
carefully and were able to effect the withdrawal of their piquets
at the appointed hour and without casualty. These young
British officers in command and their men showed great courage
and skill in carrying out a movement fraught with grave risk
and in a situation in which every condition was against them.
In the meantime at 5-50 a.m. two detachments of one
battalion each, moved off to take up positions covering tlie
flanks of the route to Dwa Toi, the advanced guard following
at 6-15 A.M. with artillery to take up successive positions to
cover the withdrawal from the camp. All transport was
loaded in the dark and using all roads was clear of camp by
daylight. The infantry had by this time occupied a series
of positions and the witlidrawal of the camp piquets began.
Some Mahsuds were seen to enter '' S])lit Hill " piqu(^t, where
a *' })ooby "' trap was reported later to have accounted for
four.
The withdrawal which had proved a great surprise to the
Iribesinen was not prcssc^d except during the evacuation of a
camp j)ifjuet en 1 he right i)ank of tjie st ream, where the enemy
succeeded in working down the river bed and firing at close
PLATE NO. 22.
139
range on tlie piquet during its witlidrawal. The troops
supporting the withdrawal of this piquet were too far out of
range to afford tliis party any useful assistance. The piquet
lost 2 killed and six prisoners ; the latter, Punjabi Mussalmans
were released eventually by the Mahsuds and rejoined their
unit at Dwa Toi.*
The enemy followed up the withdrawal to within a mile
of Marobi frequently coming under the fire of guns and aero-
planes.
The Column encamped in the afternoon on cultivation at
Dwa Toi and the empty animals of the second line transport
were sent to Piazha.
<
Our casualties on this day were four killed and one wounded.
The enemy losses were reported subsequently as twenty-eight
killed and a number severely wounded, chiefly due to gun
and aeroplane fire while searching for food and loot on the
deserted camping ground.
This action by the enemy had been anticipated, and several
'' booby " traps were 'arranged, the principal being a sham
grave containing a charge of fifty pounds of guncotton. This
trap caused eight casualties of whom seven were blown to
pieces. ^ ^ ^M?
To support the withdrawal of the column from Makin the
43rd Brigade under Brigadier-General
Preparations for ad- Q-^vvn-Thomas had movcd out from Piazha
vance on Ivaniguram. ^ J *■ ■^'^ ^
and constructed and occupied two perma-
nent piquets on the right and left bank of the Baddar Toi,
upstream of Dwa Toi camp. The next few days were
employed in the construction of piquets up the valley of
the Baddar Toi as a preliminary step to the advance of
the column to Kaniguram. These piquets were not com-
pleted without casualties from enemy snipers concealed on
the hillsides, which are comparatively thickly covered with
small trees affording excellent opportunities, as the cover
is sufficient to protect the snipers from view, while insuffi-
cient to limit their range of vision. The most effectual
method of dealing with enemy snipers was to detail espe-
cially intelligent men to stalk or fire at likely places.
Although enemy snipers may not have been killed iu'^this
manner they were certainly driven off. The use of ^rifle
* These men were court-martialled and sentenced to death for cowardice, but the
sentences were commuted to one of three years' imprisonment.
140
grenades too proved very useful in clearing ^voodcd country
of snipers.
C)n the 29th February wliile the cohinin was at Tauda
China camp, some i\Iahsud representatives
Surrender of rifles to ^jcrj^ified tlicir intention of Surrendering the
■ave Kaniguram. • , i i i i • • r
rilles demanded to ensure the imnuinity oi
Kaniguram from destruction. The total handed in however,
amounted to 103 Government rifles, 113 tribal rifles and
about Rs. 2.400. Some liity oi the Government rifles were
without bolts, and many without magazines. As the numbers
were below the specified number, the maliks were informed
thev might withdraw the rifles and that the march to Kani-
guram would begin. The headmen however, preferred to
leave them in our possession and promised to renew their
efforts to collect the balance. On the 2nd information was
received that the ^'^ahsuds had given up hope of effecting
the surrender of tl e necessary rifles and had dispersed to their
homes.
Difficulties of Maliks The difficulties that beset the maliks in
in collecting rifles. ^j^gi^ cfforts to collect the rifles were —
{a) In many cases an individual was in possession of 3
or 4 government rifles and although willing to
surrender one wished to keep the remainder or be
paid com2)ensation for them.
(h) in many cases a rifle was held conjointly by some
ten mem some of these belonging to the peace and
others to the war party.
(c) many rifles had been buried and their possession
concealed. In addition to this there was the fear
of the tribesman that the full numbers not being
forthcoming his individual sacrifice might be in
vain.
The advance towards Kaniguram began at 5-30 a.m.
on the 3rd March, the advanced guard
3rdM?rch' ^'^ ^'''^^'^' ^•^>nsisting of two battalions and a section
of guns witii a ])r()])ortioji of i^iojieers ajid
Sappers and Miners. Tliese teclmical troops were to assist
in the constructioji of t lie five permanent piquets which rccoji-
naissance had sliown to be necessary.
Shortly before dawn the ejiciny hiddcji iji t h<' r(K'ky and
bush-covcr«(l .sh)])es oji 1 he lij^ht hajik
See panorama No. (>. , , .. * . i i i ..
ojiencd a iicavy lire on t lie leaduig troops,
who however stcndily jtiislicd oji up t h(» nahi hcd and
PLATE NO. 23.
PLATE NO 24.
141
secured '' The Dam ", a spur from tlie Maidan plateau pro-
jecting between the Baddar Toi and the Maidan Algad.
The able handling of the advanced guard secured for the
column the series of rocky bluffs commanding the route at
short range which on account of their ruggedness and steep
bush-covered slopes made this portion of the route the most
difficult of the whole series of the tangis traversed by the
column since leaving Jandola.
Heavy hostile fire from the right bank continued to enfilade
the troops occupying " The Dam " to which position a section
of guns had been ordered. Fortunately at this time the
howitzers came into action in the river under cover, and
searched the wooded hills very thoroughly with their fire.
Under cover of this fire the section was enabled to get into
action without a casualty, and as soon as the detachments
were established behind their shields in action the hillsides
were sprayed with shrapnel. The enemy having been thus
driven off the advance was resumed. The column encamped
on the cultivation below Ladha, and nearly all the camel
transport was passed back to Piazha to bring up supplies the
next day.*
It was evident that the heart had gone out of the Mahsuds
and that it was now most unlikely that any large lashkar
would again take the field. Haji Abdur Raziq and Shah
Daula had moved to Shakai and had taken with them the
Afghan guns. All that could be anticipated from the tribes-
men was occasional sniping in the defence of particular
villages or localities.
As a precaution against interruption by the weather or the
enemy, and to ccyitrol the upper exit of the defiles near the
Dam, a strong point was constructed on the site of the present
Ladha Camp. On the 4th and 5th March the troops were
employed in constructing two camel tracks to avoid the im-
passable tangi near Paiozar village, three quarters of a
mile upstream. The permanent piquets named '' Prospect "
and '' Clubhouse" were also established.
The 3rd Guides having taken over the Ladha Strong point
and the permanent piquets in this area
guSSrhM'aJch.^^'''' "tlie column resumed the advance to Kani-
guram on the 6th March. Permanent
♦ Our casulties on this day were, one killed and nine wounded.
14-2
piquets were established en route and the column encamped
about 800 yards east ot Kaniguram. Little opposition was
encountered but accurate sniping caused us a loss of
thirteen men while establishing piquets in the area north-west
of the town.
Kaniguram is, properly speaking, the only town in ^Fahsud
country. Although the inhabitants are principally Urmars
it is regarded as the capital of the country. The town is
built in terraces on the south side of a steep spur about a mile
in length flanking the left bank of the Baddar Toi, and con-
sists of about one thousand houses and five towers. It is
the chief commercial centre of the country and contains a fair-
ly large bazaar, several rifle and knife factories. Here all
important Mahsud national assemblies take place at the
expense of the Urmars who, tradition demands, should
provide free entertainment for their hungry guests.
On the following day a deputation of prominent Urmars
visited the camp and announced that the
Attitude of Mahsuds. -»t i j i i r -i i j. ^^ j. j.\. -n
jiahsuds had tailed to collect the rmes
necessary to save Kaniguram and that they did not intend
to take any further action in the matter. This obduracy of
the tribesmen is at first sight difficult to explain. Our demands
w^ere not excessive and the Mahsuds had had ample time to
collect double the numbers demanded, if they had w^ished
to do so. It can only be concluded therefore that the situa-
tion was due to the results of former policies when terms were
a matter of mutual concessions and anything in the nature
of insistence or full compliance with original terms was un-
known. The childish subterfuges of trying to pass unservice-
able rifles or parts of rifles and of producing half the numbers
demanded showed that the tribe had been educated for so long
in the art of mutual concessions that it was unable to realize
the fact that Government was determined on this occasion
to obtain a complete submission.
The Mahsuds had suffered heavy casualties and much
destruction of their ])roj)erty had taken place, but these
]>unishments failed lo coerce the tribe into acco])ting our
terms, and no d(;st ruction could c()m])ensate adequately for
this failure. It a])]>eared, theicfore, that this coercion could
not be attained without a jjrolonged stay iji the country as
it was impossible to force this tiibe of ujiruly ;ui(l obdurate
ijidividuals, recognizing no resj)ojisil)le leaders ,\nd no form
( f or^/jinized government, to nuike ajiy ejigagements, or to
PLATE NO. 25.
PLATE NO. 26.
I
PLATE NO. 27.
KANIGURAM SECOND uAiVll-
PLATE NO. 27.
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No. 6
BADOAR TOl VALLEY
LOOKING W.S.W. FROM ST. MARKS PiqUET PlAZHA RAGHZA
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No. 7
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UPPER BADDAR
LOOKING WEST FROM NEAR KANI6URAM
Hit, N» as B n «
ni.. N. «ilo t 21
No.8
;C£ME or THE ACTION AT GIGA KHEL ON IV APRIL - LOOKING W6.8T
/^DRAWN FROM PHOTOGRAPHS AND DESCRIPTIONS SUPPLIED BY OFFICERS PRESENT ^
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143
keep such promises if made, once the troops had left the
country. Under these new conditions the destruction of tlie
amenities or of the resources of the country seemed inadvisable
as thev might be required for ourselves. The opportunity
was therefore taken to give the tribesmen a further extension
of time in which to comply with our demands.
During the stay of the Column at Kaniguram the Mahsuds
gave little trouble, and much useful survey work was
completed. The weather however, was most unsettled and
heavy snow falling on the 12th and the 13th caused
interruption to convoys and great discomfort to the troops
and animals. On the 18th during a terrific thunderstorm
two sentries were struck by lightning, and severely injured.
Most of the tribes now began to make genuine efforts to
collect and pay in their shares of the fine and their pro-
portion of tribal and Government rifles, but certain sections,
especially those further removed from our line of advance,
made little or no effort. The worst offenders were the in-
habitants of the upper valleys of the Baddar Toi who
believed themselves out of reach of our troops.
These people were well known recalcitrants and, as no
Punitive operations ^roops had penetrated into their country
np Baddar Toi, 6th-8th for manv ycars it was decided to punish
"^P"^* them. Accordingly a force composed of
detachments from all units numbering 6 guns and 2,620 rifles
with 2,000 transport animals moved from the new camp
near Karon on the 6th April and advanced up the Baddar
Toi. No opposition was encountered during the march but
on forming camp at Sine Tizha about 4 p.m., sniping began,
causing two casualties. The day's oneratiojjis included the
destruction of two towers at Mano Tsilai and the villages
and towers of Sine Tizha.
On the following day the Column continued its advance
to Giga Khel with the object of carrving
A sTt end°of book!'''* "^ ^^^ punitivc mcasurcs as^ainst the villas^es
and property of the Abdur Rahman Khel
in that area. The towers were demolished in spite of opposition
and the troops began to withdraw. The retirement was
followed up by some three hundred tribesmen who met with
little success except against a small party of the 4 /3rd Gurkha
E^ifles which descending into a ravine, found itself delayed by
a waterfall, and was overwhelmed. This incident besides
showing a lack of previous reconnaissance and the danger
14 i
of using a nala as a line of retirement demonstrates the
fact tliat ravines are more dangerous than ever since the
tribesman p<ssibly to avoid gunfire, uses them to cover his
pursuit of a retiring piquet. The troops were all in camp by
4 P.M.. our casualties during the day being ten killed and
tweiitv-nine wounded. 'J' he enemy principally Wazirs from
Shakai lost approximately the same number.
The withdrawal to Kaniguram began at G-45 a.m. on the
8th April and was followed up by about one hundred of the
enemy. These at first contented themselves with long range
snipijig but later a determined attack was pressed down the
Baddar Toi and caused a few casualties to the rear parties.
The C'olumn was back in Kaniguram at 5 p.m. losing this day
five killed and fourteen wounded.
The operations in the Baddar Toi valley closed the active
work of the Derajat Column. After a
^'^''?uM '^P^'^^^^''" sixteen-foot road graded to suit Mechanic
cease, /thMav. i i i i p
cal Transport had been constructed irom
Kaniguram to Ladha, the whole column concentrated at the
latter place and begann then the construction of a permanent
camp.
As all resistance had practically ceased and our troops
were unmolested, it was decided to reduce the garrison at
Ladha to one Infantry Brigade with a battery of artillery, a
field company of Sappers and Miners and a Pioneer battalion.
Similarly a reduction was effected in the garrisons of perma-
nent piquets ; thus affording opportunities of better training
and permitting the larger posts to send out strong patrols,
and assume the spirit of aggression. The ambushes and
offensive measures adopted by the posts on the Lines of Com-
munication were meeting with success, and there was a
general feeling of apprehension and uneasiness among the
tribesmen. Alarms, generally ill-founded, were constantly
raised among them of projected night incursions by our troops
in various directions.
The Headquarters of tlie Derajat Column were dispersed
on the 7tli ^lay and their dis])ersal brought the o])erati()ns
to an end. 'I'hus ended a Frontier (•am})aigji of ujiparalleled
liard lighting and severity. 'J'he enemy fought with a deter-
minalicm and courage which has rarely, if ever, been encoun-
tcr'*fi hv our troops in simihir (/jx'iat ions. The diaracter of
the terrain, (•(jnd)ined with trying ajid aiduous climatic condi-
tions, alojie presented difliculties beloic wliicli t h(^ most
PLATE NO. 28.
PLATE NO. 29,
145
seasoned troops might well have liesitated. Tlie resistance
of the enemy was broken, ajid the dilliculties successfully
overcome by a force composed almost entirely of young Indian
troops. No British troops except for the Jloyal Air Force,
and a British Battery of JMountain Artillery were employed.
This fact has without doubt, considerably raised the prestige
of the Indian Army on the Frontier and increased the es^'it-
de-corf s of the troops engaged.
CHAPTER XII.
Lessons of the Campaign.
The chief lesson of the campaign of 1919-1920 is that
although a force may be equipped with the most modern
weapons and appliances it cannot command success unless
its men are well trained and its officers lead them in accordance
with the time-honoured and proved principles of war as record-
ed in our regulations. Powerful modern weapons demand a
higher standard of intelligence in their employment and a
higher standard of technical efficiency in their actual use
than our troops had been trained up to before their introduc-
tion. Further, it must be recognized that the rifle and bayonet
are the sheet anchor of the infantryman and that all other
weapons are merely auxilliary to these two. Partially, or
badly, trained troops are apt to place undue reliance on these
subsidiary weapons, even though they are far from expert
in their use, to tlie detriment, in time of emergency, of the
proper handling of their main weapon — the rifle.
In the initial stages of the campaign the training of the
infantry left much to be desired. The special faults which
led to ineffective operations and undue casualties are not
new or peculiar to these operations. First and foremost there
was a lack of confidence in the rifle, and power to use it effi-
ciently. Although there were many instances of hand-to-
hand fighting examples of the proper use of the bavonet wore
few and far Ijetween. The fire discipline was bad, resulting
in poor fire effect and a waste of ammunition. The use of
ground and preparation of cover was not properly under-
stood and in many cases neither officers nor men were suffi-
ciently trained in this important respect. In time however,
these difficulties were overcome, and the iiifautrv were trained
to be keen and alert, ready to apply effective fire to any
target which presented itself. As had been noted in many
former campaigns the chief rcqnircments for an efficient
infantryman are physical and mental fitness, keen eyesight,
supreme confidence in his rifle and bayonet, and ability to
obtain cover quickly, i.e., sam/ar making. ^
In nporations against mol)ik^ and energetic tribesmen
■especially, the following very important principle enunciated
in " Infantry Trainint^ " nnist be observed :
{ 140 )
147
'' The early opening of fire discounts surprise and, wlietlier
in attack or defence, often indicates the position of troops
which would otherwise be unnoticed by the enemy." Ka])id
fire in Frontier Waifare sliould be tlie exception rather than
the rule. The rifieman sliould depend on deliberate aimed
lire, determined to place bullets very close to the spot he
wishes to hit. Trained observers are indispensable not only
to watch the effect of fire but to keep all ground under con-
tinuous observation, so that the slightest indication of the
presence of a hostile marksman shall not be missed. For
volume of fire and covering and surprise fire we should de-
pend chiefly on machine and Lewis Guns.
It cannot be impressed too strongly on young units and
young soldiers that wild firing by day or night is one of the
indications whereby the tribesmen gauge the moral, physical
and professional standard of our troops. It is against units
with indifferent day and night fire discipline that they pre-
pare their more elaborate surprises.
Training in loading and firing with a minimum of exposure
and a maximum of accuracy uphill and down hill, round and
over cover, and from among rocks and boulders are some of
the chief essentials for the preparation of riflemen for fighting
among mountains.
Two tactical modifications of previous practice were intro-
duced with great success — Night advances and permanent
piquets. Night advances were adopted in order to avoid
the casualties which must have been incurred during daylight
in gaining unusually difficult ground commanded by well-
armed tribes-men, and also to use to the best advantage the
short hours of daylight. Prior to these operations movement
of troops by night was* deprecated because it gave away our
advantage of armament and discipline. The enemy's arma-
ment as regards the rifle being equal, and his use in it superior
to that of our troops these advantages passed away from us.
The advantages we gained therefore by night movement
were : —
(a) the enemy was denied the full value from his rifle,
and he disclosed his numbers and positions if he
used it before daylight.
(b) the bewildering effect on an unorganized enemy,
whose lack of discipline prevented adequate j^iquets
to watch our movements especially at night and-
during cold.
148
(c) the enemy was frequently forestalled in the occupation
of important tactical points.
The system of protecting the Lines of Communication by
permanent piquets had the most gratifying results and it is
interesting to record that throughout the operations losses by
enemy action in convoys did not exceed 20 animals. This
is a remarkable result in view of the length of the Lines of
Communication and of the very difficult country through
which they passed.
The svstem has justified its institution by giving us the
following advantages : —
(a) its avoidance of daily encounters to secure the march
of the daily convoy ; encounters which are certain
to be costly w^ith an enemy armed w^ith a high-
velocity rifle.
(b) it avoids fatigue to the troops in scaling difficult
heights.
(c) if well organized this system is less expensive in the
employment of troops than the daily establishment
of both inner and outer lines of protection.
(d) these piquets command the main route which
usually passes through the richest part of the
country, and thus form an efiective and constant
threat to the inhabitants.
(e) it prevents all communication between separated
portions of the country except during the hours
of darkness, and even this can be made dangerous
by the use ot ambushes or offensive patrols from
the larger piquets.
The dangers of the system are obvious and should be
overcome by careful instruction and supervision to prevent
the occurrence of regrettable incidents.
it uiay be possible in the future against a less enterprising
and less courageous tribe than the IMahsuds to revert to
longer daily advances ])rotected by teniporary day piquets.
In the cam])aigii herein described short marches and the
presence of permanent ])i(]uets curtailed our losses to an extent
difficult to estimate, in connection with ])(M'manont ])iquets
the earliest steps should ])c taken to reduce thr original
strengf >h to the lowest limits ; this becomes feasible by the
artificial strengthening of the position occupied by every means
possible.
149
The ])rinciple of daily and nightly •variation in the system
of protection of camps, routes, etc., cannot
Tactics to mystify ^^ known too widely : by its ado])tion
troops are econonused, longer periods oi
rest ensured and the tribesmen ke])t in a state of uncertainty.
In the case of a camp the princiy)le is attained by pro-
Abiding eight inlying ])iquets one night, four the next night,
six the third night, 3 or 4 the following night and so on, ])atrols
round the inside of the perimeter being employed on the
night when less than the maximum protection is provided.
In the case of a Mechanical Transport road, the first day
may consist of maximum protection by piquets, armoured
cars and Lewis Guns and Ford vans, the second day parties
of Cavalry and Ford Vans, the third day armoured cars and
Ford Vans and so on.
It is v\^ell known that the tribesmen, before carrying out a
road raid, study the conditions for some days, and if there is
no variation in the protection they very soon determine where
the weak point or points are. Daily change of protection
leaves the tribesmen guessing and that is the state of mind
we desire to induce.
Until the last two months of the campaign the country
, , , occupied belonged to us by day, but after
dark the tribesmen were at liberty to roam
at their will. This has been the history of all occupations of
frontier territory. In March both in the Tochi and in the
Takki Zam commanders of defence troops on the Lines of
Communication were encouraged to lay ambuscades at night
both on a large and small scale. Eventually there ensued a
fair degree of friendly rivalry between adjacent camps. The
results were very gratifying and were much beyond expecta-
tion. The tribesmen became apprehensive of night incursions
and moved with much less freedom than heretofore. It is
not too much to state that he became the raided instead of
the raider.
To demonstrate the impossible situations which arise during
^ J ^ transition from peace to war, the following
Command and staff. , F rm /-^ i r\m
examples are givea. Ihe Greneral Umcer
Commanding Bannu Brigade at Dardoni, with his communi-
cations cut except for wireless, was constantly being appealed
to by the Civil Authorities and referred to by the Bannu
Military Authorities to deal with incursions of tribesman in
the back areas. Similarly the General Officer Commanding
150
J
Derajat Brigade at Kliiigi was endeavouring to control the
area in his rear which is roughly 00 miles m width and lUO
niiles in lengtii. Both of these conunanders were deeply
engrossed with the situation in their inunodiate neighbour-
hood and should have been free to attend to these matters only.
This condition of all'airs can be obviated by suitable conuuand
and staS arrangements in peace time : the institution of ad-
ministrative coumiandants at Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu,
in touch with local conditions and requirements, would serve
the purpose. On the necessity arising for the General Officer
Commanding and his stafi to take the field, the Adminis-
trative Commandant is ready on the spot to deal with adminis-
trative and defence questions on the Lines of Communication,
while the General Officer Commanding on movmg forward
has the satisfaction of knowing he has left these matters in
competent hands.
For the first time in the history of the North- West Frontier,
aeroplanes were employed extensively against the tribes.
The aeroplanes used were Bristol Fighters, 1). H. 9. A's and
D. H. lO's. It is impossible to overestimate the value of
aircraft in tactical co-operation with other arms. Their
presence alone greatly raised the moral of our troops while
correspondingly decreasing that of the enemy. In order to
obtain the full value of this important factor it is very
necessary that the officers of the Royal Air Force should
be well acquainted with the principles of Infantry tactics,
and of land formations especially those employed in
Mountain warfare. Communication between ground and the
aeroplanes in the air is essential if the fullest co-operation
is to be gained. The Popham panel was found to have
little value for the purpose. The positions of our troops
were indicated by ground strips, but these sometimes fell
into the hands of the enemy. Aeroplanes, when thus em-
ployed in tactical co-operation did considerable damage
and helped in no small nieasui*e towards the success of many
of the acti(ms.
The information obtained from air photographs both
vertical and (oblique was of great tactical and topographical
value, and officers of the land forces would iind their labour
well r(q>aid if they ujidertook the study of
this important auxiliary to the art of tac-
tics. The study should however, Ijc su])])lcincntcd by train-
ing in observation from the air. On the other hand the
151
results from bombing nnd taftical rcconnaisf^anco did not
fulfil expectations. This was largely due to the nature of
the country and the skill with which the tribesman concealed
themselves.
The new 3-7-incli howitzer was used with considerable
effect but the special conditions of Frontier warfare show that
to obtain its maximum usefulness it must be associated with a
direct quick-firing weapon. This may be a mountain gun
or the Vickers machine gun. The latter, however, was not
available with the Force. The Lewis gun was used in its
place on occasion but it cannot be maintained that this is
the proper role of this weapon. The Lewis gun is essentially
a short-range weapon, whereas, what is required is accurate
fire effect at medium and long rifle range.
Throughout the whole Force special attention was paid to
the problem of sanitation and the maintenance of a pure water
supply. To the efforts of the medical officers and the hearty
co-operation of all ranks is due the remarkable results achieved
and the immunity of the Force from the disorders that caused
the heavy casualties incurred during the operations of 1917.
APPEXDIX A.
ORDER OF BATTLE.
South Waziristan Field Force 1917.
Commander .—Major General W. G. L. Beynon, C.B., CLE., D.S.O.
Divisional Headquarters. •
Divisional Headquarters.
Headquarters Section, No. 38 Divisional Signal Company.
1 Pack AVireless Set No. 3 (Wireless) Signal Squadron.
1 Troop, 11th King Edward's Own Lancers (Probyn's Horse).
43rd Brigade.
Brigade Section, No. 38 Divisional Signal Company.
1 Squadron, 11th King Edward's Own Lancers (Probyn's Horse).
2 Sections, 30th Mountain Battery.
1 Section, 1st Mountain Battery.
No. 7 Company, 1st King George's Own Sappers and Miners.
l-25th (County of London) Battalion, the London Regiment.
54th Sikhs (Frontier Force).
1st Rifles Regiment (Nepalese Contingent).
Brigade Supply Column.
45th Brigade.
Brigade Section No. 38, Divisional Signal Company.
I Squadron, 11th King Edward's Own Lancers (Probyn's Horse).
23rd Peshawar Mountain Battery (Frontier Force).
No. 11 Company, 2nd Queen Victoria's Own Sappers and Miners.
2-Oth Battalion, The Royal Sussex Regiment.
55th Coke's Rifles (Frontier Force).
2-lKt King George's Own Gurkha Rifles (The Malaun Regiment).
Mahindradal Regiment (Nepalese Contingent).
Brigade Supjily Column.
Links of Communication Defences.
1 Wagon Wireless Set, No. 3 (Wireless) Signal S(juadron.
1 Pack Wireless Set No. 3 (Wireless) Signal Squadron.
1 Sfjiiadron, Alwar Lancers.
*2\si Punjabis.
40th Punjabis.
1-lMth RusseH'H Infantry.
l-107th Pioneers.
( l.'-'^ )
I
153
Wing l-124th Duchess of Connaught's Own Baluchistan Infantry.
127th Queen Mary's Own Ralucli Liglit Infantry.
Brigade Section, No. 38, Divisional Signal Company.
Outposts.
1 Pack Wireless Set, No. 3 (Wireless Signal Squadron). ^
1 Section 30th Mountain Battery.
l-4th Gurkha Rifles. >^arwakai.
11th Rajputs.
South Waziristan Militia.
2-67th Punjabis 1 t^i • • Tr
South Waziristan Militia / ^^^J^" ^^^^•
, Wing 2-67th Punjabis 1 vr-r it
f South Waziristan Militia J^'^' ^^^^^
South Waziristan Militia, Other Gonial Posts.
2 Sections, No. 154 Indian Field Ambulance "^
No. 25 Combined Field Ambulance (less 1 British ^43rd Brigade.
Section). J
2 Sections No. 2 Amalgamated Field Ambulance 1 ^k v, -d •
1 British Section, No. 25 Combined Field Ambulance J *^^^ Brigade.
Medical Units.
1 Indian Section No. 12 Combined Field Ambulance ") . , -d .
1 Section No. 149 Indian Field Ambulance j ^^^ Brigade.
1 Section No. 2 Amalgamated Field Ambulance ")
1 British Section No. 5 Amalgamated Field Ambu- |
lance. VLines of Com-
1 Indian Section No. 27 Combined Field Ambu- | munication.
lance. J
1 British Section, No. 27 Combined Field Ambulance ^
1 Indian Section, No. 27 Combined Field Ambulance y^ reserve.
No. 17 Combined Clearing Hospital, Jandola.
1 Section No. 2 Amalgamated Field Ambulance, Sarwakai.
l2
APPENDIX B.
ORDER OF BATTLE.
South Waziristan Field Force
Striking Force.
Divisional Headquarters.
Divisional Headquarters.
Headquarters Section Divisional Signal Companv.
1 Wireless Station.
1 Troop, lltli Lancers.
43rd Brigade.
J Squadron, lltli Lancers.
2 Sections 30tli Mountain Battery.
1 Section, Lst Mountain Battery.
7tli Company Sappers.
l-25tli Londons.
Mth. Sikhs.
1st Nepalese.
Brigade Section Divisional Signal Company.
Brigade Supply Column.
45th Brigade.
J Squadron lltli Lancers.
23rd Mountain Battery.
lltli Company, Sappers.
2-Gth Sussex.
55th Rifles.
2-lst Ourkhas.
Mahindradal Regiment (Nepalese).
Jirigade Section Divisional Signal Company.
Brigade Supply Column.
Lines of Communication Defences ,.
General Baldwin's Brigade.
1 Squadron A I war Lancers ~\
94th Infantry ' m. ^
Indian liasn Depot C
1 Wirch'ss Station
Wing 124tli iWuchis, Khirgi.
( 13i )
155
Garrisoned by Frontier Constabulary, Zam,
4Gtli Punjabis *)
107tli Pioneers > Jandola.
1 Wireless Station J
21st Punjabis "j
127th Balucliis [-Advanced L. of C.
Brigade Section Divisional Signal Company J posts.
Under Divisional Headquarters, Base, Dera Ismail Khan.
1 Flight Royal Flying Corps Depot, Depot and Details, Tank.
Outposts.
456 South Waziristan Militia, Wana.
25 South Waziristan Militia, Tiarza.
25 South Waziristan Militia, Karab Kot.
71 South Waziristan Militia, Tanai.
25 South Waziristan Militia, Dargai Oba.
44 South Waziristan Militia, Toi Khulia.
l-4th Gurkhas ^
11th Rajputs. [
1 Section, 30th Mountain Battery )>Sarwakai.
1 Wireless Station |
186 South Waziristan Militia J
Wing 2-67th Punjabis 1 ^rr. - -^ ,
66 South Waziristan Militia j ^^^3^^^ ^^^^•
Wing 2-67th Punjabis \
2 South Waziristan Militia J ^'^^ ^^^^•
56 South Waziristan Militia, Spinkai.
35 South Waziristan Militia, Khuzma.
30 South Waziristan Militia, Tormandu.
20 South Waziristan Militia, Madhassan,
80 South Waziristan Militia, Murtaza.
40 South Waziristan Militia, Jatta.
66 South AVaziristan Militia, Girni.
1 Troop Alwar Lancers, Hathala.
1 Troop Alwar Lancers Potah.
2 Troops, 11th Lancers, Draband.
Medical Units.
2 Sections No. 154 1. F. A. 1 .o j -n • j -
25 C, F. A. (less 1 British Section) /^^^^ Bngade.
2 Sections No. 2 A. F. A. ^
1 British Section, No. 25 C. F. A. / ,^^, ^ . , ...
1 Indian Section, No. 12 C. F. A. \ ^^^^ ^^%^^^' \
1 Section No. 149 I. F. A. J
i Section No. 2 A. F. A. "j
1 British Section No. 5 A. F. A. > Lines of Communication.
1 Indian Section No. 27 C. F. A. )
156
1 British Section No. 27. C. F. A. 'J
1 Indian Section Xo. 27 C. F. A J ^'^ reserve.
No. 17C. C. H., Jandola.
1 Section No. 2 A. F. A.. Sarwakai.
Base, Dera Ismail Khan.
Suitable cases to be evacuated from the General Hospitals to
Rawalpindi as quickly as possible.
APrENDIX C.
Statement showing casualties from 10th May to 15th July 1917,
by itnits.
Units.
British
OtlUlTH.
Jixliaii
OrtUcrs.
Kan
k8.
KolloWCfB.
K.
W.
K.
w. j
K.
W.
M. D.
K. W.
M.
D.
West Surreys
•
1
2-6th Sussex
2
21
1
1
l-25th Londons .
1
3
12
2
11th Lancers
4
. .
23rd Mountain Battery
2
30th Mountain Battery
2
1
11th Eajputs
..
1
4
3
2
54th Sikhs .
..
1
2
5
15
1
55th Rifles .
2
12
1
2-67th Punjabis .
• •
1
72nd Punjabis
1*
..
94th Infantry
3
107th Pioneers .
3
124th Infantry .
1
••
It
• •
■ ■
127th Infantry .
• •
1
••
1st Nepalese
1 ••
3
3
10
..
Mahindradal Regiment
1
1
4
5
26
2
■ ■
2- 1st Gurkhas
1
37
31
4 ..
l-4th Gurkhas .
2
2
2
57
53
59J 4
Supply and Transpor
Corps.
t
1
A. B. Corps,
Cooly Corps
!
3
1
2
Total
3
5
3 12
118
192
63 28 1 ..
2
2
Note. —
K. Killed.
W. Wounded.
M. Missing.
D. Died of disease.
• Accidental.
t Ward Orderly.
t Includes 2 prisoners.
( 157 )
APPENDIX D.
Distribution of Troops in Waziristan on 0th May 1919.
Bannu Area.
Bannu —
31st D. C. 0. Lancers (less 1 Squadron).
1 Sec. G-3 R. M. L. guns.
1 Section 33rd Indian Mountain Battery.
l-103rd Mahratta Light Infantry.
3-6th Gurkha Rifles.
Xos. 5 & 6 Armoured Motor Batteries.
Dardoni —
1 Squadron 31st D. C. 0. Lancers,
1 Section.
33rd Indian Mountain Battery (less 1 section).
• 55th Field Company Sappers and Miners.
l-41st Dogras.
2-1 12th Infantry.
KuRRAM Garhi — Detachment 3-6th Gurkha Rifles.
Northern Waziristan Militia and Frontier Constabulary holding
their usual posts.
Derajat Area.
Dera Ismail Khan —
27th Cavalry (less one Squadron).
27th Indian Mountain Battery (less one section).
l-7Cth Punjabis (less 2J Companys).
2-2nd Gurkha Rifles.
No. 7 Armoured Motor Battery.
Tank—
1 Squadron 27th Cavalry.
1 Section 27th Mountain Battery.
2 Platoons l-7Cth Punjabis.
Manzai —
75th Field Coy. Sappers and Miners.
1-GOtli Punjabis.
Jandola, Khiiuji, Girni, Jatta — 2 Coys. l-7Gth Punjabis.
Southern Waziristan Militia Frontier and Constabulary holding
tlieir usual posts.
( 1^« )
APPENDIX E.
Terms announced to the Wazirs and Mahsuds.
After consultation between the Secretary of State and the Govern-
iiient of India it was decided that no permanent policy could be for-
mulated at that time, and that punitive operations against the tribesmen
in Waziristan should be undertaken without delay. The following
plan of operations was decided on : —
(a) Toclii Wazirs. — Terms as hereunder to be announced at a jirga
to be held at Miranshah on the 9th November 1919. Troops
would advance to Datta Khel and receive a reply on November
17th, 1919. Should the terms be refused, intensive aerial
bombardment and punitive measures by land force would
be taken to enforce acceptance of our terms.
(b) Mahsuds. — Terms as given hereunder to be announced at a
jirga to be held at Khirgi on the 3rd November 1919. Reply
to be given by 11th November 1919. Should the terms be
refused, the whole of Mahsud country would be subjected
to intensive aerial bombardment and if they still refused
to accept terms, punitive operations on land would also
commence, after the Tochi Wazirs had been dealt with,
to enforce acceptance.
(c) Wana Wazirs. — Terms and punitive measures to be held in
abeyance.
1. Tochi Wazir Terms. — The report that an amnesty has been secured
for you by the Amir is without foundation and there is no question of
your country being handed over to the Amir.
2. The British Government will make roads, station troops and
build posts wherever it may deem necessary or desirable in any part
of the Tochi Agency, that is in any places which have been previously
occupied or any places on the Bannu-Datta Khel or Thal-Idak roads.
3. The Tochi Wazirs will not interfere in any way with the construc-
tion of roads within the Tochi Agency. Such roads may be constructed
with any labour the British Government may wish to employ. Should
tribal labour be employed, normal rates of pay will be given, and the
grant of contracts, if any, will be made on the same principle of normal
jates.
4. The Tochi Wazirs will hand back all rifles, ammunition, bombs
and other military equipment taken since May 1st, 1919.
5. The Tochi Wazirs will not interfere with the movement of troops
or convoys within the Tochi Agency, and will not molest aeroplanes
or their occupants flying over country East of the Durand Line.
( 159 )
160
6. The Tochi Wazirs will pay a fine of Rs. 40,000 (Forty thousand)
and the Daurs of Tochi will pay a tine of Rs. 10,000 (Ten thousand).
7. Unpaid allowances will be forfeited and allowances will not again
be granted to the Tochi Wazirs till the British Government are satisfied
of their good behaviour. The allowances will then be subject to re-
consideration as regards both the amount and the distribution.
8. The Tochi Wazirs will deposit as a guarantee of good faith and
for the fulHlment of the above terms, 200 (Two hundred) rifles which
will be retained until such time as the British Government is satisfied
as to their bond fides. These rifles are to be either good Pass made
or of higher class. These rifles will be returnable within a period of
twelve months, subject to the continued good behaviour of the Tochi
Wazirs.
9. All sums already received from the Tochi Wazirs by the Poli-
tical Agents are to be retained.
10. Sepoys and Sowai-s who deserted from the Northern Waziristan
Militia will not be considered outlaws once their rifles have been handed
in. All officers and non-commissioned officers must either hand them-
selves up for trial or will remain liable to arrest w^ien opportunity offers.
1. Mahsud Terms. — The report that an amnesty has been secured
for vou by the Amir is without foundation and there is no question of
your country being handed over to the Amir.
2. The British Government will make roads, station troops and
build posts in any part of the " Protected Area " wherever the Govern-
ment mav deem necessary or desirable. This includes the route from
Jandola to Sanvekai via the Shahur Valley.
3. Mahsuds will not interfere in any way with the construction of
roads within the " Protected Area." Such roads may be constmcted
with any labour Government may wish to employ. Should tribal
labour be employed normal rates of pay will be given, and the grant
of contracts, if any, will be made on the same principle of normal rates.
4. The Mahsuds will hand back all rifles, anununition, bombs and
other military equipment taken since May 1st, 1919.
5. The Mahsuds will not interfere with the movement of troops or
convoys within the " Protected Area " and will not molest aeroplanes
or their occupants flying over the country East of the Durand I.iine.
G. The Mahsuds will pay to the liritish Government a fine of Rs. 10,000
(Ten thousand).
7. Unpaid allowances will be forfeited and allowances will not again
be granted to the Mahsuds till the British Government is satisfied of
thfir good behaviour. The .'lUowancos will then be subject to recon-
sideration as icganls botli tin* anioimt and distiibution.
8. Tln' .Mahsuds will deposit, as a guarantee of good faith and for
the fulfilment of tin* above temis, 200 (two hundred) rifles which will
be retained until such time as the British Government is satisfied as
161
to their ho7id fides. These rifles are to be of not less value than Rs. 200
(two hundred) each in the opinion of the Political Officers. These
rifles will be returnable within a period of 12 (twelve) months, subject
to the good behaviour of the Mahsuds.
9. The British Government will not admit of any claims for owing
to payment alleged incorrect measurements of work done on the Gomal
road between October 1918 and June 1st, 1919 or for other work done
for the Military Works Services within the Wana Agency during that
period.
10. For the purposes of the above terms the expression " Protected
Area " will comprise that country lying within the following bound-
aries : —
East. — Bhittani protected area and Bhittani Independent territory.
North. — From a point one mile North of the confluence of the Tank
Zam with the Shahur Valley Westwards to Peak one mile South
of Point 4329 on the Tsappar Garh or Nanaghara Ridge. Thence
Westwards to the confluence of the Sarela Nulla with the Shahur
Valley. Thence along the Ridge to Suraghar. Thence to Point
5822, three miles West-North-West of Sarwekai. Thence to the
small knoll North of the Pass situated half a mile North of Wizha
Ghundai. Thence North-West to Point 6150, the summit of
Minchan Baba. Thence North along the Ridge to Bobai and
Tiarza Post. Thence West-North-West through Point 5551 to
the boundary of Wazir Protected Territory. Reference one:
mile to the half-inch map.
APPENDIX F.
^Composition of the Three Echelons of the Tochi Column on ISth
November 1919.
No. 1 EcJMun —
Column Headquartei*s — Major-General A. Skeen, C.M.G., Com-
manding.
No. 40 Divisional Signal Company, H. Q. Section.
No. 16 Pack Wireless Section.
\\ Squadrons, 31st D. C. 0. Lancers.
1 Section, 4-5-inch Howitzers, R. F. A.
No. 35 Indian Mountain Battery.
55th Field Company, Sappers and Miners.
2-61st Pioneers.
Northern Waziristan Militia Scouts (Cavalry and Infantry).
67th Bri^-ade (comprising — l-55th Coke's Rifles, l-103rd Mahratta.
Light Infantry, 104th Wellesley's Rifles and 2-1 12th Infantry).
Survey Section.
Medical Units.
Supplv and Transport Units.
Also
2-21st Punjabis, and
2-76th Punjabis (less 2 Companies) both from 47th Brigade.
These troops were used for the defence of the L. of C. The
2-76th Punjabis were later transferred to the 68th Brigade
for the Derajat operations and on 21st December joined 67th
Brigade.
.No. 2 Echelon —
Lieutenant-Colonel C. R. Wilkinson, D.S.O., 2-152nd Punjabis,
Commanding.
74th Field Company, Sappers and Miners.
3-34th Pioneers.
2-152nd Punjabis.
No. 6 Armoured Motor Battery.
Medical Unit.
Supply and Transport Unit.
No. 3 Echelon —
Brigadier-General G. Gwyn-Thomas, C.M.G., D.S.O., Command-
ing.
1 Squadion (less 2 troops), 31st D. C. 0. Lancers.
No. 3!> Indian Mountain I>attery (less 1 Section).
43rd lirigadf^ (less 2-152n(l Punjabis) c()mj)rising — (4-39th (Jarhwal
Rifles, 57th Wilde's Rifles, H2nd Punjabis, Medical Units and
♦Supply and Transport Units).
( ir.2 )
I
APPENDIX G.
Troops Comprising Waziristan Force, 1919-20.
Commander —
Major-beneral S. H. Climo, C.B., D.S.O.
Headquarters, Waziristan Force —
Dera Ismail Khan.
Attached troops —
Royal Air Force.
52nd Wing, Headquarters, Dera Ismail Khan.
No. 20 Squadron, Tank and Bannu.
1 Flight, No. 97 Squadron, Mianwali.
No. 99 Squadron, Mianwali.
Details —
Draught Cable Section of 38th Divisional Signal Company.
Draught Cable Section of 40th Divisional Signal Section.
2 Mobile Pigeon Lofts.
Headquarters No. 10 Armoured Motor Brigade.
One Survey Section.
No. 4 Litho. Section.
Striking Force — Tochi and Derajat Columns.
Commander —
Major-General A. Skeen, C.M.G.
Column Headquarters.
Cavalry —
*2 Squadrons, 31st D. C. 0. Lancers.
•fl Squadron (less one troop), 21st P. A. V. 0. Cavalry (for advance-
as far as Kotkai only).
Artillery —
*One Section, 4-5-inch Howitzers, R. F. A.
tNo. 6 Mountain Battery, R. G. A.
fNo. 27 Indian Mountain Battery.
*No. 33 Indian Mountain Battery.
No. 35 Indian Mountain Battery (joined L. of C. defences during
advance of Derajat Column).
• Divisional Ammunition Column.
Safpers and Miners —
55th Field Company.
*74th Field Company.
One Survey Section.
tNo. 4 Photo. Section.
* Tochi Column only,
t Derajat Column only.
( 163 )
164
SigmiJ Utiits —
t38th Divisional Siirnal C'oinpany, H. Q. Section.
*-i(>th Divisional Signal Company, H. Q. Section.
No. 16 Pack Wireless Station.
Infantry —
43rd Brigade. (Commander — Brigadier-General G. Gwvn-
Thomas, C.M.G., D.S.O.).
Brigade Signal Section.
4-39th Garhwal Rifles.
57th Wilde's Rifles.
82nd Punjabis.
2-152nd Punjabis.
67th Brigade. (Commander. — Brigadier-General F. G. Lucas,
C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O.).
Brigade Signal Section.
l-55th Coke's Rifles.
l-103rd Mahratta Light Infantry.
104th AVellesley's Rifles (relieved by 109th Infantry from 68th
Brigade in Derajat Column).
2-112th Infantr>\
Pioneers —
, 3-34th Sikh Pioneei-s.
2-61st Pioneers (remained on L. of C. after Derajat Column
reached Kotkai).
Militia —
♦Northern Waziristan Militia (100 Infantry Scouts and 20 Mounted
Scouts).
tSouthern AVaziristan Militia (100 Infantry Scouts).
Note —
The 2-19th Punjabis
., 82nd Punjabis
,, l-103rd Mahratta Light Infantry
„ 2-1 12th Infantry
were transferred to the L. of C during the latter part of
December. They weie, later on in the operations, replaced
in the force (with the exce])tion of the 2-19th Punjabis who
came from the 68th Brigade and were only with the Derajat
Column for 5 days) by the following battalions who joined
the Column on the dates shown. 2-5th Gurkha Rifles oth
January, 2-9th Gurkha Rifles lOth Jainiary, •l-3rd Gurkha
Rifles 12th Februarv and 3-llth (uirkha Rifles 16th February
1920.
The 3-llth Gurkha Rifles became Column troo])s, while the 3
remaining Gurkha Regiments joined the 67tli Hrigade.
* Toclii foluniii only.
t Derajat ( "oluinii only.
165
Administrative Units with Striking Force.
:Supply Units —
No. 12 Divisional Supply and Transport Head<iuarters.
No. 12 Divisional Troops Su])ply Section.
No. 12 Divisional Su])})ly ( ohiinn Headquarters.
No. 12 Divisional Su])ply Park.
Nos. 7 and 34 Brigade Supply Sections.
No. 381 Bakery Section.
No. 381 Butchery Section.
J No. 71 Bakery Section.
I No. 71 Butchery Section.
Transport Units —
48th, 49th, 66th, 67th (3 troops) and 71st Pack Mule Corps.
3rd Government Camel Corps.
8th Patiala Camel Corps.
52nd, 53rd, 55th and 57th Silladar Camel Corps.
Medical Units —
Nos. 2 and 4 Indian Field Ambulances.
No. 42 Combined Field Ambulance.
No. 1 Bearer Unit.
5 Combined Staging Sections.
No. 3 Sanitary Section.
Tost Offices —
3 Field Post Offices.
Lines of Communication— Fighting Troops.
TOCHI.
No. 1 Section, Bannu Lines of Communication Defences.
Area —
From Mianwali — Kalabagh (inclusive) to Pezu (inclusive) and
Idak (exclusive).
^Commander —
Brigadier-General T. K. Maclachlan, C.M.G.
Headquarters —
Bannu.
Cavalry —
31st D. C. 0. Lancers (less 2 Squadrons).
Artillery —
One Section, No. 33 Indian Mountain Battery.
*2 10-pr. Post Guns.
1 Section, 15-pr. Guns, F. G. A.
1 Section, 6-3-inch R. M. L. Howitzers, F. G. A.
* Later transferee! to No. 2 Section, Tank Lines of Communication.
166
Machine Gun Corps —
No. 5 Armoured Motor Battery
Post Machine Guns.
Injantry —
45th Brigade Headquarters.
Brigade Signal ^Section.
2-4th Rajputs.
2-25th Punjabis.
l-150th Infantrv.
2-154th Infantry.
1 Company, Northern Waziristan Militia.
Supphj Units —
No. 9 Brigade Supply Section.
Nos. 77 and 78 Bakery Sections.
Nos. 77 and 78 Butchery Sections.
Details —
Post Stokes Mortars.
1 Wireless Station.
No. 2 Section, Bannu Lines of Communication Defences.
Area —
From Idak to Datta Khel (both inclusive). Datta Khel was-
evacuated on 25th November 1919.
Commander — .
Brigadier-General W. C. Walton, C.B., C.M.G.
Headquarters —
Dardoni.
Cavah-jj —
2 Squadrons, 31st D. C. 0. Lancers.
Artillery —
No. 33 Indian Mountain Battery (less one Section).
1 Section, 15-pr. Guns, F. G. A.
Saj/})ers and Miners —
74th Field Company.
Ivfantrij —
47tli lirigade Headquarters.
Brigade Signal Section.
2-21st Punjabis.
2-09th Punjabis.
:M51st J\injabi Rifles.
*3- 152nd Punjabis.
Northern Waziristan Militia (less one Company),
Supply Unitii —
No. 70 lirigade Supj)ly Section.
No. 11<» i>rii.'ad<* Supply Section.
167
Supply Units — contd.
No. 157 Bakery Section.
No. 157 Butchery Section.'
Details —
Post Stokes Mortars.
Post Machine Guns.
One Wireless Station.
DERAJAT.
No. 1 Section, Tank Lines oj Communication Dejenccs.
Area —
Darya Khan to Hathala (both inclusive), later from Darya Khan
to half way between Khirgi and Jandola.
€mmnander —
Brigadier-General R. B. Worgan, D.S.O.
Headquarters —
Dera Ismail Khan (later Tank).
{Jaralry —
16th Cavalry.
21st P. A. V. 0. Cavalry (less 1 Squadron).
27th Light Cavalry.
Artillery —
1 Section, No. 35 Indian Mountain Battery.
1 Section, 15-pr. Guns, F. G A.
Machine Gun Corps —
Nos. 6 and 7 Armoured Motor Batteries.
Post Machine Guns.
Infantry. —
62nd Brigade Headquarters.
Brigade Signal Section.
2-90th Punjabis.
2-94th Infantry.
2- 102nd Grenadiers.
2-1 13th Infantry (later moved up to Kotkai and joined No. 2
Section, Tank L. of C).
2-127th Baluchis (later moved up to Sorarogha and joined 43rd
Brigade).
2- 150th Infantry (joined -IBrd Brigade at Kotkai on 29th Decem-
ber 1919).
Southern Waziristan Militia (less detachment with Striking
Column).
Supply Units —
No. 119 Brigade Supply Section.
J No. 395 Bakery Section.
S!.,,-
I No. 395 Butxihery Section.
M
168
Deta ils —
Post Stokes Mortars.
1 Stationary Wireless Plant.
No. 2 Section, Tank Liyies of Comtminicatton Defences.
Area —
From Hathala (exclusive) to Murtaza and Jandola (both inclusive),
later took over area from half way between Khirgi and Jandola
to Ahnai Tangi (inclusive).
Commander —
Brigadier-General J. L. R. Gordon, C.B.
Headquarters —
Manzai (later Jandola and Kotkai).
Cavalry —
1 troop, 21st P. A. V. 0. Cavalry.
Artillerij —
No. 35 Indian Mountain Battery (less one Section).
2 10-pr. Guns (from No. 1 Section, Bannu L. of C.;.
Sappers and Miners —
75th Field Company.
Infantry —
68th Brigade Headquarters.
Brigade Signal Section.
3rd Guides (joined Striking Column on 18th January 1920).
2-19th Punjabis.
2-76th Punjabis (joined Striking Column on 21st December 1919
until 28th January 1920).
109th Infantrv (transferred to 67th Brigade on 17th December
1920).
Suirply Units —
No. 37 Brigade Supply Section.
i No. 390 Bakery Section.
I No. 396 Butchery Section.
Details —
Post Machine Guns.
No. 3 Pack Wireless Station.
Administrative Units on the Lines of Communication.
Headquarters —
jM.sp<*ct(;r GonrTal of Communications. Brigadier-General li. C.
Tytler, D.S.U.
Siynal Units— ]
No. I L. of C. Signal Section.
].. i>{ C. Signal Company (Indian Telegraph Department).
169
Signal Units — contd.
Headquarters Pack Cable Section and one Brigade Section of
40tli Divisional Signal Company.
1 Brigade Section of 38tli Divisional Signal Company.
Technical Units —
Advanced Engineer Parks, Bannu, Tank and Mari-Indus.
26tli Railway Company, Sappers and Miners.
122nd, r26th (one wing), TiTth and 131st Railway Construction
Companies.
Detachment No. 9 Works Depot.
Detachment No. 12 E. and M. Works Depot.
11th Military Works Company.
3rd Punjab, 4th Madras and 5th Madras Works Battalion.
6th United Provinces Works Battalion.
13th, loth, 101st, 103rd and 120th Military Works Labour Corps.
99th, 110th, 112th and one wing 118th Labour Corps.
Su'pfly Units —
No. 21 Force Supply and Transport Headquarters.
No. 13 Divisional Supply and Transport Headquarters.
No. 13 Divisional Supply Park.
No. 13 Divisional Troops Supply Section.
Nos. 33, 35, 36, 61, 62 and 63 Brigade Supply Sections.
No. 13 Divisional Area Troops Supply Section.
Nos. 63, 64, 384, 401, 402 and 675 Bakery Sections.
Nos. 63, 64, 383, 384, 401, 402 and 675 Butchery Sections.
Nos. 22, 23 and 24 Supply Depot Headquarters.
Nos. 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 173, 174, 175, 176, J of
177, 206, 207, 312, 313 and 314 Supply Depot Sections.
Nos. 22, 44 and 45 Supply Workshop Sections.
Nos. 77, 79, 80, J of 82, 135 and 136 Supply Tally Sections.
Cattle Depots at Bannu and Darya Khan.
Transport Units —
64th, 65th, 68th (2 troops), 70th (5 troops), 72nd and 101st (6
troops) Pack Mule Corps.
157th Pack Sub-Division.
58th (4 troops), 59th, 60th (4 troops), 62nd and 69th (4 troops)
Draught Corps.
2nd, 5th, 6th, 7th and 71st (3 troops) Government Camel Corps.
Nos. 7, 9, 14, 30, 36, 37, 38, 40, 42, 49, 50, 54 and 81 Bullock
Half Troops.
3rd, 4th (4 troops), 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th (4 troops), 11th, 12th, 14th
(4 troops), 17th, 18th and 19th (4 troops) Bullock Corps.
81st (6 troops), 82nd and 83rd Local Corps.
1 Horse Transport Companv.
Nos. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 Ford Van Companies.
Medical Units —
British Hospital, Bannu.
M 2
170
MfdicaJ Units — contd.
Indian General Hospital, Dora Ismail Khan.
liidian General Hospital, Tank.
Indian General Hospital, Bannu.
Indian Station Hospital, Dardoni.
Nos. 38, 43 and 49 Indian General Hospitals.
Xos. 7, 21, 38 and 118 Casualty Clearing Stations.
Xos. IG, 25, 27, 43 and 64 Combined Field Ambulances.
Xos. 11, 12, 13, 15, 19, 41 and 43 British and 55, 59, 00 and 66
Indian Staging Sections.
Xos. 19 and 22 X-Ray Sections.
X'os. 4, 8 and 36 Sanitary Sections.
X'^os. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 Bleaching Powder Laboratories.
Xos. 11 and 13 Advanced Depots, Medical Stores.
Xo. 3 Motor Ambulance Convoy.
Xo. 23 Motor Ambulance Convoy (less one Section).
Veterinary Un its —
Xos. 5, 14 and 21 Field Veterinary Sections.
Xos. 26 and 27 Field Veterinary Sections (Camels).
X'o. 4 Base Depot Veterinary Stores.
Remounts —
Remount Depot, Dera Ismail Khan.
Remount Depot, Bannu.
Remount Depot, Tank.
Ordnance —
Advanced Ordnance Depot, Bannu.
Advanced Ordnance Depot, Tank.
Ordnance Transit Depot, Mari-Indus.
Xo. 34 Ordnance Mobile Workshop, Bannu.
Post Offices —
3 Field Post Offices.
I
• APPENDIX H.
Detail of Tuooi'ii advancing through the Ahnai Tangi on the
14th January 1920.
Advanced Guard —
Commander — Licutena;it-Colonel H. Herdoii, CLE. (l-5nt!i
Coke's Rifles).
l-55th Coke's Rifles.
2 Companies, 2-5th Gurkha Rifles.
1 Section, No. 27 Indian Mountain Battery.
Advanced Party, No. 38 Divisional Signal Company" (H. Q.
Section).
Special Flank Guard —
Commander — Lieutenant-Colonel J. D. Crovvdy, 'D.S.O. [(2-5 th
Gurkha Rifles).
2-5th Gurkha Rifles (less 2 Companies).
Main Body —
Commander — Major-General A. Skeen, C.M-G.
1 Troop, 21st Cavalry.
No. 6 Mountain Battery (less 1 Section).
No. 27 Indian Mountain Battery (less 2 Sections).
2-76th Punjabis.
2 Companies, 109tli Infantry.
3-34th Sikh Pioneers.
55th Field Company, Sappers and Miners.
No. 38 Divisional Signal Companv H. Q. Section (less Advanced
Party).
No. 16 Pack Wireless Station.
Survey Section.
Photo. Section, 2nd Sappers and Miners.
Rear Guard —
Commander — Major A. E. Mahon, D.S.O. (attached 109th
Infantry).
109th Infantry (less 2 Companies).
Covering move of Tra^isport on road in rear of Column —
Commander — Brigadier-General F. G. Lucas, C.B., C.S.L, D.S.O.
2-9th Gurkha Rifles.
57th Wilde's Rifles.
1 Section, No. 6 Mountain Battery, R. G. A.
1 Section, No. 27 Indian Mountain Batterv.
( 171
ArrENDIX T
Statement fallowing casualties in the Waziristdu Force jroni '.IGth October
1919 to 1st Ma}/ 1920.
Avciagc
Strength
(whole
Admissions.
Deaths.
•
Force).
Sick.
Wounded.
Sick.
Wounded
Operation Areas.
British officers .
1,094
72
41
8
British other ranks
939
40
1
...
1
Indian officers .
1.294
55
64
...
4
I ndian other ranks
41,843
3,915
1.501
20
74
Non-combatant ranks.
37,870
1,360
39
7
8
Total
83,040
5,442
1,046
27
95
Lima oj Communication
Areas.
British officers .
...
540
12
14
2
British other ranks
...
586
4
0
1
Indian officers .
...
334
U
8
1
Indian other ranks ,
...
14,090
290
441
57
Non-combatant ranks.
...
10,943
26
792
1,261
7
Total
...
33,093
340
C8
1
( 172 )
ATPENDIX T.
Siaiancnt slwuing casualties in the Drrajat Column jrom 11th December
1919 to Sth April 1920.
Killed.
Missingk
Wounded.
T. TAL.
British officers .
.
1
. ' 28
1
40
69
British other ranks
•
.
...
I
1
Indian officers .
.
15
'
08
87
Indiaa other ran"k
Total
323
232
1,574
2,120
366
237
1,683
2,280
( 173 )
APPENDIX K.
OrCANIZATION' and WoRKIXr. OF THE LiNES OF COMMUNICATTON OP
Waziristax Force, 1919-20.
1. Playi of Operations.
1 . 1 briefly the plan of campaign was to concentrate a force of 2 Brigades
at Dardoni early in November 1919 which would move on Datta Khel
and operate in the upper Tochi as eventualities demanded.
Afteu the conclusion of these operations a large portion of the Force
was to move to the Southern Line by road and operate against the
Mahsuds.
2. The following reserves were to be laid in : —
At Bannu 25 days for all troops at Bannu and beyond.
At Tank 15 days for the garrison.
At Dardoni 15 days for the Tochi Column and the garrison.
The numbeis on which reserves of supplies were to be calculated
were : —
Bannu —
British 25,000
Indian^ 4,3,000
Animal.-' 20.000
Dardoni —
British 700
Indians 25,000
AnimaU 13,000
Appendix 1 shows Reserve of Rations, held on 1 March lf'20.
3. On the 15tli Xovember the column marched to Datta Khel.
On 17th Xovember, the Tochi Wazirs conceded to our terms. On the
25th Xovember the transfer of troops to the Southern Line was com-
menced, last Echelon reaching Tank on the 5th December.
2. Lwes of Communication.
1. The lines of communication for Waziristan Force comprised two
lines (see map Xo. 0).
(?) the line from Kalabagh rid Bannu to Dardoni (and later to
Datta Khel) which provided for the requirements of the
Forces which oj)erated against the X^)rthern Wazirs. There
was also a post at Mianwali to meet the reipiirements of
the Royal Air Force.
(?"?') (d) the line fnmi Kalabagh ria Tank to Piazha [{agliza which
served the For(-e operating against the Mahsuds.
(6) Subsidiary to (n) {n) was a line from Darya Khan to Tank.
( 174 )
175
{Hi) ail ofTshoot of (u) (6) to provide for the requirements of the
Force operating against the Slierannis was organized via
Saggu to Draband.
The above liiu's were organized with sections as foHows : —
1. Northern Ijne.
iiccliom and Post^. Adminiatralive Commandants and
Staff.
Kaljjbagh Section. Administrative Commandant
(graded as D. A. Q. M. G.)
Kalabagh to Laki Marwat including Mianwali
post . . . . . . .1 Staff Captain.
Bannu Section. Administrative Commandant
(graded as A. Q. M. G.)
Laki Marwat (exclusive) to Saidgi (exclusive)
It also included Latambar .... 2 Staff Captains.
Idak Section. Administrative Commandant
(graded as D. A. Q. M. G.)
Saidgi (inclusive) to Idak (inclusive) . .1 Staff Lieutenant.
Dardoni Section. Administrative Commandant
(graded as D. A. Q. M. G.)
Idak (exclusive) to Dardoni (inclusive) . . 2 Staff Captains.
Datta Khel Section.* Administrative Commandant
(graded as D. A. Q. M. G.)
Dardoni (exclusive) to Datta Khel (inclusive) . I Staff Captain.
* After the conclusions of operations against the Tochi Wazirs the head of the Line:
of Communication was withdrawn to Dardoni.
2. Southern Line.
Kalabagh Section. As above.
This section was common to both Northern and
Southern Division.
Darj^a Khan Section. Administrative Commandant
(graded as D. A. Q. M. G.)
Railhead to left bank of the Indus including post
at Karlu and Steamer Point. . . .2 Staff Captains
D. I. Khan Section. Administrative Commandant
(graded as D. A. Q. M. G.)
Left bank of the Indus (exclusive) including I Staff Captain D. I. K.
posts at D. I. Khan, Potah, Hathala.
1 Staff Captain, Draband.
Saggu, Draband ...... 1 Staff Lieutenant, Saggu.
Tank Section. Administrative Commandant
(graded as D. A. Q. M. G.)
Tank (inclusive) to Jandola (exclusive) with 1 Staff Captain, with an ad-
posts at Tank, Kaur Bridge Manzai, Khirgi. ministrative Commandant.
(graded as Staff Captain) and
I Staff Lieutenant at each
post.
Jandola Section. Administrative Commandant
(graded as A. Q. M. G.)
Jandola (inclusive) to Piazha Raghza (inclusive) 1 Staff Captain. Posts being
with posts at Jandola, Kotkai, Sora Rogha, administered as in the Tank
Piazha Raghza. Section.
176
3. The establishment sanctioned for I. G. C. Headquartei-s was as
iollows : —
One A. A. and Q. M. G., D. A. A. G. . . D. A. D. V. S.
Two D. A. A. and Q. M. G A. D. Remounts.
Two Staff Captains, A. D. S. and T., A. D. W.,
A. D. R. T., A. D. M. S.
Clerical establishments were completed from civilian clerks. Provost
and Rest Camp establishments were filled as far as possible by con-
valescents.
3. Characteristics of the L. of C in Waziristan Raihcays.
1. Ceitain characteristics of the communication by rail and road
in Waziristan militated against simplicity of working. Goods reachinc:
Mari-Indus have to be transferred from broad to narrow gauge and
ieriied across on flats or else transported across the Indus by barge
or boat and loaded into narrow gauge trucks on the right bank. One
line of supply had to be fed at the expense of the other and that side
where active operations were not in progress was consistently cut down
to a bare minimum. Except for a period in June and July when ferries
cannot carry deck loads, the limiting factor as regards carrying capacity
is the K. B. Railway whose daily average carrying capacity is 650 tons.
The average carrying capacity of the ferry except for a portion of June
and July is approximately 800 tons.
2, Roads. — The main road to Tank runs from D. I. Khan, a place
which is not served by the narrow gauge railway at all. ^Matters here
were alleviated to some extent by laying the Decauville along the D. I.
Khan-Tank Road, thus increasing the tonnage at the expense of the
r(»ad. Lateral communications are also deficient, in that the Advanced
Bases and railheads of Bannu and Tank are not connected directly
either bv road or rail. The necessity for transferring stores from Bannu
to Tank by rail via Lakki Manvat seriously effected the tonnage available
for maintaining the forces from Kalabagh.
3. Movements of troops from Bannu to Tank on the conclusion of
operations in the Tochi were carried out cid Pezu and thence alongside
the railway to Tank. The going from Pezu to Tank is sandy and heavy
and water difficulties are great. Wheeled transport cannot use the road,
but must proceed rid I). T. Khan involving a detour of 80 miles.
4. Kalabagh, the ])rin(;ipal lailwa}' centre fni- Waziristan cannot be
reached by road at all.
5. Forward oommiiuication in the Tociii beyond Hamui consists (»f
£L load for wheeled traffic as far as Datta Khel, beyond which place
DO operations were undertaken.
The road is inadequate as a military road, and there is no alternative
route. A track for jjack transport was made clear {A the metalled road,
from the I^aran rivf-r A iniles out of Bannu, to l)ardo!ii, and \iiivv to
Datta Khfl.
J
177
6. Forward of Tank, there are alternative routes as far as Khirgi,
which consist of a metalled M. T. road via Kaur Bridge to Khirgi in two
stages, and a cross country camel track via Chaisan Kach to Khirgi
in one stage. In addition the Tank-Kaur railway extension has been
successfully used for the carriage of war materiul of all soils.
7. Beyond Khirgi there was a double camel track only, which followed
the Tank Zam for the greater part of its course.
8. Telephonic communication was established throughout the area
with the exception of a trunk line to Kalabagh.
4. Position ojl.G.C.^H.Q.
1. The Headquarters of the L. of C. was at first located at Kalabagh
"but owing to the poor communication by road and rail from Kalabagh,
and the absence of telephonic communication with Force Headquarters,
the L. of C. headquarters was transferred to D. I. Khan on 8th October.
5. The position of depots.
1. The base for the Force was at Lahore and the requirements of the
Force were forwarded via Mari-IiKius (where a Base Transit depot was
established) Kalabagh and to a minor degree via Darya Khan to ad-
vaiiced Depots within the Force as follows : —
(i) Supplies. — Main Supply Depots were located at Bannu for
the Northern and at Tank for the Southern Line.
From the above Depots Reserves of rations, grain, fodder and
fuel, were stocked at Posts as shown in Appendix I attached.
(n) Ordnance. — Advanced ordnance depots were established at
Bannu and Tank.
From these, Ordnance Dumps were established at Dardoni,
Jandola and Sorarogha to meet the requirements of advanced
troops. In addition an officers' shop was opened at the
latter place.
Ammunition Parks were established at Dardoni and Jandola
with ammunition refilling points at Datta Khel and Piazha
Raghza.
{Hi) Engineer Field Parks. — Advanced Engineer Field Parks were
established at Bannu and Tank and from these, Engineer
Dump, were located at Dardoni and Datta Khel on the
Northern Line and at Jandola and Sorarogha on the Southern .
(iv) Remounts. — Remount Sections were established at Bannu
and D. I. Khan with advanced Sections at Tank and Kotkai.
(r) Medical Stores. — Medical Store Depots were located at Bannu,
D. L Khan and Khirgi.
178
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179
(vi) Veterinary Stores. — Base Veterinary Stores were located first
at Bannu for the Toclii Operations and later at D. I. Khan
for the Derajat Column.
{vii) Postal — Base Post-Oflices were located at Bannu and D. I.
Khan.
{viii) ^Stationery. — A Stationery Depot was established at Kalabagh.
(ix) Red Cross. — Red Cross Depots were located at Bannu and
Dera Ismail Khan, with advanced Depots at Tank and
Jandola.
(x) Live Stock. — Cattle Depots were located on the Northern Line
at Bannu, on Southern Line at Darya Khan with a Sub-
Depot at Tank. (Two thousand sheep were received at
Darya Khan daily by special trains from Rawalpindi and
Lahore.) The Depot on the Northern Line was filled by
local purchase.
6. Transportation.
1. The Forces on both the Northern and Southern Line were supplied
mainly through Kalabagh through which an average of 600 tons and
200 personnel and a maximum of 680 tons and 180 personnel were trans-
ported to Bannu and Tank.
Owing to the limited receiving capacity at Mari-Lidus only 60 broad
gauge wagons could be discharged daily by direct transhipment or into
the small transit dumps.
Small reserves of supplies (fodder and grain) and military works
stores '>vere maintained but the lack of regular reserve depots with sidings
caused an uneven flow on the narrow gauge, especially of fodder, and
hence it w^as often found that less urgent military works stores were
forwarded to avoid congestion or the narrow gauge ran below its full
capacity.
It is to be noted that the Kalabagh-Bannu Railway is not equipped
to take t-he same amount of tonnage to Tank as to Bannu, Vacuum stock
being essential in the Tank section.
2. The Decauville "was able to carry from Dera Ismail Khan to Tank
a daily average of —
160 tons supplies.
1,600 sheep.
100 personnel.
3. The daily average delivered by rail to Kaur Bridge was 250 tons.
A maximum of 200 tons was reached.
4. The average tonnage delivered at the Head of each Line of Com-
munication was as follows :-^
Datta Khel . ... 200 maintenance and reserve.
Piazha Raghza ... . . 100 tons maintenance.
180
5. On the Soutiieiii Line ' going ' in the Tank Zam was paiticularly
bad for pack transport and it became neces.sary to work camels on a
J basis (instead of the normal i^ basis) and to allow 18 per cent, for
casualties and lameness.
6. The following M. T. (Ford Van) Companies worked on the L.
of C. Against each is shown the approximate percentage of vans which
were in workshops daily : —
per cent.
No. 7 M. T. Company 40
o 29
9 U
„ 10 „ „ 05
„11 „ M 15
19 . 12
All M. T. Companys were worked on a basis of 75 per cent, of fit
cars. Deficiency of personnel in Transport units both in numbers and
efficiencv when" judged on pre-war standards increased considerably
the strain upon the Transport Service.
But despite the difficulties which had to be contended with this
Transport performed very valuable service.
7. Control of Raihvay tonnage.
The supplies by rail to Mari-Indus and Darya Khan were regulated
throuf'h decade tonnaore demands on the Base Lahore and allotments
by the Base.
8. System of Supply to the Striking Force.
1. As the Striking Force advanced it laid in at each place destined
to be a post on the Line of Communication 10 days supply for itself
and the eventual garrison.
2. When a further advance was made, the column lifted forward,
the 10 davs reserve, leaving at each Post 10 days reserve for the
gariison.
3. After the completion of the above arrangements the Line of
Communication was extended to include each post in succession and
an Administrative commandant was placed in charge.
.V. J /np/ovements to Communications and Rolling Stock.
1. J la 1 1 u:ay 8. —Additional sidings were placed in the Depots at Mari
Lidus, Darya Khan, Bannu and Tank.
A Decauville Railway was laid between D. I. Kiian and Tank.
Narrow gauge and Decauville trucks were cribbed for fodder.
in addition a proportion of Decauvillf trucks were converted for
evacuation of the sick, for carria-^.' of sheep and also for piMSonnel.
•2. Roads.- T\w road Darya Khan-D. L Khan was grassed.
181
The road Hathala-Draband was improved so as to take ambulance
motors.
A motor road was constructed from Manzai to Khirgi and later
extended to Jandola. The track from Jandola to Piazha Raghza was
also improved.
10. Reinforcements.
1. A dailv average of 200 personnel including civilian traffic waa
conveyed by the K. B. Railway to Bannu and Tank.
The Decauville Railway was capable of carrying 100 personnel in
addition to supplies and live stock thus doing away with the route
march from D. I. Khan to Tank.
Thus it was found easy to forward expeditiously all reinforcements
even at the greatest time of pressure.
2. Advanced Base Camps were situated at Bannu, D. I. Khan and
Tank where all deficiencies in clothing and equipment reinforcements
were made good.
Rest, Reinforcement and Convalescent Camps were located as
shown in Sub-Appendix II attached.
11. Sanitation.
At all places on the L. of C. sufficient arrangements were made
for incineration and bathing but on account of the great number of
transport animals employed, sanitation was difficult. The difficulty
was partly met by employing local labour and splitting up Sanitary
Sections to supervise. Early in the year a considerable reinforcement
of sweepers was received from India and sanitation was placed on a
satisfactory basis.
12. Water Supply.
It was found necessary in all places to improve the water supply
to enable troops to obtain puie water. Force pumps, pulsometres and
engines were installed, tube wells sunk and all water vvas chlorinated
in masonary or iron tanks provided for the purpose. Where an exten-
sive pipe system was not laid and where it was possible to use water
carts, these were employed to facilitate a pure supply of drinking water
for the troops. The existing supply of drinking water for the echelons
at Shah Baz Khel and Abizar during their march from Bannu via Pezu
and Abizar to Tank, was the most precarious but this was supplemented.
by water being lun out in tanks from Tank along the K. B. Railway.
13. Medical
1. The!^means of evacuation employed vrere camel kajawah, motor
ambulance, ambulance train (both narrow and broad gauge) and
Decauville (in specially converted trucks). Hospital accommodation
proved adequate for the troops w^hose health as a whole was good.
182
2. Owing to an epidemic of Influenza, congestion did arise, and a
further congestion arose as the echelons maiclied from the Tochi to the ^
Perajat. Cases were not usually evacuated from the Forces to Rawal H
Pindi unless the number of cases increased to such an extent as to congest ■
hospitals. Indian General Hospitals were never unduly empty hut
"were kept as full as safety allowed.
14. Canteens,
1. Monro Canteens were located at Mari-Indus and Kalabagh and
proved of great value. I
2. At Darya Khan, Bannu, Tank and Kaur Bridge all troops arriving
bv rail were served with hot tea before marching to Rest Camps.
3. Branches of Madan's Canteen were opened under the direction of
the S. and T. at—
Kalabagh ....... (Headquarters with one montli's
reserve.)
Bannu • . • • • • ^^
D. I. Khan
Tank .....*•
Manzai .....•• S-Endeavour was made to keej)
Jandola up one week's supply.
Kotkai . . . . . • . I
Piazha Raghza . . . . . -J
There was also a Canteen with the Derajat Column at Ladha.
15. Messes and Clubs Library.
1. Standard messes with folding furniture, crockery and servants
complete were established at places mentioned in A])pcndix F attached
and contributed greatly to the comforts of B. Os. and B. 0. Ks.
A convenient unit was found to be : —
A me.ss for 12 B. Os. (expandable to 18 B. Os).
A mess for 20 ?>. O. Rs.
Soldiers Clubs were located at D. I. Khan, Bannu and Tank.
2. A circulating Library for Indian Troops existed at I). I. Khan.
Ifj. Dairies.
Dairies were located at Kalabagh, Bannu, J). 1. Kli.m, Tjink and
Jandola which sufficed for Hos))ital requirements, the stirphis (if any)
being Hold to l>. Os. and I>. O. I<«. meHwes.
183
• 17. Labour.
The labour organization was not altogether satisfactory, as no labour
control either as a separate directorate, or as a branch of the S. and
T. control was established. The D. A. and Q. M. G. or the I. E. S.
had no one of technical knowledge or whole time officer, to study the
economical use of labour. (Note. — The future labour organization now
specified provides for this and for the general principles of labour orga-
nization as a Q. M. G.'s Service.)
18. Miscellaneous Personnel.
The want of employment companies and followers' companies was
much felt, a unit is required by which the many miscellaneous require-
ments in personnel outside organised services, can be furnished. [Note,
— This is being organised.)
Sub-Appendix I.
Reserves of Rations.
Held on 1st March.
Tank bne
1
Ladha .
10 days.
Piaza Raghza
. 10 „
Sorarogha
. 10 „
Kotkai .
. 10 „
Jandola
Khirgi .
30 „
30 „
for its garrison and all
beyond.
*
Manzai .
30 „
Kaur Bridge .
30 „
Tank .
D. I. Khan .
30 „
40 „
for its garrison and
certain minor cons-
tabulary posts and
10 days for its garri-
son and all posts up
to Ladha.
Bannu line
Dardoni
30 „
Idak .
30 „
Saidgi .
30 „
Bannu .
40 „
for its garrison and
10 days for all posts
beyond.
^ N.B. — Lately reserves have been increased to 60 days across the Indus, the surplas
l)eing kept at Tank and Bannu and at Dera Ismail Khan for that Post.
N
184
Sub-Appendix TT
The following table shows the accoinmodation provided in Rest,
Reinforcement and Convalescent Camps at the various posts on the
Line of Communication : —
Accommodation.
Nature of Camps
Place.
B. Os.
B. 0. Rs.
I. A. 0. Rs
Mari Indus
Rest
20
40
950
Kalabagh
Rest
60
18
824
Bannu
Rest
32
140
420
Bannu
Reinforcement Con-
valescent.
...
...
300
Idak
Rest
6
100
Dardoni .
Rest
...
50
300
Darj-a Khan
Rest
14
80
760
Darya Khan
Reinforcement
28
400
1480
D. I. Khan
Rest
40
200
900
D. I. Khan
Reinforcement
...
...
90a
D. I. Khan
Convalescent .
...
...
900
Tank
Rest and Reinforce-
ment.
50
48
920-
Tank
, Convalescent .
...
...
140
Kaur Bridge .
Rest . . .
...
...
190
Manzai .
Rest
12
20
200
Maiizai .
Convalescent .
...
...
100
Khirgi .
Rest
40
1()
600
Jandoia.
Rest
40
32
600
Reinforcement
...
...
300
Convalescent
...
...
388
Kotkai .
Rest
10
18
300
8orarogha
Kent
15
2.-)
200
Piaza Pva^hz.'i
Rest
11
:{<»
2tt0
185
Sub-Appendix III,
List
of Messes administered by Inspector of Messes.
•
Place.
B. 0.
B. 0. R.
Tank line.
Darya Khan
24
20
D. I. Khan .
24
20
Tank .
12
20
Tank .
24
Kaur Bridge
12
20
Manzai
12
20
Khirgi
12
20
Jandola
12
20
Jandbla
12
...
Kotkai
12
20
Sorarogha* .
12
20
Derajat Column
12
...
Draband
Ba nnu line
12
...
Mari-Indus .
12
20
Kalabagh
12
20
Kalabagh
24
...
Bannu
.
•
36
40
Dardoni
12
* For the use of British Service Officers attached to the Column.
APPENDIX L.
3Iaiti suh-diviswns ctf Darwesh Khel ]yazirs and Mahsuds with fighting
strengths.
UTMAXZAl (Torin) WAZIKS.
Tribe.
isub- tribe.
riaee of residence.*
r Madda Khel (2,000) .
Ibrahim Khel (5,600) < Manzar Khel (400)
( Tori Khel (3,200) .
I
" BakkaKhel (1,000) .
1
I
I
■Waii Khel (5,000) .-< , Jani Khel (1,000)
Kabul Khel (including Malik-
shahi) (3,000).
Bora Khel (1,000)
Alohmit Khel (2,880) ■{ Wuzi Khel (800)
KhaddarKhel (080)
Hassan Khel (400)
Khaza Valley. Maizar and
Siieranni.
Between Datta Khel and Mami
Rogha, head of Khaisora.
Spinwani on Kaitu, across
Tochi and Khaisora Valleys
to mouth of Shaktu.
Majority in Bannu District
near mouths of Tochi and
Khaisora. Some in Shawal
Plain (S. of Maizar).
Bannu District near mouth of
Khaisora with grazing lands
near Shawal.
In winter on Kurram between
Thai and Zarwam. Summer
in Birmal (Afghanistan).
Sheratala Plain and Palosin
plain in Kaitu. Summer
quarters — head of Khaisora
Head of Khaisora
Tochi between Datta Khel
and Sheranni.
Kaitu Valley. Migrate to
Laram Range on Khost
border in Summer.
* The groat majority of both Tochi and Wana Wazirs are nomadic and migrate
■every year with their families to their summer grazing grounds, which are in some
cases in British territory.
AHMADZAI (wana) WAZIRS.
Tribe.
Sub-tribo.
Place of residence.
IspeiHta (1,300) .
Bannu District. Summer
Kalu Khel (8,500)
quarters Shakai Plain and
head of Kiiai.sora.
Nasradin (7,200)*
Wana Wazir.><. Have settle-
ments N. of Bannu.
^
Hathi Khel (2,000)
N. E. of Jiannu. Possess
Shiin (Sani) Khel
land in Wana and Shakai.
(3,400).
I
Sirki Khel (800) .
Bannu and Wana.
Umarzai (<500) .
Bannu District. Shaktu
Valley n<'ar Mandanwam.
Urazr their Hocks near l^az-
mak in Sumnier.
*>ia.srailin (mi.hm Suh-(iivi«ions; : —
Shadi Khel —
Kl.ojal Khel (170).
Jioirii Kli«l (3,:{.0())—
Ziilll Khel (l.2()(t).
Tojiyu (or 'J'aji) Khel (1,«jUU)
( 1«<1 )
187
MAHSUDS.
Tribo.
Mahsuds.
Alizai (4,o00) .
Bahlolzai (4,500)
Shaman Khcl .
ISub- tribo.
Manzai (3,000)
ShabiKhcl (1,600)
NanaKhel (1,500)*
Aimal Khcl (2,000)*
vShingi (1,000) .
Band Khcl (300)
ChaharKhcl (600)
Khalu Khcl (300)
Galeshai (700) .
Badanzai (300) .
I'Licc of icKidcuco
Mostly between th(i two bran-
ches of the Tank Zam and
along 8haliur.
No 6e|)arato settlements —
>• scattered over Mahsud
country.
* Nana Khel (main siib-divisions) : —
Abdur Rahman Khel.
Nokzan Khel.
Haibat Khel.
Jalal Khel.
Kikarai.
Gigar Khel.
Umar Khel.
Urmar Khel
* Aimal Khel (main sub-divisions)
Abdullai.
MaHkshahi.
Nazar Khel.
I
O
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THE MAHSUD GAMPAIGJiT.
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NEW 1 Inch Survey
JANDOLA TO MAKIN
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